


# Seismic Performance Evaluation of Water Supply Systems

by  
Yu Wang and Thomas D. O'Rourke



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Yu Wang<sup>1</sup> and Thomas D. O'Rourke<sup>2</sup>

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- 1 Assistant Professor, Department of Building & Construction, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon, Hong Kong; former Ph.D. Candidate, School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Cornell University
- 2 Thomas R. Briggs Professor of Engineering, School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Cornell University

MCEER

University at Buffalo, The State University of New York

Red Jacket Quadrangle, Buffalo, NY 14261

Phone: (716) 645-3391; Fax (716) 645-3399

E-mail: [mceer@buffalo.edu](mailto:mceer@buffalo.edu); WWW Site: <http://mceer.buffalo.edu>

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
## Preface

The Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research (MCEER) is a national center of excellence in advanced technology applications that is dedicated to the reduction of earthquake losses nationwide. Headquartered at the University at Buffalo, State University of New York, the Center was originally established by the National Science Foundation in 1986, as the National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research (NCEER).

Comprising a consortium of researchers from numerous disciplines and institutions throughout the United States, the Center's mission is to reduce earthquake losses through research and the application of advanced technologies that improve engineering, pre-earthquake planning and post-earthquake recovery strategies. Toward this end, the Center coordinates a nationwide program of multidisciplinary team research, education and outreach activities.

MCEER's research is conducted under the sponsorship of two major federal agencies: the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), and the State of New York. Significant support is derived from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), other state governments, academic institutions, foreign governments and private industry.

MCEER's NSF-sponsored research objectives are twofold: to increase resilience by developing seismic evaluation and rehabilitation strategies for the post-disaster facilities and systems (hospitals, electrical and water lifelines, and bridges and highways) that society expects to be operational following an earthquake; and to further enhance resilience by developing improved emergency management capabilities to ensure an effective response and recovery following the earthquake (see the figure below).



A cross-program activity focuses on the establishment of an effective experimental and analytical network to facilitate the exchange of information between researchers located in various institutions across the country. These are complemented by, and integrated with, other MCEER activities in education, outreach, technology transfer, and industry partnerships.

*This report describes an evaluation process for simulating the seismic performance of large geographically distributed water supply systems and characterizing their performance in terms of reliability and serviceability. The evaluation process makes use of probabilistic seismic hazard analysis tools, theoretical and empirical relationships of pipeline responses, hydraulic analysis of heavily damaged water networks, and multi-scale simulations of complex water systems. The process provides information for decision makers to assess the economic and social impacts of lifeline disruptions due to earthquakes, and works in combination with a computer code, Graphical Iterative Response Analysis for Flow Following Earthquakes (GIRAFFE) developed by the authors to simulate heavily damaged pipeline networks and presents the simulation results in GIS format. The framework for decision-making presented in this report describes five basic activities: seismic hazard characterization, system definition, system component response evaluation, global system response evaluation, and consequences assessment. The methodology was applied to evaluate the seismic performance of the water supply operated by the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP). The results of the analysis show that the five water districts in the LADWP have significantly different seismic risks and deteriorate to various extents after a 24-hour period following an earthquake. These differences in serviceability and reliability are consistent with the geographical position of the districts in relationship to the seismic faults and their capacity for water storage.*

## ABSTRACT

This report deals with the seismic performance evaluation of water supply systems. An evaluation process is developed for simulating the seismic performance of a large, geographically distributed water supply system and characterizing the performance in terms of system reliability and serviceability. The process makes use of probabilistic seismic hazard analysis, theoretical and empirical relations to estimate pipeline response, hydraulic analysis for heavily damaged water systems, and multi-scale simulations of complex water systems. It provides output that is beneficial for system management and decision-making and necessary for economists and social scientists to assess the economic and community impacts of lifeline disruption by earthquakes.

A general model is presented for the longitudinal force and pullout induced in underground pipelines/conduits by seismic body waves. The model provides a definition for pipelines that are either relatively rigid or flexible in the axial dimension with respect to seismic ground deformation. Both finite element and simplified models are presented that account for the effects of peak ground velocity, wave propagation velocity, predominant period of seismic excitation, shear transfer between soil and conduit, axial stiffness of the conduit, and pullout and compressive capacity of conduit joints. In total, 320 finite element runs were performed to account for different combinations of ground conditions, pipeline properties, and seismic wave characteristics. Dimensionless plots were developed from the simulations that facilitate the computation of relative slip at pipeline joints and connections between tunnels and underground facilities.

The seismic performance was evaluated for the water system operated by the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP), and the results show that the system risk curve without storage water loss varies almost linearly in the semi-logarithmic scale. The results show that the system deteriorates rapidly when storage water losses in tanks are modeled by a 24-hour period of pipeline leakage. The system serviceability index (SSI), which is defined as the ratio of the sum of satisfied water demands after an earthquake to that before an earthquake, decreases significantly. After a 24-hour period of running tanks, the SSI associated with a 475-

year recurrence interval decreases from 0.79 to 0.42. The number of scenario earthquakes that have contributions to the system risk increases as the recurrence interval for the risk decreases. As the recurrence interval decreases, or SSI increases, the contributions increases from scenario earthquakes with relatively large distances from originating faults to the system. The five water districts in LADWP system have significantly different risk curves and deteriorate to various extents after a 24-hour period of running tanks. The difference among the water district serviceability and reliability is consistent with their relative positions and the concentration of most water storage tanks in the system and with the north to the south water flow pattern in the LADWP water supply system.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION	TITLE	PAGE
<b>1</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION</b> .....	<b>1</b>
1.1	Background.....	1
1.2	Objectives .....	6
1.2.1	Framework for Earthquake Effects on Lifelines. ....	6
1.2.2	Seismic Hazard Characterizations of LADWP System.....	7
1.2.3	Seismic Body Wave Effects on Pipelines.....	8
1.2.4	Prototype for Water Supply System Seismic Performance Evaluation.....	8
1.2.5	Seismic Performance Evaluation of LADWP Water Supply System .....	9
1.3	Scope .....	10
<b>2</b>	<b>FRAMEWORK FOR EARTHQUAKE EFFECTS ON LIFELINES</b> .....	<b>13</b>
2.1	Introduction .....	13
2.2	Lifelines.....	13
2.2.1	Geographical Dispersion .....	14
2.2.2	Interconnectivity.....	15
2.2.3	Diversity .....	16
2.2.4	Interdependencies .....	18
2.3	Framework for Earthquake Effects on Lifelines .....	18
2.3.1	Seismic Hazards .....	19
2.3.2	System Characteristics.....	24
2.3.3	Seismic Demand / System Interaction.....	25
2.3.4	System Response.....	26
2.3.5	Consequences .....	27
2.3.6	Interaction.....	30
2.4	Summary.....	30

## TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

SECTION	TITLE	PAGE
<b>3</b>	<b>LADWP SEISMIC HAZARD CHARACTERIZATIONS.....</b>	<b>33</b>
3.1	Introduction .....	33
3.2	Seismic Hazard Characterizations in California.....	34
3.2.1	Basic Steps of Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis.....	34
3.2.1.1	Earthquake Sources .....	36
3.2.1.2	Seismicity Recurrence Characteristics for Each Source.....	36
3.2.1.3	Ground Motion .....	37
3.2.1.4	Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Curves .....	37
3.2.1.5	Treatment of Uncertainties .....	38
3.2.2	California Earthquake Sources .....	39
3.2.3	California Seismicity Recurrence Characteristics .....	42
3.2.4	Attenuation Relationships for California.....	43
3.2.4.1	Abrahamson and Silva (1997) Attenuation Relationship.....	44
3.2.4.2	Boore et al. (1997) Attenuation Relationship.....	47
3.2.4.3	Sadigh et al. (1997) Attenuation Relationship.....	48
3.2.4.4	Campbell and Bozorgnia (2003) Attenuation Relationship .....	49
3.2.5	California Seismic Hazards. ....	52
3.3	LADWP Seismic Hazard Characterizations.....	53
3.3.1	Limitation of Applying USGS 2002 Dataset to Lifeline Systems.....	54
3.3.2	Development of 59 Scenario Earthquakes.....	56
3.3.2.1	Control Points .....	56
3.3.2.2	Ground Motion Parameters .....	58
3.3.2.3	Selection of Scenario Earthquakes .....	59
3.3.2.4	Optimized Annual Frequencies of Occurrence .....	60
3.3.2.5	Comparison of Seismic Hazards between USGS 2002 Dataset and 59 Scenario Earthquakes .....	64
3.3.3	Strong Ground Motion Data.....	66



## TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

SECTION	TITLE	PAGE
3.4	Seismic Demands on LADWP System Components .....	68
3.4.1	Data Interpolation .....	69
3.4.2	Correction for Site Conditions.....	71
3.4.3	Seismic Demands on Link-type Components .....	77
3.4.4	Seismic Demands on Node-type Components .....	78
3.5	Summary.....	78
<b>4</b>	<b>SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS OF LADWP WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM .....</b>	<b>81</b>
4.1	Introduction .....	81
4.2	Physical Characteristics.....	81
4.2.1	System Structure.....	82
4.2.1.1	Subsystems .....	82
4.2.1.2	Pressure Zones.....	86
4.2.2	Water Flow Pattern.....	89
4.2.2.1	Water Sources.....	89
4.2.2.2	Aqueduct Systems .....	90
4.2.2.3	Van Norman Complex.....	93
4.2.2.4	Major LADWP Trunk Lines.....	99
4.2.2.5	MWD Feeders and MWD/LADWP Connections .....	102
4.3	Operational Characteristics .....	105
4.3.1	Physical Components of H2ONET Hydraulic Network Model .....	106
4.3.2	Operational Aspects of H2ONET Hydraulic Network Model .....	107
4.3.3	Simulation Scenarios of H2ONET Hydraulic Network Model.....	109
4.4	Summary.....	111

## TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

SECTION	TITLE	PAGE
<b>5</b>	<b>SEISMIC BODY WAVE EFFECTS ON PIPELINES .....</b>	<b>113</b>
5.1	Introduction .....	113
5.2	Seismic Body Wave Characteristics.....	114
5.2.1	Typical Strong Motion Ground Velocity Record.....	114
5.2.2	Near Source Strong Ground Motion Characteristics.....	116
5.2.3	Resolution of Particle and Wave Velocities Relative to Pipeline.....	120
5.3	Seismic Wave Interactions with Pipelines.....	121
5.3.1	Analytical Model.....	123
5.3.2	Finite Element Model.....	127
5.3.2.1	FE Analysis Setup .....	127
5.3.2.2	Flexible Pipe Behavior .....	129
5.3.2.3	Rigid Pipe Behavior .....	129
5.3.2.4	$\epsilon_{pmax}/\epsilon_{gmax}$ and f/EAR Relationship.....	131
5.3.3	Calculating Shear Transfer f.....	132
5.3.4	Typical Range of f/EAR for Water Trunk Lines.....	134
5.3.5	Model Applications .....	135
5.4	Seismic Body Wave Interaction with JCCPs .....	136
5.4.1	Performance of JCCPs during Previous Earthquakes.....	136
5.4.2	JCCP Characteristics .....	138
5.4.2.1	JCCP Joint Details.....	138
5.4.2.2	Axial Pullout Capacity Immediately after Construction .....	138
5.4.2.3	Joint Movement after Construction and Existing Cracked Joints .....	145
5.4.2.4	Axial Tensile Resistance .....	148
5.4.3	Simplified Model for JCCPs with Existing Cracked Joints .....	150
5.4.4	Finite Element Model for JCCPs with Existing Cracked Joints.....	154
5.4.4.1	FE Analysis Setup .....	154
5.4.4.2	FE Analysis Example .....	156

## TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

SECTION	TITLE	PAGE
5.4.4.3	Parametric Studies .....	158
5.4.4.4	Universal $\delta_j/\delta_0$ and $f/EAR$ Relationship .....	161
5.4.5	Simplified Model for JCCPs without Existing Cracked Joints .....	163
5.4.5.1	Seismic Body Wave Propagation along JCCPs.....	163
5.4.5.2	Relative Joint Displacement .....	167
5.4.6	Effect of Mortar Cracking Strain.....	170
5.5	Seismic Body Wave Interaction with Pipelines Containing Locally Weak Joints .....	173
5.5.1	Locally Weak Joint Characteristics .....	174
5.5.2	Simplified Model.....	176
5.5.3	Finite Element Model .....	176
5.6	Model Applications to Other Linear Structures .....	180
5.7	Summary.....	180
<b>6</b>	<b>SYSTEM RESPONSE EVALUATION WITH GIRAFFE .....</b>	<b>185</b>
6.1	Introduction .....	185
6.2	Hydraulic Analysis for Damaged Water Supply Systems.....	186
6.2.1	Limitation of Hydraulic Analysis for Damaged Water Supply Systems.....	187
6.2.2	Negative Pressure Analysis .....	188
6.3	GIRAFFE .....	189
6.3.1	Structure of GIRAFFE .....	190
6.3.2	System Damage Simulations .....	192
6.3.2.1	Probabilistic Pipe Damage Occurrence Simulations .....	193
6.3.2.2	Hydraulic Simulations of Pipe Break .....	195
6.3.2.3	Hydraulic Simulations of Pipe Leak.....	196
6.3.3	Treatment of Local Distribution System Damage.....	200
6.3.4	Monte Carlo Simulations.....	204
6.4	GIRAFFE Simulations of LADWP System Performance during 1994 Northridge Earthquake .....	206

## TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

SECTION	TITLE	PAGE
6.4.1	LADWP System Performance during 1994 Northridge Earthquake.....	206
6.4.2	GIRAFFE Simulation Procedure.....	208
6.4.3	GIRAFFE Simulation Results .....	212
6.5	Summary.....	215
<b>7</b>	<b>PROBABILISTIC SEISMIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF LADWP WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM .....</b>	<b>217</b>
7.1	Introduction .....	217
7.2	Evaluation Procedures .....	218
7.2.1	Seismic Hazards .....	218
7.2.2	System Characteristics.....	219
7.2.3	System Component Performance Evaluation .....	220
7.2.3.1	Regressions for Estimating Pipeline Damage .....	222
7.2.3.2	Explicit Trunk Line Damage Simulations .....	224
7.2.3.3	Implicit Simulations of Local Distribution Line Damage .....	225
7.2.4	System Performance Evaluation.....	229
7.2.5	Social and Economic Consequence Evaluation.....	231
7.3	Evaluation Example: Scenario 175 Verdugo Earthquake .....	231
7.4	Risk Curves .....	238
7.4.1	System Risk Curves.....	240
7.4.2	System Risk Deaggregations .....	241
7.4.3	Risk Curves for Five Water Districts .....	247
7.4.4	Risk Deaggregations for Five Water Districts.....	250
7.5	Input Data for Consequence Analysis .....	251
7.6	Summary.....	253

**TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)**

<b>SECTION</b>	<b>TITLE</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>8</b>	<b>SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS</b> .....	<b>257</b>
8.1	Introduction .....	257
8.2	Framework for Earthquake Effects on Lifelines .....	258
8.3	Seismic Hazard Characterizations of LADWP Systems .....	259
8.4	Seismic Body Wave Effects on Pipelines.....	260
8.5	Prototype for Water Supply System Seismic Performance Evaluation.....	264
8.6	Probabilistic Seismic Performance Evaluation of LADWP Water Supply System .....	266
8.7	Future Research .....	268
<b>9</b>	<b>REFERENCES</b> .....	<b>271</b>
<b>Appendix A</b>	<b>TRUNK LINE REPAIRS DURING 1994 NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKE AND REGRESSION ANALYSIS</b> .....	<b>287</b>
<b>Appendix B</b>	<b>RISK DEAGGREGATIONS FOR FIVE WATER DISTRICTS</b> .....	<b>321</b>



## LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE	TITLE	PAGE
2.1	Framework for Lifeline System Performance under Earthquake Effects.....	20
2.2	Physical and Operational Characteristics of Lifeline Systems.....	25
3.1	Basic Steps of Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis.....	35
3.2	Logic Tree Example.....	40
3.3	Major Fault Systems in California.....	41
3.4	Example of Seismic Hazard Curve from USGS 2002 Dataset.....	53
3.5	475-yr Recurrence Spectral Acceleration at T = 1 sec for Rock Sites in California and Nevada.....	54
3.6	Spatial Distribution of 56 Control Points for Seismic Hazard Matching between USGS 2002 Dataset and 59 Scenario Earthquakes.....	57
3.7	Spatial Distribution of the Faults for 59 Scenario Earthquakes.....	63
3.8	Comparison between 59 Scenario Earthquakes and USGS 2002 Dataset.....	65
3.9	Spatial Distribution of Strong Motion Data Grid.....	67
3.10	Contour Surface Corresponding to Mean + $\sigma_{\text{inter-event}}$ PGV at Rock Sites from Scenario 175 Verdugo Earthquake.....	70
3.11	Map of NEHRP Site Classification in Los Angeles Superimposed by LADWP Pipeline System.....	73
3.12	PGV Contour Surface after Site Condition Corrections.....	76
3.13	Map of LADWP Demand Nodes Superimposed by Corrected PGV Contour Surfaces.....	79
4.1	Map of LADWP Water Districts.....	83
4.2	Overview of LADWP Water Supply System.....	84
4.3	Spatial Distribution of Pressure Zones in LADWP System.....	87
4.4	LADWP System Water Sources.....	91
4.5	Aqueduct System and LADWP System Connection.....	92
4.6	Overview of Van Norman Complex.....	94
4.7	Plan View of Water Facilities in Van Norman Complex.....	95
4.8	MWD Transmission and Trunk Lines around Jensen Filtration Plant.....	97
4.9	Major Trunk Lines, Reservoirs, and Tanks in LADWP System.....	100

## LIST OF FIGURES (Cont'd)

FIGURE	TITLE	PAGE
4.10	Major MWD Feeders and LADWP/MWD Connections .....	103
4.11	Statistics on Pipe Diameter in LADWP H2ONET Hydraulic Model .....	107
4.12	Statistics on Pipe Material in LADWP H2ONET Hydraulic Model.....	107
5.1	Ground Velocity Record at Rinaldi Station during 1994 Northridge Earthquake .....	115
5.2	Original and Simplified Sinusoidal Pulses for Strong Ground Motion Record at Rinaldi Station during 1994 Northridge Earthquake .....	119
5.3	Pipeline Subjected to Shear Wave Propagation .....	121
5.4	Sinusoidal Wave Interaction with Pipe Element .....	124
5.5	Seismic Wave-pipeline Interaction for Rigid Pipeline .....	126
5.6	Finite Element Model for Seismic Wave and Pipeline Interaction .....	128
5.7	Shear Transfer and Soil-pipe Relative Displacement Relationship.....	129
5.8	FE Results for Flexible Pipes .....	130
5.9	FE Results for Rigid Pipes .....	130
5.10	$\epsilon_{pmax}/\epsilon_{gmax}$ and f/EAR Relationship.....	131
5.11	Relationship between $\alpha$ and $s_u(CIUC)/p_a$ .....	133
5.12	Cross sections of Representative Joints on JCCPs .....	139
5.13	Close-up Views of Joints and Probability Density Functions for Gasket Positions .....	142
5.14	Probabilities of Exceedance for Initial Gasket Position with MOP = 26 mm .....	145
5.15	Subsequent Field Displacement Exceedance Probability.....	147
5.16	Probability of Exceedance for Combined Initial Position and Subsequent Slip .....	149
5.17	Expanded View of Probability of Exceedance for the Tail Portion of Figure 5.16 .....	149
5.18	Typical Stress Strain Relationship for Mortars under Tension .....	150
5.19	Seismic Displacement and Velocity Interaction with JCCPs with Existing Cracked Joint .....	152
5.20	Simplified Model for Seismic Wave Interaction with JCCPs .....	153
5.21	Finite Element Model for JCCPs with Existing Cracked Joints.....	155
5.22	Pullout Force and Joint Displacement Relationship for Existing Cracked Joints.....	156



## LIST OF FIGURES (Cont'd)

FIGURE	TITLE	PAGE
5.23	Shear Wave Record at Newhall Station Intersect a Section of Pipeline Oriented at N25W.....	157
5.24	FE Results for PCCP in Santa Clarita Valley Subjected to 1994 Northridge Earthquake.....	159
5.25	Universal Relationship between $\delta/\delta_0$ and $f/EAR$ .....	162
5.26	Seismic Wave Interaction with JCCPs without Existing Cracked Joints.....	164
5.27	Simplified Model for Seismic Wave Interaction with JCCPs without Existing Cracked Joints.....	168
5.28	Effects of $V_T$ on Magnitude of Relative Joint Displacement.....	172
5.29	Cast Iron Joint Pullout Test Results.....	175
5.30	Axial Force and Displacement Relationship for Cast Iron Pipeline with Lead Caulked Joints.....	175
5.31	Seismic Displacement and Velocity Interaction with Pipeline Containing Locally Weak Joints.....	177
5.32	Joint Displacement Correction Factor As a Function of Strain Ratio.....	178
6.1	Negative Pressure Analysis.....	189
6.2	GIRAFFE Flow Chart.....	191
6.3	Probabilistic Pipe Damage Occurrence Simulations.....	194
6.4	Schematic Diagram of Pipe Break Hydraulic Simulation.....	196
6.5	Schematic Diagram of Pipe Leak Hydraulic Simulation.....	197
6.6	Spatial Distribution of Six Pressure Zone Distribution Systems.....	202
6.7	Damaged Tank, Trunk Line Repairs, and Water Outage Areas Induced by 1994 Northridge Earthquake.....	207
6.8	GIRAFFE Simulation of the Northern Half of LADWP System.....	209
6.9	GIRAFFE Simulation Results.....	213
6.10	Comparisons between GIRAFFE Results and Monitored Data.....	214
7.1	Regressions of Repair Rate vs. PGV for Cast Iron and Ductile Iron Pipelines.....	223
7.2	Regressions of Repair Rate vs. PGV for Concrete, Riveted Steel and Steel Pipelines.....	224
7.3	Simplifications of LADWP Water Supply System in H2ONET Database.....	226

## LIST OF FIGURES (Cont'd)

FIGURE	TITLE	PAGE
7.4	Spatial Distribution of Mean Pressures for Local Distribution Systems.....	228
7.5	Spatial Distribution of Pipe Breaks and Leaks for Scenario 175 Verdugo Earthquake.....	233
7.6	Spatial Distribution of Increasing Demands for Scenario 175 Verdugo Earthquake.....	234
7.7	Spatial Distribution of Water Outage for Scenario 175 Verdugo Earthquake .....	236
7.8	Spatial Distribution of Water Outage after 24-hour Period of Running Tanks for Scenario 175 Verdugo Earthquake .....	237
7.9	System Risk Curves.....	241
7.10	Spatial Distribution of LADWP Water Districts and Their Centroids.....	243
7.11	System Risk Deaggregations.....	245
7.12	Risk Curves for Five Water Districts .....	248
7.13	Spatial Distribution of Subsystems Utilized in Economic Analysis .....	252
A.1	Spatial Distribution of Trunk Line Repairs during 1994 Northridge Earthquake.....	288
A.2	Welded Slip Joint Damage in LA-25 .....	300
A.3	Concrete Trunk Line Performance during 1994 Northridge Earthquake .....	313
A.4	Steel Trunk Line Performance during 1994 Northridge Earthquake.....	316
A.5	Riveted Steel Trunk Line Performance during 1994 Northridge Earthquake .....	319
A.6	Regressions of Repair Rate vs. PGV for Concrete, Riveted Steel and Steel Pipelines .....	320
B.1	Risk Deaggregations for West Valley Water District .....	323
B.2	Risk Deaggregations for East Valley Water District.....	328
B.3	Risk Deaggregations for Western Water District.....	333
B.4	Risk Deaggregations for Central Water District.....	337
B.5	Risk Deaggregations for Harbor Water District.....	342

## LIST OF TABLES

TABLE	TITLE	PAGE
2.1	Principal Causes and Types of Transient Ground Deformation.....	22
2.2	Principal Causes and Types of Permanent Ground Deformation.....	23
3.1	Characteristics of 59 Scenario Earthquakes .....	61
3.2	NEHRP Site Classification.....	72
3.3	Site Condition Correction Factor $F_{SAI}$ for $S_{AI}$ .....	74
3.4	Site Condition Correction Factor $F_{PGV}$ for PGV.....	75
4.1	Daily Water Consumption of Each Subsystem in LADWP System .....	85
5.1	Near Source Strong Ground Motion Characteristics.....	117
5.2	Summary of Observed Joint Separation in BDPLs .....	146
5.3	Summary of FE Modeling Parameters Characterizing Seismic Wave Interaction with JCCPs with Existing Cracked Joints .....	160
6.1	Occurrence Probability of Different Leak Types .....	199
7.1	Monte Carlo Simulation Results for Scenario 175 Verdugo Earthquake.....	239
7.2	Summary of Scenario Contributions to 475-year Recurrence Risks .....	242
7.3	Summary of Scenario Contributions to 50-year Recurrence Risks .....	246
A.1	Summary of LADWP Trunk Line Repairs during 1994 Northridge Earthquake.....	290
A.2	Summary of MWD Trunk Line Repairs during 1994 Northridge Earthquake.....	297
A.3	Summary of CMWD Trunk Line Repairs during 1994 Northridge Earthquake .....	301
A.4	Summary of CLWA Trunk Line Repairs during 1994 Northridge Earthquake .....	304
A.5	Summary of Repairs in Concrete Trunk Lines after PGD Screening.....	309
A.6	Summary of Concrete Trunk Line Repair Rate According to PGV .....	314
A.7	Summary of Repairs in Steel Trunk Lines after PGD Screening.....	315
A.8	Summary of Steel Trunk Line Repair Rate According to PGV .....	317
A.9	Summary of Repairs in Riveted Steel Trunk Lines after PGD Screening.....	318
A.10	Summary of Riveted Steel Trunk Line Repair Rate According to PGV .....	320
B.1	Summary of Scenario Contributions to 475-year Recurrence Risks in West Valley Water District.....	322

**LIST OF TABLES (Cont'd)**

<b>TABLE</b>	<b>TITLE</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
B.2	Summary of Scenario Contributions to 50-year Recurrence Risks in West Valley Water District.....	324
B.3	Summary of Scenario Contributions to 475-year Recurrence Risks in East Valley Water District.....	327
B.4	Summary of Scenario Contributions to 50-year Recurrence Risks in East Valley Water District.....	329
B.5	Summary of Scenario Contributions to 475-year Recurrence Risks in Western Water District.....	332
B.6	Summary of Scenario Contributions to 50-year Recurrence Risks in Western Water District .....	334
B.7	Summary of Scenario Contributions to 475-year Recurrence Risks in Central Water District .....	336
B.8	Summary of Scenario Contributions to 50-year Recurrence Risks in Central Water District .....	338
B.9	Summary of Scenario Contributions to 475-year Recurrence Risks in Harbor Water District .....	341
B.10	Summary of Scenario Contributions to 50-year Recurrence Risks in Harbor Water District .....	343

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. Background

Lifelines are the systems and facilities that provide services vital to the function of an industrialized society and important to emergency response and recovery after disastrous events (Duke and Moran, 1972). These systems and facilities include electric power, natural gas and liquid fuels, telecommunications, transportation (airports, highways, ports, rail and transit), waste disposal, and water (O'Rourke, 1998). Taken individually, or in aggregate, these systems are intricately linked with the economic well-being, security, and social fabric of the communities they serve.

This report focuses on the seismic performance evaluation of water supply systems. The basic function of a water supply system is to deliver water from sources to customers. A water supply system contains a network of pipes, pumps, and valves that move water from sources to customers, tanks and reservoirs that store water to accommodate fluctuations in demand because of varying rates of usage or fire protection needs, and other supporting infrastructures. A survey of the residents in high seismic risk communities (Nigg, 1998) showed that water pipeline systems, major hospitals, and power systems are ranked as the three most important infrastructure elements in the built environment that must remain operational in the

event of a major earthquake. Those surveyed also indicated that they are more willing to invest in the seismic upgrading of these infrastructure elements.

In urban and suburban environments, most lifelines are located underground. As a consequence, ground movements triggered by earthquakes in the form of transient and permanent ground deformation (TGD and PGD, respectively) have direct effects on the integrity of system components as well as the overall system performance. TGD is the dynamic response of the ground, and PGD is the irrecoverable movement that persists after shaking has stopped (O'Rourke et al., 2005). PGD often involves large displacements, such as those associated with surface fault rupture and landslides. TGD can cause soil cracks and fissures triggered by pulses of strong motion that develop localized shear and tensile strains exceeding the strength of surficial soils. The principal causes of TGD and PGD have been summarized and discussed by O'Rourke (1998) and updated by Bird et al. (2004).

To understand and evaluate system performance during earthquakes, this research was conducted in collaboration with the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP), which operates one of the largest and most complex water and electric power networks in the United States, serving 3.8 million people in an area of approximately 1,200 km<sup>2</sup>. The LADWP system is large, complex, and spatially variable. Therefore, models and simulation procedures that can accurately represent LADWP system performance should be applicable to smaller, less complex systems. The LADWP system contains many different facilities, types of pipelines, ground conditions, and geotechnical and seismic hazards. Procedures developed for LADWP, therefore, will have broader application to other systems where similar components and site conditions exist. Because LADWP operates both a water supply and electric

power distribution network, using the LADWP system provides an excellent opportunity to explore the interrelationship and interdependencies between water distribution and electric power. Because the LADWP system is a real system, procedures developed and utilized by LADWP personnel must take account of practical operational issues, which are an essential part of a functioning water supply and an essential feature of effective modeling for any lifeline network.

Research has been performed on the modeling of water and electric power distribution networks in areas vulnerable to earthquakes. This work includes modeling of the Memphis Light, Water, and Gas (MLWG) lifeline systems in Memphis and Shelby County, TN, which are at risk from earthquakes originating in the New Madrid Seismic Zone (Chang et al., 2000a; Shinozuka et al., 1998; Rose et al., 1997; and Chang et al., 1996).

Monte Carlo simulations of system performance were conducted for earthquakes of different magnitudes and distances for both electric power and water systems in the Memphis area. For the MLWG electric power system, the peak ground accelerations, PGAs, were computed for each earthquake scenario, spatially interpolated, and linked with damage states in electric substations. Ratios of power output in the damaged system to that in the undamaged system, and the number of days for restoration power, were evaluated for various parts of Shelby County (Shinozuka and Hwang, 1998). For the water system, procedures similar to those followed for the electric power system were utilized to estimate the ratio of water flow in the damaged system to that in the undamaged system in a hydraulic network model specifically configured for the piping and facilities operated by MLWG (Chang et al., 2002). The regional economic impacts of the MLWG lifeline system disruption caused

by earthquakes were assessed through a methodology that correlates lifeline losses with areas of economic activity, adjusts for business resiliency (remaining percentage output that can still be produced by a specific industry in the event of total losses of lifeline systems), and accounts for direct and indirect economic losses (Chang et al., 2002). Indirect economic losses generated by seismic damage to lifelines were estimated with Input-Output (I-O) analysis and Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) methods (Rose and Benavides, 1998).

For the LADWP electric power system, methodologies have been developed for evaluating the post-earthquake performance of electric power systems (Shinozuka et al., 2003; Shinozuka and Chang, 2004; and Shinozuka et al., 2004). Performance data for LADWP transformers compiled after the 1994 Northridge earthquake were used to develop fragility curves. Modeling of the LADWP power transmission network was performed with the software IPFLOW, available through the Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI. Monte Carlo simulations were performed for a suite of 47 scenario earthquakes, compiled to represent the seismic hazards for the LADWP electric power system, to estimate the ratio of mean power supply in the damaged network to that of the undamaged network for each LADWP service area for a scenario earthquake. Risk curves were derived from the system simulation and 47 scenario earthquakes, for which the annual frequency of exceedance was plotted relative to the percentage of households lacking electricity immediately after an earthquake. The regional economic impact of the LADWP system power losses were estimated, and the results were plotted by the variation of annual frequency of exceedance as a function of the percent of gross regional product (GRP) in the LADWP service area that would be lost, given the electric power outage in each simulation earthquake.



Earthquake effects on water supply systems have been investigated extensively (Ballantyne et al., 1990; Taylor, 1991; Shinozuka et al., 1992; Markov et al., 1994; Tanaka, 1996; and Hwang et al., 1998), and substantial progress has been made in developing modeling procedures that account for soil-structure interaction (O'Rourke and Liu, 1999), PGD and TGD (O'Rourke, 1998), and system reliability (Grigoriu et al., 1989). Work in San Francisco, for example, has focused on characterizing liquefaction hazards, the interaction between PGD generated by liquefaction and pipeline response, water supply system performance, and effects of water supply performance on fire following earthquakes for both the 1906 San Francisco and 1989 Loma Prieta earthquakes (O'Rourke et al., 1992; O'Rourke and Pease, 1992; O'Rourke et al., 2006; and Scawthorn et al., 2006). Of special note are methodologies for estimating the serviceability of a water supply system heavily damaged by an earthquake (Markov et al., 1994). These methodologies account for the limitation of commercially available hydraulic analysis software in predicting unrealistic negative pressures in a heavily damaged system by eliminating portions of the network containing negative pressures in accordance with the commercially available software.

For the LADWP water supply system, a comprehensive geographic information system (GIS) database, containing extensive pipeline damage and strong motion data during the 1994 Northridge earthquake, as well as approximately 10750-km distribution lines and 1000-km trunk lines, was developed (O'Rourke and Toprak, 1997; and Toprak, 1998). Toprak (1998) explored the spatial relationship between cast iron pipeline damage and various seismic parameters, and he found that the damage correlation with peak ground velocity (PGV) is one with the highest statistical significance. Jeon and O'Rourke (2005) and Jeon (2002) focused on the spatial

variability of earthquake strong motion and its relationship with the performance of water distribution pipelines in the LADWP system. Statistically significant correlations were developed among pipeline repair rate, repairs/km, and PGV for cast iron, ductile iron, asbestos cement, and steel pipe. Ordinary kriging was used to develop regressions of pipeline repair rate associated with 90% confidence PGV. Such regressions provide an explicit means of characterizing the uncertainty embodied in the strong-motion data.

## **1.2. Objectives**

The overall objective of this research is to develop an evaluation process for simulating the seismic performance of a large, geographically-distributed, water supply system and characterizing the performance in terms of system reliability and serviceability. The process makes use of probabilistic seismic hazard analysis, theoretical and empirical relations to estimate pipeline response, hydraulic analysis for heavily damaged water systems, and multi-scale simulations of complex water systems. It provides output that is beneficial for system management and decision-making and that is necessary for economists and social scientists to assess the economic and community impacts of lifeline disruption by earthquakes. There are five principal objectives of this research that are described briefly under the following subheadings:

### **1.2.1. Framework for Earthquake Effects on Lifelines**

A framework for evaluating lifeline system performance under earthquake effects is presented and described. There are five principal steps in the framework,

consisting of seismic hazard characterizations, system property characterizations, system demand / system interaction, system response evaluation, and consequence assessments. Seismic hazards are combined with system characteristics in models that account for the effects of transient ground motion and permanent ground deformation on both above ground and underground facilities. Fragility analyses of system components are used to assess the overall system response, from which the consequences with respect to the broader community of lifeline users are derived. Interaction with other external systems affects the response of the specific system being evaluated. Each of these steps is described, and these interrelationships are discussed. Examples illustrating the application of the framework are presented.

### **1.2.2. Seismic Hazard Characterizations of LADWP System**

An important objective of this research is to describe the characterizations of seismic hazards for the LADWP system and to apply the seismic hazard characterizations to evaluate the effects of earthquakes on the Los Angeles water supply system. A process jointly developed by URS Corporation, MCEER, and LADWP is described to characterize the seismic hazards in the LADWP system using a suite of 59 scenario earthquakes and their optimized annual frequencies of occurrence. Strong ground motions, e.g., PGV, for each of the 59 scenario earthquakes are generated in a grid with 572 points in total and an interval of  $0.03^\circ$  longitude or latitude covering the LADWP water supply system. The PGV contour surfaces are interpolated from these 572 points using local polynomial interpolation, and site condition corrections are followed according to the NEHRP-HAZUS procedures. With the aid of GIS software, the spatial distribution of the LADWP system components are

superimposed on the PGV contour surfaces to determine the seismic demand on each component in accordance with their respective locations.

### **1.2.3. Seismic Body Wave Effects on Pipelines**

A primary objective of this research is to gain insights into the seismic body wave effects on pipelines. A general model is presented for the longitudinal force and pullout induced in underground lifelines in the form of pipelines/conduits by seismic body waves. The model provides a definition for pipelines that are either relatively rigid or flexible in the axial dimension with respect to seismic ground deformation. Both finite element and simplified models are presented that account for the effects of peak ground velocity, wave propagation velocity, predominant period of seismic excitation, shear transfer between soil and conduit, axial stiffness of the conduit, and pullout and compressive capacity of conduit joints. Modeling results for water trunk line performance during the 1994 Northridge earthquake are shown to compare favorably with observed pipeline behavior during that earthquake. In total, 320 finite element runs were performed to account for different combinations of ground conditions, pipeline properties, and seismic wave characteristics. Dimensionless plots were developed from the simulations that facilitate the computation of relative slip at pipeline joints and connections between tunnels and underground facilities.

### **1.2.4. Prototype for Water Supply System Seismic Performance Evaluation**

Another objective of this research is to demonstrate the process of seismic performance evaluation of water supply systems using the LADWP water supply system. Procedures are developed to determine the seismic demands on the system

components, which are compiled into a hydraulic network model. The performance of pipelines affected by transient ground deformation are estimated using regression equations between repair rate and PGV. The Poisson process is utilized to simulate the occurrence of pipe damage, and Monte Carlo simulations are performed to assess system serviceability using a special hydraulic analysis program, GIRAFFE, which is equipped with hydraulic models for pipe break and leak and is capable of eliminating unrealistic negative pressure predicted by commercially available hydraulic analysis software. The evaluation results are organized in the form of system risk curves, plotting the variation of annual exceeding frequency as a function of system serviceability index, SSI, which is the ratio of the sum of satisfied water demands after earthquakes to that before earthquakes.

#### **1.2.5. Seismic Performance Evaluation of LADWP Water Supply System**

Another objective of this research is to provide a probabilistic seismic performance evaluation of the LADWP water supply system. The system risk curves are developed for both the overall system and the five water districts. Significant impacts on the system performance because of storage water losses in tanks after earthquakes are discussed, and the system deterioration that results from the storage water losses is quantified. The risk levels corresponding to 475-year or 50-year recurrence intervals are deaggregated to identify key scenario earthquakes that significantly contribute to the system risks and their magnitudes and distances to the water system. The evaluation results are organized in a fashion that can be utilized by economists and social scientists as key input information in their economic and community impact assessment. More reliable post-earthquake damage scenarios are provided for the emergency response and recovery activity studies, whose main

objective is to minimize the earthquake losses and to effectively allocate the limited resources.

### **1.3. Scope**

This report is divided into eight chapters, the first of which presents objectives and introductory comments. Chapter 2 presents a framework for evaluating earthquake effects on lifeline systems. There are five principal steps in the framework, consisting of seismic hazard characterizations, system property characterizations, system demand / system interaction, system response evaluation, and consequence assessments. Each of these steps is described, and the roles for the various disciplinary professionals are depicted.

Chapters 3 to 7 follow these principal steps and focus on the seismic performance evaluation of the LADWP water supply system. Chapter 3 describes the seismic hazard characterizations of the LADWP water supply system by a suite of 59 scenario earthquakes and presents the procedures utilized to determine the seismic demand on each system component, e.g., peak ground velocity for each water pipeline. Chapter 4 summarizes the system characteristics of the LADWP water supply system, including the physical characteristics, such as system statistics, system structure, and water flow pattern, and the operational characteristics, which are compiled into a hydraulic analysis model provided by LADWP engineers.

Chapter 5 develops simplified and numerical models for the seismic wave interaction with pipelines. Attention is directed to seismic body wave effects on one particular class of pipelines used for trunk and transmission facilities in North

America, referred to collectively in this work as jointed concrete cylinder pipelines (JCCPs). The structural and joint characteristics of JCCPs are described, revealing the vulnerability of JCCPs. Both finite element and simplified models are developed, and the effect of the mortar cracking strain at the JCCP joints is discussed. The models for the JCCP interactions with seismic body waves are expanded to accommodate other type of pipelines or facilities containing locally weak joints.

Chapter 6 describes the system response simulations utilizing GIRAFFE. The structure and capability of GIRAFFE, as well as the verification of GIRAFFE with the observed LADWP water supply system performance during the 1994 Northridge earthquake, are described. Chapter 7 summarizes the process for seismic performance evaluation of the LADWP water supply system and presents the probabilistic evaluation results in the form of system risk curves, plotting the annual exceeding frequency as a function of system water availability to their customers after earthquakes. The final chapter summarizes the research findings and presents conclusions pertaining to this research, as well as some recommendations for future research.





## **CHAPTER 2**

# **FRAMEWORK FOR EARTHQUAKE EFFECTS ON LIFELINES**

### **2.1. Introduction**

This chapter presents a general framework to evaluate earthquake effects on lifelines, starting with a description of lifelines and lifeline system characteristics. The framework is structured around a basic chain of activities that includes the characterizations of seismic hazards and system properties, analyses of the interaction between seismic demand and lifeline component or facility response, and the assessment of system response and its consequences on the regional economy and community institutions. The framework is applicable to hazards other than earthquakes, including natural disasters and human threats.

### **2.2. Lifelines**

Lifelines are the systems and facilities that provide services vital to the function of an industrialized society and important to emergency response and recovery after disastrous events. These systems and facilities include electric power, natural gas and liquid fuels, telecommunications, transportation (airports, highways, ports, rail and transit), waste disposal, and water. Taken individually, or in aggregate,

these systems are intricately linked with the economic well-being, security, and social fabric of the communities they serve.

In general, each lifeline system is a network within which there are sources, major transmission lines, storage, and distribution or collection systems. They are public utilities, each of which has a terminus outside the communities and an extensive matrix of contact or distribution points inside. All lifeline systems share four common characteristics: geographical dispersion, interconnectivity, diversity (O'Rourke, 1998), and interdependencies, which are discussed under the subheadings that follow.

### **2.2.1. Geographical Dispersion**

Lifeline systems are usually constructed over a broad geographic area, where the communities they serve are dispersed, thus, are vulnerable to a broad range of natural disaster hazards, such as earthquakes. Consider, for example, the water supply system in the greater Los Angeles region, which is dispersed over an area of more than 1,200 km<sup>2</sup>. The geographical dispersion characteristic of lifelines has a profound influence on planning and design as compared with those for a building or local facility. The site of a building or local facility can be chosen and / or remediated on the basis of detailed geotechnical and seismic investigations on a relatively narrow area. However, because of their geographical dispersion, it is not practical to characterize and remediate all sites that lifeline systems cover with the same degree of detail. This characteristic constrains the application of models that require detailed and site-specific input information to evaluate seismic performance. This limitation can be lessened by detailed geotechnical and seismic investigations for critical links of

systems, areas that multiple lifelines are co-located, and known locations of geotechnical hazards to provide site-specific input information for seismic performance modeling.

The geographical dispersion characteristic of lifelines also leads to the application of stochastic simulation procedures to assess lifeline performance. Because the exact locations of failure within the systems are not known with certainty, the lifeline performance can not be evaluated on a deterministic basis, but have to make use of stochastic simulation procedures. Quite often, Monte Carlo techniques are employed in the system performance evaluation to cope with the associated uncertainty.

Although lifeline systems are dispersed over broad geographic areas, many are constrained to follow existing rights-of-way or are routed within river valleys, canyons, and mountain passes, where the saturated alluvial sediments susceptible to liquefaction during earthquakes typically exist. The inability to change location and/or direction within restrictive rights-of-way can create difficulties at fault crossings and landslide areas and lead to potentially troublesome interactions when different lifelines are co-located within narrow corridors.

### **2.2.2. Interconnectivity**

Lifelines are usually configured as networks. Consider, for example, water distribution networks in which customers and water treatment plants are interconnected by pipelines, control valves, pumps, tanks, and reservoirs. Transportation networks are also interconnected. A highway system, for example, is

composed of primary roads, bridges, overpasses, interconnections with secondary roads, tunnels, and traffic control and surveillance facilities. Damage to lifelines not only results in the physical impairment and cost of repair at specific locations, but also the losses of connectivity and the potential for more widespread and serious losses of functionality throughout the network. Very often the critical links are bridges and tunnels where damage is not easily fixed, access may be difficult, and alternative pathways are not available. All physically interconnected civil infrastructure systems are characterized by critical links. The identification and quantification of system impact associated with the losses of critical links is an important aspect of any procedure to manage risk and optimize physical network performance.

The performance of a lifeline system will be influenced by the critical paths and the degree of physical and operational redundancy vested in a particular system. Systems with more redundant connectivity are more robust and therefore will perform better when compared with less redundant systems.

### **2.2.3. Diversity**

A lifeline system is a collection of many different facilities and components, which contribute to the overall system performance by their unique functionalities. The integration of these parts achieves the designated function of the lifeline system. The seismic performance of lifeline systems depends on the characteristics of each facility and component. Consider, for example, a water supply system. Many water supply systems are composed of pipelines manufactured with steel, cast iron, asbestos cement, and plastic, which have significantly different strengths and ductilities, and perform differently under seismic loads. The joints linking individual sections of pipe

may be fitted with rubber gaskets, rigidly formed with full circumferential welds or riveted cross-sections, or composed of lead or cement-caulked bell-and-spigot couplings. Even if a pipeline system is composed of the same material, there will be a variety of special fittings, valves, joints, tees, and bends that must be considered for a comprehensive analysis.

Additional diversity may result from the fact that most lifeline systems have been built over many years and function with facilities and components produced according to different construction and / or manufacturing techniques, standards, and design procedures. As the knowledge in earthquake engineering and geotechnical hazards advances, it is not unusual to find that existing lifelines are sited in locations that are vulnerable to ground failure or severe transient effects related to the adverse site response characteristics. From this perspective, it is a much different problem to operate an existing system for optimal earthquake response than to site and design new lifeline systems.

The deterioration of an existing lifeline system is another source of variability. Some lifeline systems have components constructed more than 100 years ago, and their degree of deterioration is difficult to quantify. Deterioration, or aging, of system components can be caused by corrosion; deformation associated with settlement, adjacent construction, and past seismic events; repetitive loads leading to fatigue; fracture initiation and propagation; and loss of resilience in polymeric products associated with creep and material degradation. Most often, there is spatial distribution associated with deterioration. Deterioration may vary across different sites within the system and localized deterioration in parts of the systems is not uncommon. System

performance therefore will depend on the degree of local deterioration, the number of deteriorated sites within the network, and the potential for deterioration at critical links.

#### **2.2.4. Interdependencies**

Lifeline systems have interdependencies, both by virtue of operational interaction and physical proximity. Damage to one lifeline system may, in turn, affect other lifeline systems. For example, the loss of electricity affects water supply systems by rendering pumps and automatic valves inoperable, thereby affecting the flow and pressure in the water system, and impairs transportation systems with malfunctioning traffic lights. As mentioned in the previous section, many lifeline systems are constrained to follow existing rights-of-way and different lifeline systems may co-locate within narrow corridors. Because of this physical proximity, which occurs quite often in the crowded urban environments, the disruption of one lifeline system may affect the performance of another. For example, a break in a water trunk line siting along a main street in an urban area may significantly block the traffic in the vicinity. If other lifeline systems, such as a power system and a telecommunication system, have underground cables running closed to the water trunk line, these systems may be negatively affected as well.

### **2.3. Framework for Earthquake Effects on Lifelines**

A framework for evaluating lifeline system performance is shown schematically in Figure 2.1. Seismic hazards are combined with system characteristics in models that account for the effects of transient ground motion and permanent ground deformation on both above ground and underground facilities. Fragility

analyses of system components are used to assess the overall system response, from which the consequences with respect to the broader community of lifeline users are derived. Interaction with other external systems affects the response of the specific system being evaluated. By setting performance goals with respect to consequences, one can determine the desired level of system response. This response is achieved through interaction with the community by altering operational and physical characteristics of the system, as well as mitigating seismic hazards.

There is a basic chain of activities that predominates in this framework. The basic chain starts with the characterizations of seismic hazards and system properties, then proceeds to the analyses of interactions between them, from which system response and the evaluation of community impacts follow. This basic chain is emphasized in Figure 2.1 with bold and enlarged print, and its principal features are discussed under the subheadings that follow.

### **2.3.1. Seismic Hazards**

Engineering seismologists can estimate the ground shaking hazards at a particular site quantitatively by either deterministic seismic hazard analysis, DSHA (Reiter, 1990), in which a particular earthquake scenario is assumed, or probabilistic seismic hazard analysis, PSHA (Cornell, 1968; and Reiter, 1990), when uncertainties in earthquake size, location, and time of occurrence are explicitly considered. The seismic hazard analysis, regardless of deterministic or probabilistic, starts with identification and evaluation of earthquake sources by reviewing geologic evidence, tectonic evidence, historical seismicity, and instrumental seismicity (Kramer, 1996). Then, a recurrence relationship, which specifies the average rate at which an




Figure 2.1. Framework for Lifeline System Performance under Earthquake Effects (O'Rourke et al., 2004a)



earthquake of some size will be exceeded, is used to characterize the seismicity of each source zone. The ground motion produced at each site is determined with the aids of some attenuation relationships, which describes the decrease of ground motion with increasing distance. Finally, PSHA combines the uncertainties in earthquake location, earthquake size, and attenuation relationships to obtain the probability that the ground motion level will be exceeded during a particular time period.

The earthquake-induced ground motion deforms the ground and affects lifeline systems by transient and permanent ground deformation (TGD and PGD, respectively). TGD refers to recoverable movement of the ground and soil strain as the seismic wave propagates through. The principal causes and types of TGD were summarized by O'Rourke (1998) and updated by Bird et al. (2004), as reproduced in Table 2.1. The most common cause of TGD is the traveling ground waves by seismic body waves, either compressional or shear waves, propagating from a seismic source. The body waves are characterized by a relatively high apparent wave propagation velocity that results in low ground strains, generally insufficient for serious lifeline damage except for the highly deteriorated lifeline systems and / or near source strong shaking. Surface waves may be amplified as seismic body waves propagate in some specific local geologic settings, such as large sedimentary basins, resulting in TGD capable of considerable lifeline disruption. Significant TGD-induced lifeline damage quite often occurs as the result of adverse ground conditions, such as narrow sediment-filled valleys with respect to relatively rigid valley boundaries, steep ridges and elevated topography accompanied locally by slip in fracture rock, and virtually level ground with liquefiable soils relative to adjacent and underlying competent materials.

Table 2.1. Principal Causes and Types of Transient Ground Deformation  
(After O'Rourke, 1998; and Bird et al., 2004)

Cause	Description
Traveling Ground Waves	Near surface ground deformation caused by body wave propagating from a seismic source.
Surface Wave Generation in Large Sedimentary Basins	Surface waves generated by scattering incoming waves in large sedimentary basins typically several km wide, with depths < 1 km.
Vibration of Relatively Narrow Soil-filled Valleys	Deformation of sediment-filled valleys with respect to relatively rigid valley boundaries. Valley width and depth are typically several hundreds and several tens of meters, respectively.
Ridge Shattering	Ground disturbance along steep ridges and elevated topography that may be accompanied locally by slip in fracture rock.
Ground Oscillation	Transient lateral shear strains and horizontal movement of liquefiable soil relative to adjacent and underlying competent materials.

PGD refers to the irrecoverable movement of the ground that often results from ground failure, but also may be the result of modest levels of volumetric strain and shear distortion. Table 2.2 summarizes the principle causes and types of PGD (O'Rourke, 1998; and Bird, et al., 2004). The main sources of PGD include surface faulting, tectonic uplift and subsidence, liquefaction, landslides, and densification. Surface faulting and tectonic uplift and subsidence are associated with the crustal deformation from which the ground shaking originates. In contrast, local ground conditions are responsible for liquefaction, landslides, and densification. Liquefaction usually occurs in loose saturated granular soils, which transform to a liquefied state or condition of substantially reduced shear strength when subjected to seismic loading. Inertial forces from seismic shaking may trigger mass movement of the ground, i.e., landslides, in the forms of rock falls, relatively shallow slumping and sliding of soils, or relatively deep translation and rotation of soil and rock. The earthquake-induced

Table 2.2. Principal Causes and Types of Permanent Ground Deformation (O'Rourke, 1998; and Bird et al., 2004)

<b>Cause</b>	<b>Description</b>
Faulting	The principal components of fault movement include: 1) strike, 2) reverse, and 3) normal slip. Reverse and normal faults promote compression and tension, depending on the angle of intersection between lifelines and the fault trace.
Tectonic Uplift and Subsidence	Regional changes in dimension associated with crustal deformation. Deformation occurs over a long distance so strains imposed will be small. Subsidence adjacent to water bodies can flood sections of a lifeline and possibly lead to erosion and undermining.
Liquefaction	Displacement caused by transformation of saturated, cohesionless soils to liquefied state or condition of substantially reduced shear strength. Liquefaction-induced lifeline deformation can be caused by: 1) lateral spread, 2) flow failure, 3) local subsidence, 4) post-liquefaction consolidation, 5) buoyancy effects, and 6) loss of bearing.
Landslide	Mass movement of the ground triggered by inertial forces from seismic shaking. Many displacement patterns are possible. Principal forms of movement include: 1) rock falls, 2) relatively shallow slumping and sliding of soils, and 3) relatively deep translation and rotation of soils and rocks. Landslides include lurching and soil block movement in which ground displacements are triggered by transient loading of gently sloping deposits underlain by weak soil not susceptible to liquefaction.
Densification	Decrease in volume caused by seismic vibration of dry or partially saturated cohesionless soils.

shaking can decrease the volume of dry or partially saturated granular soils, resulting in ground subsidence.

Most PGD are relatively large and capable of severe damage to lifeline systems. For example, the liquefaction is one of the most pervasive causes for lifeline

damage during earthquakes (Hamada and O'Rourke, 1992; and O'Rourke and Hamada, 1992). Numerous investigators (e.g., Hamada et al., 1996; Hamada and Wakamatsu, 1996) have documented and analyzed the effects of large lateral and vertical ground deformation on the damage to lifeline systems.

### **2.3.2. System Characteristics**

System characteristics involve both physical and operational attributes. As indicated in Figure 2.2, physical characteristics involve the types and numbers of components that assemble the system, the connectivity among components, the required functionality for each component, and how different components interact with each other to achieve the designated functionality of the system as a whole.

The operational characteristics of the system include its organizational and social aspects. Those who operate the system are the interface between the system and the user communities. Operational characteristics involve the system operating procedures, mapping, monitoring, maintenance, and planning.

As described in the previous section, lifeline systems are usually dispersed over a broad geographical area with tremendous diversity in the systems. The characterization of such systems requires a comprehensive data inventory with reference to spatial coordinates. Geographical information system (GIS), a computer-based system to aid in the collection, maintenance, storage, analysis, output, and distribution of spatial data and information, has unique advantages in characterizing lifeline systems. A GIS is a tool for making and using spatial information, and hence, automatically accommodates the geographical dispersion characteristics of lifeline

<b>PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS</b>	<b>OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• COMPONENTS</li> <li>• CONNECTIVITY</li> <li>• FUNCTIONALITY</li> <li>• INTERACTION</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PLANNING</li> <li>• MAPPING AND GIS</li> <li>• MONITORING</li> <li>• MAINTENANCE</li> <li>• OPERATING PROCEDURES</li> </ul>

Figure 2.2. Physical and Operational Characteristics of Lifeline Systems

systems. The database embedded in the GIS permits the collection of diverse information regarding the lifeline systems, manipulation of the collected information, exploration of the relationship among system characteristics, and visualization of system performance. GIS is frequently part of the mapping process in lifeline engineering practices. However, it should be recognized that GIS is much more than a mapping process; it is a means of visualizing system performance and of identifying and quantifying multi-dimensional interactions within a two-dimensional surrogate of the real world.

### **2.3.3. Seismic Demand / System Interaction**

The effects of TGD and PGD are evaluated for the components of above ground and underground facilities. The underground facilities performance under seismic loading is assessed primarily by geotechnical engineers, who have developed models for soil-structure interaction, including empirical models based on the observations from the past earthquakes, closed form analytical methods, and numerical simulations, such as finite element and finite difference analyses.

Structural engineers focus typically on the performance of above ground facilities. The principles of structural dynamics (Chopra, 2005) are routinely applied in the engineering analysis and design of above ground structures. Theoretical models, as well as advanced numerical models, have been developed and applied for analyzing the above ground structure responses to ground shaking (Chopra, 2001; and Naeim, 2003).

To account for uncertainty with respect to component or facility response, seismic behavior is frequently characterized by fragility curves that provide the probability of failure as a function of the demand (e.g., peak acceleration or peak velocity) and confidence limit. Fragility curves can be derived from either the observations of past earthquakes or, more typically, Monte Carlo techniques that have special capability in quantifying uncertainty.

#### **2.3.4. System Response**

After evaluating the interaction between seismic demand and the component response of either above ground or underground facilities, lifeline performance assessment proceeds to system integration, in which performance is evaluated according to the functionality and serviceability of the entire network. Each lifeline system employs its simulation methodologies and / or software consistent with its characteristics. Consider, for example, a water supply system that needs to deliver water with sufficient pressure to customers. Its overall system performance is assessed using hydraulic network analysis, given the estimation of earthquake-induced damage at the component level (such as the damage to the trunk lines, distribution lines, and pump stations). Hydraulic network analysis is based on mass and energy conservation

equations, and is employed to integrate the impacts of component damage into the assessment of the designated system functionality as a whole. More specifically, hydraulic network analysis is performed to determine where the water outage area will be and how the customer demands are satisfied, given the earthquake-induced damage scenario at the component level.

System response is evaluated and used as the basis for changing network characteristics and/or mitigating seismic hazards. In some cases, seismic hazards can be reduced by densification of loose, saturated sand deposits, which are vulnerable to liquefaction, and by dewatering and stabilizing areas subject to landslides. Changes in the system characteristics may involve retrofitting existing facilities or replacing components with more resilient ones. Conventional engineering investigations lead to products that perform at a quantifiably improved level. To understand the ramifications of such improvements, simulations of system response must be performed with the improved component characteristics to show how the overall reliability is increased and broader community impacts are reduced.

### **2.3.5. Consequences**

Lifeline systems are interwoven with the fabric of the communities they serve. Therefore, evaluation of earthquake effects on lifeline systems should account for the emergency response and system restoration procedures the communities utilize to reduce the adverse consequences, and quantify lifeline losses in terms of regional economic and social impacts. The economic and social impacts of lifeline system disruption are generally the most important with respect to community well-being.

The evaluation of system performance needs to incorporate larger social and economic effects to provide a realistic assessment of true expenses.

Economists and social scientists have contributed to a growing body of research and applications associated with the economic and social consequences of lifeline damage and loss of functionality. It is well recognized that lifeline disruption has a direct effect on business losses and social consequences. Consider, for example, water supply disruption, which adversely affects fire protection, the loss of which may trigger serious economic and social consequences. One catastrophic example is the 1906 San Francisco earthquake in which most of the city of San Francisco was burned out by the fires following the earthquake because of the water supply disruption and loss of fire fighting capability (Gilbert et al., 1907).

The direct regional economic consequences of lifeline loss often set off a chain reaction of further production cutbacks among successive rounds of customers and suppliers that spread through the entire regional economy, which is depicted vividly as “ripple effect” or “multiplier effect”. Some well established analysis methodologies in economics, such as Input-Output (I-O) analysis and computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis, have been successfully utilized to assess the indirect economic effects of lifeline disruption.

Input-Output analysis was developed by Leontief (1986), who recognized that, when measuring the impact that a particular sector has on regional economy, it is important to look beyond its direct role and to also examine the extent to which it affects other sectors. No economic enterprise stands alone, but rather depends on other businesses as suppliers or customers, which, in turn, rely on suppliers and customers



of their own. Input-Output analysis characterizes the interdependencies among different sectors by a set of tabulated economic statistics pertaining to purchases, inputs, and sales, outputs, among all sectors of the regional economy, and assumes a linear relationship exists between inputs and outputs. Official versions of the Input-Output tables for either the whole nation or many regions of the US, based on an extensive collection of data from nearly all US business establishments, are compiled and provided by government agencies (Rose and Benavides, 1998).

A promising alternative to assess economic impacts of earthquakes is computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis, which is a behavioral model for producer and consumer response to price signals in a multi-market context (Shoven and Whalley, 1992). As opposed to Input-Output analysis, which is generally referred as Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models in economics and relies heavily on statistics of economic data, CGE analysis starts with the construction of economical theoretical models and then finds data that fits the construct. CGE models are nonlinear and readily incorporate behavioral response, such as input substitution and conservation, under explicit constraints (Rose and Liao, 2003).

The typical construction and application of CGE models (Shoven and Whalley, 1992) consist of four steps. First, a theoretical model, which is usually referred as constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function with multiple tiers and in a nested form, is constructed with some model parameters unspecified. Then a dataset, which is referred as the benchmark dataset, is used to calibrate the unspecified model parameters in such that the model with the parameters supports the benchmark equilibrium. Once correctly specified, the model will reproduce the initial benchmark dataset as an equilibrium solution using these calibrated parameter values, which is

referred as a replication check. After that, these calibrated parameters can be used to solve for the associated alternative equilibrium in any policy experiment, or counterfactual experiment.

### **2.3.6. Interaction**

Interconnectivity among components and interdependencies among different systems are two prominent characteristics of lifeline systems. The damage and disruption to one component may affect other components in the system through interconnectivity. Similarly, the damage and disruption in other systems may, in turn, affect the system being assessed because of physical proximity and / or operational interaction. Hence, a key component of the framework is the interaction of the system under scrutiny with other lifeline systems.

Lifeline systems are critical civil infrastructures that support the well-being of the communities they serve. Therefore, the interaction between lifeline systems and the communities they serve is another important component in the framework. The interaction between them mainly reflects in the operational characteristics of lifeline systems, such as planning, operating procedure, and maintenance.

## **2.4. Summary**

Lifelines are the systems and facilities that provide services vital to the function of an industrialized society and important to the emergency response and recovery after disastrous events. These systems and facilities include electric power, natural gas and liquid fuels, telecommunications, transportation, waste disposal, and

water. In general, each lifeline system is a network within which there are sources, major transmission lines, storage, and distribution or collection system. All lifeline systems share four common characteristics: geographical dispersion, interconnectivity, diversity, and interdependencies.

A framework for evaluating lifeline system seismic performance was presented and a basic chain of activities that predominates in the framework was identified. The basic chain starts with the characterizations of seismic hazards and system properties, then proceeds to the analyses of interactions between them, from which system response and the evaluation of community impacts follow. Engineering seismologists may estimate the ground shaking hazards at a particular site quantitatively by either deterministic or probabilistic seismic hazard analysis. The lifeline system properties are usually characterized by the utility companies, who own and operate the systems. Geotechnical engineers and structural engineers focus on the evaluation of component response, which are then integrated to provide an evaluation of system performance in terms of system reliability and serviceability, e.g., water availability after earthquakes for water supply systems. The engineering output of the system response evaluation is then utilized in the social and economic consequence evaluation by social scientists and economists.



## **CHAPTER 3**

### **LADWP SEISMIC HAZARD CHARACTERIZATIONS**

#### **3.1. Introduction**

The seismic performance evaluation of a water supply system often begins with the characterization of seismic hazards affecting the system. This chapter describes the process, which was followed in this work, for characterizing the seismic hazards in the LADWP water supply system and determining the seismic demand on each system component. The seismic hazard characterization for the Los Angeles area was developed by approximating the aggregate seismic hazard in the area that takes into account all currently identified, potential seismic sources in a probabilistic context. This was accomplished by means of 59 scenario earthquakes that were selected to provide probability of exceedance characteristics for strong ground motion similar to those for all currently identified, potential seismic sources in the area (Lee et al., 2005). Strong ground motions are generated for each of the 59 scenario earthquakes in a grid covering the LADWP water supply system. The peak ground velocity (PGV) contour surfaces are interpolated from these grid points using local polynomial interpolation and corrected for site condition corrections using NEHRP-HAZUS procedures. With the aid of GIS software, the spatial distribution of the LADWP system components are superimposed on the PGV contour surfaces to determine the seismic demand on each component in accordance with their respective locations.

## **3.2. Seismic Hazard Characterizations in California**

The United States Geological Survey (USGS) developed a probabilistic seismic hazard assessment methodology for all locations in the US, and prepared probabilistic seismic hazard maps in 1996, with revised maps in 2002 (<http://earthquake.usgs.gov/hazmaps/>). Both USGS and California Geological Survey (CGS) applied this methodology for locations in California, and the resulting 1996 and 2002 maps are available at the same web sites. The maps revised in 2002 are referred in this work as the USGS 2002 dataset. The USGS 2002 dataset represents the consensus within the geo-scientific community regarding earthquake parameters that contribute to the seismic hazards. This section briefly describes the processes that USGS and CGS utilized to assess the probabilistic seismic hazards in California, and the earthquake parameters they used. Most of this section draws on the contributions of Reiter (1990), Frankel et al. (1996), Petersen et al. (1996), Harmsen et al. (1999), Harmsen and Frankel (2001), Frankel et al. (2002), and Cao et al. (2003).

### **3.2.1. Basic Steps of Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis**

The USGS 2002 dataset incorporates seismic and geologic information to consider the probability of all possible damaging scenario earthquakes, calculates the potential range of ground motions for each scenario earthquake, and arrives at a level of ground shaking that has a given probability, using the formulation first developed by Cornell (1968). Figure 3.1 shows the basic steps of probabilistic seismic hazard analysis, as described in the following subheadings:




Figure 3.1. Basic Steps of Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (after Reiter, 1990)

#### *3.2.1.1. Earthquake Sources*

The earthquake sources are delineated in accordance with geologic evidence, tectonic evidence, historical seismicity, and instrumental seismicity. Sources may range from clearly understood and defined faults to less well understood and less well defined geologic structures to hypothetical seismotectonic provinces, extending over many thousands of square kilometers, whose specific relationships to the earthquake generating process are not known. The configuration of individual sources could be points, lines, areas or volumes, depending on the type of source chosen and the ability to define it in geologic space. In Figure 3.1, the site at which the seismic hazard is to be estimated is shown with connecting lines illustrating the closest distances of these various sources to the site.

#### *3.2.1.2. Seismicity Recurrence Characteristics for Each Source*

After the earthquake sources are defined, each of them is characterized by an earthquake probability distribution or recurrence relationship, which indicates the chance of an earthquake of a given size occurring anywhere inside the source during a specified period of time, usually one year. A maximum or upper bound earthquake is chosen for each source which represents the maximum event to be considered. Recurrence relationships for individual sources have classically been represented by a linear regression line on the recorded data in a semi-logarithmic scale, as shown in Figure 3.1.



### 3.2.1.3. *Ground Motion*

The ground motion, such as peak ground velocity or spectral acceleration, due to each potential earthquake is estimated by means of an earthquake ground motion attenuation relationship which provides estimates of ground motion for an earthquake with a given magnitude at different distances by means of a curve fitted to observed data. A family of attenuation relationships, each of which relates a ground motion parameter to distance for an earthquake with a given size, is required to cover the range of earthquake sizes for all potential earthquakes.

### 3.2.1.4. *Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Curves*

As Reiter (1990) pointed out, the effects of all the earthquakes with different sizes, occurring at different locations in different earthquake sources at different probabilities of occurrence are integrated into one probabilistic seismic hazard curve that shows the probability of exceeding different levels of ground motion (e.g., peak ground acceleration) at the site during a specified period of time. The integration can be written as

$$E(z) = \sum_{i=1}^N \alpha_i \int_{m_0}^{m_u} \int_{r=0}^{r=\infty} f_i(m) f_i(r) P(Z > z | m, r) dr dm \quad (3.1)$$

where  $E(z)$  is the expected probability of exceedance of ground motion level,  $z$ , during a specified time period,  $t$ ,  $N$  is the number of earthquake sources affecting the site,  $\alpha_i$  is the mean rate of occurrence of earthquakes between lower and upper bound magnitudes,  $m_0$  and  $m_u$ , being considered in the  $i$ th earthquake source,  $f_i(m)$  is the

probability density distribution of magnitude, recurrence relationship, within the  $i$ th earthquake source,  $f_i(m)$  is the probability density distribution of epicentral distance between the various locations within earthquake source  $i$  and the site for which the hazard is being estimated, and  $P(Z > z | m, r)$  is the probability that a given earthquake of magnitude  $m$  and epicentral distance,  $r$ , will exceed ground motion level,  $z$ .

#### 3.2.1.5. *Treatment of Uncertainties*

The probabilistic seismic hazard analysis contains two types of uncertainties, aleatory uncertainties, which account for the intrinsic randomness of data or observations and epistemic uncertainties, which account for the model uncertainties. The probabilistic seismic hazard analysis assumes that the distribution of the aleatory uncertainties can be defined and incorporated into the hazard curves, contributing to the overall estimate of probability of exceedance. Consider, for example, the aleatory uncertainties of attenuation relationships, as shown in Figure 3.1 Step 3. The aleatory uncertainties of attenuation relationships can be divided into inter-event uncertainties due to “source effect”, which is attributed to different earthquake source characteristics, such as style of faulting and depth of faults, and intra-event uncertainties due to “path effect”, which describes the variation of ground motion resulting from different paths through which seismic waves propagate from the same earthquake source. The probability distribution of both inter- and intra-event uncertainties can be derived from the data or observations and incorporated in the estimation of ground motion in the Step 3 of Figure 3.1, playing a part in the calculations of  $P(Z > z | m, r)$  term in Eqn 3.1 and resulting in contributions to the final probabilistic seismic hazard curves.

Epistemic uncertainties account for the model uncertainties that are with respect to the physical nature the models intend to simulate. In reality, there is only one true state of nature, as opposed to a certain number of competing models developed by different groups of researchers. Consider, for example, four competing attenuation relationships for southern California, which are proposed by Boore et al. (1997), Sadigh et al. (1997), Abrahamson and Silva (1997), and Campbell and Bozorgnia (2003), respectively. Similarly, multiple input values may exist for the various input parameters specified in Eqn 3.1 and shown graphically in Figure 3.1, and the incorporation of them can become quite cumbersome when multiple input values reflecting model uncertainties are taken into account. Thousands of scenario earthquakes may exist, corresponding to thousands of possible seismic source zonations, recurrence parameters, and ground motion attenuation combinations.

A method for combining these inputs is a logic tree, which is a decision flow path consisting of nodes and branches. Figure 3.2 shows an example of a logic tree. Each branch represents a discrete choice of input parameters and is assigned a likelihood of being correct. Logic tree is a convenient way of displaying input parameters, the options available, and the likelihood associated with each individual choice and scenario of choices. The analysis can be easily disassembled and hazard calculations can be carried out at a particular node point showing the effect that each element, such as style of faulting, has on the final hazards.

### **3.2.2. California Earthquake Sources**

California is a high seismic hazard area, where a number of large earthquakes have occurred during historic time. California has had an average of about one  $M \geq 6$




Figure 3.2. Logic Tree Example (Yeats et al., 1997)

event every 2 to 3 years, and losses from individual earthquake have resulted in several billions of dollars of damage (e.g., 1906 San Francisco, 1933 Long Beach, 1971 San Fernando, 1989 Loma Prieta, and 1994 Northridge earthquakes).

The USGS and CGS evaluated fault length, geometry, and slip rates for about 180 faults statewide with reported displacements during late Pleistocene and Holocene times. Several major fault systems accommodate high slip rates and significantly contribute to the hazards in California including: the San Andreas Fault, the Cascadia subduction zone, the Eastern California Shear Zone, and compressional faults associated with the Western Transverse Ranges, as shown in Figure 3.3. Blind thrusts have recently been identified beneath the Los Angeles and San Fernando basins, the




Figure 3.3. Major Fault Systems in California (Peterson et al., 1996)

Western Transverse Ranges, Santa Barbara Channel, and along the western flank of the Central Valley. In addition, several offshore faults have been identified and significantly contribute to the seismic hazards in coastal areas. Many late Quaternary faults are near a complex triple junction intersection of the Mendocino fracture zone, the San Andreas Fault, and the Cascadia subduction zone. Other significant faults are

found in the eastern portion of California along a broad zone of a portion of the state (Eastern California Shear Zone in Figure 3.3). Additional faults with Quaternary offsets are scattered over almost every strike-slip and normal faults distributed across the Mojave Desert, the Owens Valley, eastern Nevada, and across the northeastern region of California.

For each fault, the associated length, slip rate, quality of slip rate, maximum moment magnitude, characteristic earthquake rate and recurrence interval for the maximum magnitude, down dip width of the seismogenic zone, the top and bottom of the rupture surface, as well as the rake, dip, and dip azimuth of the rupture surface, and the endpoints of the fault or fault segment are determined and utilized as input parameters in the probabilistic seismic hazard analysis.

Earthquakes also occur in areas where they cannot be clearly assigned to a particular fault. Earthquake recurrence in these zones is based on models that consider the historic occurrence of earthquakes in the area and calculate magnitude-frequency distributions for each zone. A Gaussian smoothing process is applied to the historical background seismicity to distribute the earthquake potential through a grid of points that covers the zone.

### **3.2.3. California Seismicity Recurrence Characteristics**

The annual number of earthquakes of various sizes, which is assigned to each fault, is based on the slip rate information and is defined using a combination of two recurrence distributions: (1) the characteristic earthquake model that implies that a typical size of earthquake ruptures repeatedly along a particular segment of the fault

(Schwartz and Coppersmith, 1984), and (2) the exponential model that implies that earthquakes on a given fault follow the Gutenberg-Richter relationship:  $n(m) = 10^{a-bm}$  where  $n$  is the incremental number of earthquakes,  $a$  is the incremental number of earthquakes of  $m > 0$ ,  $b$  is the slope of the distribution, and  $m$  is moment magnitude. These two recurrence distributions are both considered to be reasonable models either for specific faults or for larger areas of California. A combination of the two distributions is also thought to characterize the behavior of many fault systems (Petersen et al., 1996). This composite model allows for a greater number of large earthquakes than predicted by the exponential distribution, and also for earthquakes of sizes different than the characteristic event.

All the faults are categorized into two classes, i.e., A and B, each of which utilizes different recurrence distributions. The class A faults generally have slip rates greater than 5 mm/yr and well constrained paleoseismic data (i.e., the San Andreas, San Jacinto, Elsinore, Imperial, Hayward, and Rodgers Creek faults). The characteristic earthquake model is applied to the Class A faults. The class B faults include all of the other faults lacking paleoseismic data necessary to constrain the recurrence intervals of large events. Both the characteristics model and the Gutenberg-Richter model with a  $b$ -value = 0.8 are applied to Class B faults with a likelihood of 2/3 and 1/3, respectively, to account for the epistemic uncertainties.

#### **3.2.4. Attenuation Relationships for California**

The fault sources and area sources in California are divided into two types of regions: extensional and non-extensional tectonic regions. The extensional region is mostly located in eastern California and the non-extensional region is in western and

southern California. For the fault and area sources in the extensional tectonic region, five equally weighted attenuation relations are used. They are Abrahamson and Silva (1997), Boore et al. (1997), Sadigh et al. (1997), Campbell and Bozorgnia (2003), and Spudich et al. (1999). For the non-extensional tectonic region, only the first four equally weighted relations are used. The attenuation relations used for the Cascadia subduction zone are Youngs et al. (1997) and Sadigh et al. (1997) with equal weight. For the deep earthquakes (depth > 35 km) in northern California, the attenuation relations used are Youngs et al. (1997), and Atkinson and Boore (2003) with equal weight.

Because this work focuses on the seismic performance evaluation of the LADWP water supply system in the greater Los Angeles area, which lies in the non-extensional tectonic region, more details on the four attenuation relationships used in this region are provided in the following subheadings:

#### 3.2.4.1. *Abrahamson and Silva (1997) Attenuation Relationship*

Abrahamson and Silva (1997) developed an attenuation relationship with a general function form of

$$\ln Sa(g) = f_1(M, r_{rup}) + Ff_3(M) + HWf_4(M, r_{rup}) + Sf_5(\overline{pga_{rock}}) \quad (3.2)$$

where  $Sa(g)$  is the spectral acceleration in g,  $M$  is moment magnitude,  $r_{rup}$  is the closest distance to the rupture plane in km,  $F$  is the fault type (1 for reverse, 0.5 for reverse/oblique, and 0 otherwise),  $HW$  is the dummy variable for hanging wall sites (1



for sites over the hanging wall, 0 otherwise), and S is a dummy variable for the site class (0 for rock or shallow soil, 1 for deep soil).

The function  $f_1(M, r_{rup})$  is the basic functional form of the attenuation for strike-slip event recorded at rock sites, and is expressed as

for  $M \leq c_1$

$$f_1(M, r_{rup}) = a_1 + a_2(M - c_1) + a_{12}(8.5 - M)^n + [a_3 + a_{13}(M - c_1)] \ln R \quad (3.3)$$

for  $M > c_1$

$$f_1(M, r_{rup}) = a_1 + a_4(M - c_1) + a_{12}(8.5 - M)^n + [a_3 + a_{13}(M - c_1)] \ln R \quad (3.4)$$

where

$$R = \sqrt{r_{rup}^2 + c_4^2} \quad (3.5)$$

The function  $f_3(M)$  is the style-of-faulting factor with a functional form

$$f_3(M) = \begin{cases} a_5 & \text{for } M \leq 5.8 \\ a_5 + \frac{(a_6 - a_5)}{c_1 - 5.8} & \text{for } 5.8 < M < c_1 \\ a_6 & \text{for } M \geq c_1 \end{cases} \quad (3.6)$$

The function  $f_4(M, r_{rup})$  accounts for the hanging wall effect and is expressed as

$$f_4(M, r_{rup}) = f_{HW}(M)f_{HW}(r_{rup}) \quad (3.7)$$

where

$$f_{HW}(M) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{for } M \leq 5.5 \\ M - 5.5 & \text{for } 5.5 < M < 6.5 \\ 1 & \text{for } M \geq 6.5 \end{cases} \quad (3.8)$$

and

$$f_{HW}(r_{rup}) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{for } r_{rup} \leq 4 \\ a_9 \frac{r_{rup} - 4}{4} & \text{for } 4 < r_{rup} < 8 \\ a_9 & \text{for } 8 < r_{rup} < 18 \\ a_9 \left(1 - \frac{r_{rup} - 18}{7}\right) & \text{for } 18 < r_{rup} < 24 \\ 0 & \text{for } r_{rup} > 25 \end{cases} \quad (3.9)$$

The non-linear soil response is modeled by

$$f_5(\overline{pga}_{rock}) = a_{10} + a_{11} \ln(\overline{pga}_{rock} + c_5) \quad (3.10)$$

where  $\overline{pga}_{rock}$  is the expected peak acceleration in rock in g (as predicted by the median attenuation relation with  $S = 0$ ).

The total standard error (i.e., aleatory uncertainty),  $\sigma_{total}$ , is given by

$$\sigma_{total}(M) = \begin{cases} b_5 & \text{for } M \leq 5.0 \\ b_5 - b_6(M - 5) & \text{for } 5.0 < M < 7.0 \\ b_5 - 2b_6 & \text{for } M \geq 7.0 \end{cases} \quad (3.11)$$

The coefficients in Eqns 3.3 to 3.11 (i.e.,  $a_1, a_2, a_3, a_4, a_5, a_6, a_9, a_{10}, a_{11}, a_{12}, a_{13}, c_1, c_4, c_5, n, b_5,$  and  $b_6$ ) are determined by regression analysis and given by Abrahamson and Silva (1997). Consider, for example, the coefficients for spectral acceleration at period,  $T=1$  sec, are:  $a_1=0.828, a_2=0.512, a_3=-0.8383, a_4=-0.144, a_5=0.490, a_6=0.013, a_9=0.281, a_{10}=0.423, a_{11}=0.00, a_{12}=-0.1020, a_{13}=0.17, c_1=6.4, c_4=3.70, c_5=0.03, n=2, b_5=0.83,$  and  $b_6=0.118$ .

#### 3.2.4.2. Boore et al. (1997) Attenuation Relationship

Boore et al. (1997) proposed an attenuation relationship expressed as

$$\ln Y = b_1 + b_2(M - 6) + b_3(M - 6)^2 + b_5 \ln r + b_v \frac{V_S}{V_A} \quad (3.12)$$

where

$$r = \sqrt{r_{jb}^2 + h^2} \quad (3.13)$$

and

$$b_1 = \begin{cases} b_{1SS} & \text{for strike - slip earthquakes} \\ b_{1RS} & \text{for reverse - slip earthquakes} \\ b_{1ALL} & \text{if mechanism is not specified} \end{cases} \quad (3.14)$$

In Eqns 3.12 to 3.14, Y is the ground motion parameters (peak ground acceleration or spectral acceleration in g), M is the moment magnitude,  $r_{jb}$  is the distance in km, and  $V_S$  is the average shear-wave velocity up to 30 m in units of m/sec. Coefficients to be determined are  $b_{1SS}$ ,  $b_{1RS}$ ,  $b_{1ALL}$ ,  $b_2$ ,  $b_3$ ,  $b_5$ ,  $h$ ,  $b_V$ , and  $V_A$ , which are all determined by regression analysis.

The overall variance,  $\sigma_{\ln Y}$ , of the regression is given by

$$\sigma_{\ln Y}^2 = \sigma_r^2 + \sigma_e^2 \quad (3.15)$$

where  $\sigma_e^2$  represents the earthquake-to-earthquake component of the variability and  $\sigma_r^2$  represents all other components of variability.

The coefficients for spectral accelerations at various periods T are given by Boore et al. (1997). For example, the coefficients for the spectral acceleration at a period of T= 1 sec, are:  $b_{1SS} = -1.133$ ,  $b_{1RS} = -1.009$ ,  $b_{1ALL} = -1.080$ ,  $b_2 = 1.036$ ,  $b_3 = -0.032$ ,  $b_5 = -0.798$ ,  $h = 2.90$ ,  $b_V = -0.698$ ,  $V_A = 1406$ ,  $\sigma_r = 0.575$ , and  $\sigma_e = 0.214$ .

#### 3.2.4.3. *Sadigh et al. (1997) Attenuation Relationship*

Sadigh et al. (1997) suggested an attenuation relationship for strike-slip faulting in rock sites expressed as

$$\ln(Y) = C_1 + C_2 M + C_3 (8.5M)^{2.5} + C_4 \ln(r_{rup} + \exp(C_5 + C_6 M)) + C_7 \ln(r_{rup} + 2) \quad (3.16)$$

where  $Y$  is the ground motion parameters (peak ground acceleration or spectral acceleration in g),  $M$  is moment magnitude,  $r_{rup}$  is the closest distance to the rupture plane in km,  $C_1, C_2, C_3, C_4, C_5, C_6,$  and  $C_7$  are coefficients determined by regression analysis. The total standard error,  $\sigma_{\ln Y}$ , is also determined by regression analysis. The ground motions for reverse/thrust faulting are 1.2 times greater than those for strike-slip faulting obtaining from Eqn 3.16.

The coefficients for spectral accelerations at various periods  $T$  are given by Sadigh et al. (1997). When  $M \leq 6.5$ , the coefficients for the spectral acceleration at period,  $T= 1$  sec, are:  $C_1 = -1.705, C_2 = 1.0, C_3 = -0.055, C_4 = -1.800, C_5 = 1.29649, C_6 = 0.250,$  and  $C_7 = 0$ . When  $M > 6.5$ , the coefficients for the spectral acceleration at period,  $T= 1$  sec, are:  $C_1 = -2.355, C_2 = 1.1, C_3 = -0.055, C_4 = -1.800, C_5 = -0.48451, C_6 = 0.524,$  and  $C_7 = 0$ . The standard error for spectral acceleration at  $T = 1$  sec is given by

$$\sigma_{\ln Y} = \begin{cases} 1.53 - 0.14M & \text{for } M < 7.21 \\ 0.52 & \text{for } M \geq 7.21 \end{cases} \quad (3.17)$$

#### 3.2.4.4. Campbell and Bozorgnia (2003) Attenuation Relationship

Campbell and Bozorgnia (2003) developed another attenuation relationship in the form of

$$\ln(Y) = c_1 + f_1(M_w) + c_4 \ln \sqrt{f_2(M_w, r_{seis}, S)} + f_3(F) + f_4(S) + f_5(HW, F, M_w, r_{seis}) + \varepsilon \quad (3.18)$$

Where the magnitude scaling characteristics are given by

$$f_1(M_w) = c_2 M_w + c_3 (8.5 - M_w)^2 \quad (3.19)$$

the distance scaling characteristics are given by

$$f_2(M_w, r_{seis}, S) = r_{seis}^2 + g(S)^2 (\exp[c_8 M_w + c_9 (8.5 - M_w)^2])^2 \quad (3.20)$$

in which the near-source effect of local site conditions is given by

$$g(S) = c_5 + c_6 (S_{VFS} + S_{SR}) + c_7 S_{FR} \quad (3.21)$$

the effect of faulting mechanism is given by

$$f_3(F) = c_{10} F_{RV} + c_{11} F_{TH} \quad (3.22)$$

the far-source effect of local site conditions is given by

$$f_4(S) = c_{12} S_{VFS} + c_{13} S_{SR} + c_{14} S_{FR} \quad (3.23)$$

and the effect of the hanging wall (HW) is given by

$$f_5(HW, F, M_w, r_{seis}) = HW f_3(F) f_{HW}(M_w) f_{HW}(r_{seis}) \quad (3.24)$$

where

$$HW = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{for } r_{jb} \geq 5 \text{ km or } \delta > 70^\circ \\ (S_{VFS} + S_{SR} + S_{FR})(5 - r_{jb})/5 & \text{for } r_{jb} < 5 \text{ km and } \delta \leq 70^\circ \end{cases} \quad (3.25)$$

$$f_{HW}(M_w) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{for } M_w < 5.5 \\ M_w - 5.5 & \text{for } 5.5 \leq M_w \leq 6.5 \\ 1 & \text{for } M_w > 6.5 \end{cases} \quad (3.26)$$

and

$$f_{HW}(r_{seis}) = \begin{cases} c_{15}(r_{seis}/8) & \text{for } r_{seis} < 8 \text{ km} \\ c_{15} & \text{for } r_{seis} \geq 8 \text{ km} \end{cases} \quad (3.27)$$

In Eqns 3.18 to 3.27,  $Y$  is the ground motion parameters (i.e., peak ground velocity or spectral acceleration in the units of  $g$ ),  $M_w$  is moment magnitude,  $r_{seis}$  is the closest distance to seismogenic rupture in a unit of km,  $r_{jb}$  is the closest distance to the surface projection of fault rupture in units of km,  $\delta$  is fault dip in degrees,  $S_{VFS} = 1$  for very firm soil,  $S_{SR} = 1$  for soft rock,  $S_{FR} = 1$  for firm rock, and  $S_{VFS} = S_{SR} = S_{FR} = 0$  for firm soil,  $F_{RV} = 1$  for reverse faulting,  $F_{TH} = 1$  for thrust faulting, and  $F_{RV} = F_{TH} = 0$  for strike-slip and normal faulting, and  $\varepsilon$  is a random error term with zero mean and standard deviation equal to  $\sigma_{\ln Y}$ .

The standard error,  $\sigma_{\ln Y}$ , is defined as a function of magnitude,

$$\sigma_{\ln Y} = \begin{cases} c_{16} - 0.07M_w & \text{for } M_w < 7.4 \\ c_{16} - 0.518 & \text{for } M_w \geq 7.4 \end{cases} \quad (3.28)$$

Coefficients  $c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4, c_5, c_6, c_7, c_8, c_9, c_{10}, c_{11}, c_{12}, c_{13}, c_{14}, c_{15}$ , and  $c_{16}$  are determined by regression analysis and given by Campbell and Bozorgnia (2003). For

example, the coefficients for spectral acceleration at  $T = 1$  sec are:  $c_1 = -3.867$ ,  $c_2 = 0.812$ ,  $c_3 = -0.101$ ,  $c_4 = -0.964$ ,  $c_5 = 0.019$ ,  $c_6 = 0$ ,  $c_7 = 0$ ,  $c_8 = 0.842$ ,  $c_9 = -0.105$ ,  $c_{10} = 0.329$ ,  $c_{11} = 0.338$ ,  $c_{12} = -0.073$ ,  $c_{13} = -0.072$ ,  $c_{14} = -0.858$ ,  $c_{15} = 0.281$ , and  $c_{16} = 1.021$ .

### 3.2.5. California Seismic Hazards

USGS and CGS integrated the effects of all earthquakes with different sizes, occurring at different locations in different earthquake sources at different probabilities of occurrence, and the consideration of uncertainties, using Eqn 3.1 and logic trees, to provide the probabilistic seismic hazard assessment results (i.e., USGS 2002 dataset), which are available at the USGS website (<http://eqhazmaps.usgs.gov/>). Figure 3.4 shows an example of a seismic hazard curve for a rock site in Los Angeles with geographical coordinates ( $34^\circ$ ,  $-118.4^\circ$ ), in which the annual probability of exceedance is plotted as a function of spectral acceleration at  $T = 1$  sec in units of  $g$ . Obviously, the annual probability of exceedance decreases as the spectral acceleration increases. The seismic hazard curves at different sites may be combined and interpolated to generate the spatial distribution of seismic hazards in California. Figure 3.5 shows the spatial distribution of spectral acceleration at  $T = 1$  sec with a 475-yr recurrence interval (10% probability of exceedance in 50 years) in California and Nevada. The state boundaries are indicated by blue lines and the areas with high seismic hazards are signified by red. The spatial distribution of the high seismic hazard areas are consistent with that of the major fault systems (i.e., the San Andreas Fault, the Cascadia subduction zone, the Eastern California Shear Zone, and compressional faults associated with the Western Transverse Ranges), as shown in Figure 3.3.






Figure 3.4. Example of Seismic Hazard Curve from USGS 2002 Dataset [for A Site in Los Angeles with Geographical Coordinates (-118.4°, 34°)]

### 3.3. LADWP Seismic Hazard Characterizations

Although the USGS 2002 dataset represents the consensus within the geoscientific community regarding earthquake parameters that contribute to the seismic hazards, difficulty exists in applying the dataset directly to the seismic performance evaluation of lifeline systems, such as a water supply system. This section starts with explanations of the difficulties involved in this process, followed by the development of a suite of 59 scenario earthquakes by URS Corporation, MCEER, and LADWP to approximate the seismic hazards in the Los Angeles area as represented by the USGS 2002 dataset. For more details on the development of the 59 scenario earthquakes, please refer to Lee et al. (2005).




Figure 3.5. 475-yr Recurrence Spectral Acceleration at T = 1 sec for Rock Sites in California and Nevada (USGS, 2005)

### 3.3.1. Limitation of Applying USGS 2002 Dataset to Lifeline Systems

The probabilistic seismic hazard information generated in accordance with the procedures described in Section 3.2 is commonly used for site-specific seismic performance evaluation, in which only earthquake ground motion in one site is

required and spatial correlation among earthquake ground motions across many sites is never a concern. In contrast, the seismic performance evaluation of lifeline systems, which are dispersed over a broad geographic area, requires seismic hazard information at various sites across the system. For example, the seismic hazard information over an area of approximately 1,200 km<sup>2</sup> is required in the seismic performance evaluation of the LADWP water supply system. The earthquake ground motions with the same annual probability of exceedance differ, but correlate at various sites over the LADWP service area. The USGS 2002 dataset is for the aggregated hazard at a particular site associated with potentially thousands of earthquakes. If it were used simultaneously at a number of different sites distributed throughout a functioning system, it would overweight the earthquake effects on system performance by neglecting the spatial correlation that exists among different sites affected by the same earthquake.

One potential approach to account for the spatial correlation is to simulate lifeline system performance for a comprehensive set of scenario earthquakes, each of which is associated with an annual frequency of occurrence. Each scenario earthquake represents one branch of the logic trees described in Section 3.2.1.5, and denotes a discrete choice of input parameters and models. However, since detailed models of a large lifeline system are often quite complex, it may not be practical to simulate the system response for an exhaustive set of scenario earthquakes (which may contain thousands of scenario earthquakes for high seismic hazard areas, such as California). This raises a challenge on how to account for the large number of scenario earthquakes omitted and their contribution to the probabilistic hazard analysis results.

Chang et al. (2000b) proposed an approach in which a select number of scenario earthquakes are chosen based on their combined contribution to the aggregate

hazard, and the contribution of omitted earthquakes is accounted for by optimizing the annual frequencies of the earthquakes. Using this approach, a new set of event annual frequencies is sought such that the relevant ground shaking hazards computed from the selected set at the principal sites of interest matches the target probabilistic hazards, such as those associated with the USGS 2002 dataset. This procedure assumes that, when the seismic hazards of the USGS 2002 data set and select number of scenario earthquakes match, the lifeline system seismic performance matches as well.

### **3.3.2. Development of 59 Scenario Earthquakes**

An approach was developed by Lee et al. (2005), which is similar to the one proposed by Chang et al. (2000b) to characterize the seismic hazards in the LADWP water supply system by choosing a suite of 59 scenario earthquakes so that their optimized annual frequencies of occurrence match the USGS 2002 probabilistic seismic hazards in the LADWP service area. Some information relevant to the development the 59 scenario earthquakes are described in the following subheadings:

#### *3.3.2.1. Control Points*

The 59 scenario earthquakes match the USGS 2002 dataset on a group of control points spatially distributed over the LADWP system. Figure 3.6 shows 56 control points specified by researchers at Cornell University. The 56 control points include 53 grid points (green dots in Figure 3.6) spatially distributed over the LADWP water supply system and 3 additional points (i.e., 54, 55, and 56) representing the locations of 3 key facilities, i.e., Lower Stone Canyon Reservoir, Lower Franklin Reservoir, and Silver Lake Reservoir (yellow triangles in Figure 3.6). Figure 3.6 also






Figure 3.6. Spatial Distribution of 56 Control Points for Seismic Hazard Matching between USGS 2002 Dataset and 59 Scenario Earthquakes

shows another 3 key facilities, i.e., LA Reservoir, North Hollywood Pump Station, and Manhattan Well Pump Station, which are located close to grid points 5, 16, and 38, respectively, and hence, require no additional control points. The probabilistic seismic hazards at the 56 control points are calculated from both the 59 scenario earthquakes and USGS 2002 dataset, and the annual frequencies of occurrence for the 59 scenario earthquakes are adjusted until both datasets give consistent seismic hazard characterizations at the 56 control points.

#### *3.3.2.2. Ground Motion Parameters*

The seismic performance of a water supply system is mostly influenced by the performance of the pipeline system, which is closely related to one particular ground motion parameter, peak ground velocity (Toprak, 1998). Models on the seismic wave interaction with pipelines are discussed in Chapter 5. In this work, the regression equations between the pipeline repair rate and peak ground velocity (Jeon, 2002) are utilized to simulate the seismic performance of the pipeline system, as described in Chapter 7. Therefore, the seismic hazards in the LADWP water supply system are characterized using peak ground velocity, and the 59 scenario earthquakes and USGS 2002 datasets are compared according to peak ground velocity.

As described in Section 3.2.4, the attenuation relationships used in the USGS 2002 dataset depict the variation of peak ground acceleration or spectral acceleration at various predominant periods,  $T$ , as a function of distance and other seismic parameters. The peak ground velocity is often inferred from the spectral acceleration,  $S_{A1}$ , at  $T = 1$  sec using the equation adopted in HAZUS (FEMA, 1999),

$$V_p = \frac{386.4 \times S_{AI}}{2\pi \times 1.65} \quad (3.29)$$

where  $V_p$  is the peak ground velocity in units of inch/sec, and  $S_{AI}$  is in units of g. The seismic hazards in the LADWP water supply system are characterized by calculating the  $S_{AI}$  at equivalent rock sites, i.e., NEHRP B or BC site category (FEMA, 2003), at the 56 control points shown in Figure 3.6, and comparing them with the  $S_{AI}$  from the USGS 2002 dataset at the same control points.

#### 3.3.2.3. Selection of Scenario Earthquakes

The USGS 2002 dataset considers numerous uncertainties in the seismic input parameters, such as the geometric parameters of the seismic sources, and characteristics or Gutenberg-Richter reoccurrence models, resulting in thousands of scenario earthquakes (i.e., logic tree branches in Figure 3.2) for California. To reduce the number of earthquakes to be considered for hazard characterization, earthquakes that generate ground motion without engineering significance in the LADWP water supply system performance are eliminated. According to Jeon (2002), a peak ground velocity less than 10 cm/sec, corresponding to a  $S_{AI} < 0.1$  g by Eqn 3.29, has negligible effect on the pipeline performance. Accordingly, the scenario earthquakes are eliminated if they do not produce  $S_{AI} \geq 0.1$  g at any of the 56 control points spatially distributed over the LADWP water supply system. In addition, expert judgment is exercised to reduce uncertainties in some other input parameters, such as limiting magnitude uncertainty and background area seismic sources (Lee et al., 2005).

The elimination process leads to a suite of 59 scenario earthquakes, as shown in Table 3.1. Among the 59 scenario earthquakes, 55 (i.e., Scenario ID 12 to 454) of them are associated with specific fault segments, as indicated in the second column of Table 3.1. The other 4 scenarios (i.e., Scenario ID 559 to 562) are related to background area sources. The corresponding moment magnitude for each scenario earthquake is indicated in the third column of Table 3.1. Figure 3.7 shows the spatial distribution of the faults from which the 59 scenario earthquakes originate. Most faults are located with a distance less than 100 km from the LADWP water supply system.

#### *3.3.2.4. Optimized Annual Frequencies of Occurrence*

The seismic hazard associated with the 59 scenario earthquakes is adjusted to match that of the USGS 2002 dataset over the LADWP water supply system by a multivariate, nonlinear optimization process. The 59 annual occurrence frequencies for the 59 scenario earthquakes are the optimized variables. The target function is selected by minimizing an error function for the sum of the differences between the hazard curves (i.e., the variation of annual exceedance frequency as a function of  $S_{AI}$  at equivalent rock sites) from the 59 scenario earthquakes and USGS 2002 dataset at each of the 56 control points. The error function is measured at all 56 points with equal weights, except the 6 control points (i.e., 5, 16, 38, 54, 55, and 56) representing the locations of key facilities, in which the weights are increased by 6 times.

Following the USGS 2002 probabilistic seismic hazard analysis procedures, four attenuation relationships (i.e., Abrahamson and Silva, 1997; Boore et al., 1997; Sadigh et al., 1997; and Campbell and Bozorgnia, 2003) with equal weights, as described in Section 3.2.4, are utilized to calculate the  $S_{AI}$  and annual exceedance



Table 3.1. Characteristics of 59 Scenario Earthquakes

<b>Scenario ID</b>	<b>Scenario Name</b>	<b>Magnitude Mw</b>	<b>Annual Occurrence Frequency</b>
12	el15	6.8	3.60E-03
18	SAF - Mojave	7.3	4.13E-03
19	SAF - Carrizo	7.4	2.28E-03
21	SAF-All southern segments	8.1	3.00E-03
22	SAF - 1857	7.8	9.61E-03
23	SAF - Southern 2 segments	7.7	3.37E-03
118	Holser	6.5	1.66E-04
119	Hollywood	6.4	6.64E-06
120	Raymond	6.5	7.41E-04
122	Clamshell-Sawpit	6.5	1.06E-03
141	Newport-Inglewood offshore	7.1	2.56E-03
145	Coronado Bank	7.6	1.75E-03
159	Newport-Inglewood	7.1	8.10E-04
160	Newport-Inglewood	6.6	2.37E-03
161	Newport-Inglewood	6.6	5.58E-04
162	Newport-Inglewood	6.6	1.50E-04
166	Sierra Madre	7.2	7.45E-04
167	Sierra Madre	6.7	4.40E-03
168	Sierra Madre	6.7	2.21E-04
169	San Gabriel	7.2	1.53E-03
170	San Gabriel	6.7	9.97E-05
171	San Gabriel	6.7	1.27E-03
173	Malibu Coast	6.7	2.70E-06
174	Santa Monica	6.6	5.23E-04
175	Verdugo	6.9	9.65E-04
176	Verdugo	6.4	1.57E-05
177	Verdugo	6.4	2.84E-06
189	Oak Ridge-onshore	7	4.13E-03
191	Oak Ridge-onshore	6.5	3.86E-03
195	San Cayetano	7	6.86E-03
196	San Cayetano	6.5	6.03E-03
198	Santa Susana	6.7	3.01E-03
202	Simi-Santa Rosa	7	6.35E-04
203	Simi-Santa Rosa	6.5	2.87E-04
219	Anacapa-Dume	7.5	9.36E-04

Table 3.1. (Continued)

<b>Scenario ID</b>	<b>Scenario Name</b>	<b>Magnitude Mw</b>	<b>Annual Occurrence Frequency</b>
220	Anacapa-Dume	7	5.70E-04
221	Anacapa-Dume	7	9.43E-04
222	Anacapa-Dume	6.5	1.29E-06
370	Northridge	7	1.43E-03
371	Northridge	6.5	2.88E-04
372	Northridge	6.5	2.37E-05
378	Channel Island Thrust	7.5	5.12E-04
388	Upper Elysian Park	6.4	6.13E-05
397	Puente Hills blind thrust	7.1	8.63E-04
398	Puente Hills blind thrust	6.6	1.04E-05
399	Puente Hills blind thrust	6.6	8.21E-05
440	Cucamonga	6.9	6.18E-03
443	Sierra Madre-San Fernando	6.7	9.41E-04
444	Palos Verdes	7.3	1.05E-03
446	Palos Verdes	6.8	8.20E-04
447	Palos Verdes	6.8	6.24E-04
451	Palos Verdes	6.3	3.27E-03
452	Palos Verdes	6.3	1.44E-03
453	Palos Verdes	6.3	2.07E-03
454	Palos Verdes	6.3	2.17E-03
559	Background Source	7	1.05E-03
560	Background Source	7	7.75E-04
561	Background Source	7	1.29E-03
562	Background Source	7	7.63E-04

frequency relationships at the 56 control points for the 59 scenario earthquakes. As discussed under Section 3.2.1.5, the attenuation relationships contain both aleatory uncertainties and epistemic uncertainties, which are accounted by the application of four equal-weighted attenuation models. The probability distribution of aleatory uncertainties can be defined from the regression analysis and is given by Eqns 3.11, 3.15, 3.17, and 3.28 for the four attenuation models, respectively. When calculating




Figure 3.7. Spatial Distribution of the Faults for 59 Scenario Earthquakes


the  $S_{AI}$  and annual exceedance frequency relationships, two relationships are developed: one with the incorporation of the aleatory uncertainties in attenuation models and the other without the consideration of attenuation aleatory uncertainties. Both relationships are utilized with equal weights in the optimization process and compared with the  $S_{AI}$  and annual exceedance frequency relationship from the USGS 2002 dataset, respectively.

The multivariate nonlinear optimization is then solved to obtain a set of optimized annual occurrence frequencies for the 59 scenario earthquakes. Table 3.1 includes the optimized annual occurrence frequencies in the fourth column. Please note that the optimized annual occurrence frequencies are not the real occurrence frequencies of the scenario earthquakes they are associated with, but the “equivalent” occurrence frequencies of the earthquakes that are similar to the scenario earthquakes. In aggregate, the 59 scenario earthquakes and corresponding optimized annual occurrence frequencies are a proxy representing the probabilistic seismic hazards in the LADWP water supply system, as defined by the USGS 2002 dataset.


#### *3.3.2.5. Comparison of Seismic Hazards between USGS 2002 Dataset and 59*

##### *Scenario Earthquakes*

The 59 scenario earthquakes and associated optimized annual occurrence frequencies are capable of reproducing the seismic hazard curves (i.e., annual exceedance frequency and  $S_{AI}$  in rock sites relationships) at the 56 control points spatially distributed over the LADWP water supply system. Figure 3.8 shows the comparison of the seismic hazard curves from both the 59 scenario earthquakes and USGS 2002 datasets at control points 5 and 29, which are located at Van Norman



(a) Control Point 5



(b) Control Point 29

Figure 3.8. Comparison between 59 Scenario Earthquakes and USGS 2002 Dataset

Complex in the northern San Fernando valley and the central city (Figure 3.6), respectively. The seismic hazard curves from the 59 scenario earthquakes and USGS 2002 datasets are shown by open triangles and open rectangles, respectively. It is evident in the Figure 3.8 that the seismic hazard curves are consistent with each other and the 59 scenario earthquakes match the USGS 2002 dataset reasonably well. For more details on the comparison between the 59 scenario earthquakes and USGS 2002 datasets, please refer to Lee et al. (2005).

### 3.3.3. Strong Ground Motion Data

For each of the 59 scenario earthquakes, several strong ground motion parameters at equivalent rock sites, i.e., peak ground acceleration (PGA), peak ground velocity (PGV), and spectral acceleration with 5% damping at  $T = 0.2$  sec ( $S_{A0.2}$ ), and  $T = 1.0$  sec ( $S_{A1}$ ), respectively, are generated at 572 points in a grid with uniform separation of points and interval of  $0.03^\circ$  longitude and latitude covering the LADWP water supply system. The grid is shown in Figure 3.9. The LADWP trunk line system and 56 control points utilized during the matching process are superimposed in Figure 3.9.

The PGAs,  $S_{A0.2}$ , and  $S_{A1}$  are generated from the four attenuation relationships mentioned above, while the PGVs are inferred from  $S_{A1}$  using Eqn 3.29. For each strong ground motion parameter at the 572 grid points, strong motion data are generated corresponding to both the mean and mean  $\pm \sigma$ , where  $\sigma$  is the total standard error from the four attenuation models utilized. The standard error,  $\sigma_{\text{inter-event}}$ , associated with inter-event variability accounting for the “source” effects only (refer to Section 3.2.1.5) is estimated as 0.31 for PGA, PGV, and  $S_{A1}$ , and 0.35 for  $S_{A0.2}$





Figure 3.9. Spatial Distribution of Strong Motion Data Grid

(Color-coded by Mean +  $\sigma_{\text{inter-event}}$  PGV at Rock Sites from Scenario 175 Verdugo Earthquake)

(Lee et al., 2005). Since the  $\sigma_{\text{inter-event}}$  is the standard deviation of the natural log of the strong ground motion, the strong motion data corresponding to  $\text{mean} \pm \sigma_{\text{inter-event}}$ , can be calculated from the mean strong motion data by:

$$\text{mean} \pm \sigma_{\text{inter-event}} = \text{mean} \times \exp(\pm \sigma_{\text{inter-event}}) \quad (3.30)$$

In Figure 3.9, the 572 data grid points are color-coded by the  $\text{mean} + \sigma_{\text{inter-event}}$  PGVs generated from Scenario 175 Verdugo Earthquake (Table 3.1). The high PGVs are indicated in orange and occur at the upper right quarter of the figure, where the Verdugo fault is located. The PGVs decrease as the distance to the Verdugo fault increases, as showed by the gradual conversion from orange to yellow, and then to green in Figure 3.9.

### 3.4. Seismic Demands on LADWP System Components

For each of the 59 scenario earthquakes, strong ground motion data at 572 points are generated, and the seismic demands on the system components in the LADWP water supply system are determined accordingly. Ground motion contour surfaces are developed from the data at the 572 points using local polynomial interpolation in a GIS software, and further corrected for the site conditions. Then, the seismic demands on the system components are determined according to their locations. As mentioned before, this work mostly focuses on the pipeline performance, which is closely related to the PGVs they are subjected to. Therefore, the PGV is utilized as the primary seismic demand parameter, based on which the contour surfaces are developed. This section employs Scenario 175 Verdugo earthquake (Table 3.1 and Figure 3.9) as an example to illustrate the procedures on determining



the PGVs on both link-type components (i.e., trunk lines) and node-type components (i.e., demand nodes representing local distribution systems). Similar procedures are applied to other 58 scenario earthquakes, as well as other ground motion parameters, if necessary.

### **3.4.1. Data Interpolation**

The PGV contour surfaces are developed from the PGV values at the 572 points using the local polynomial interpolation in the Geostatistical Analyst module of a GIS software, ArcGIS (ESRI, 2001). Local polynomial interpolation fits many polynomials to the 572 data, each within specified overlapping neighborhoods. The polynomial parameters (i.e., the order of polynomial function and coefficients in the polynomial functions) and the number of specified overlapping neighborhoods are determined by an optimization process minimizing the root-mean-square prediction error, RMSPE. The RMSPE is the statistic that is calculated from cross-validation, in which, each measured point is removed and compared to the predicted value for that location. It is a summary statistic quantifying the error of the prediction surface. The final contour surface is developed by iteratively cross-validating the output surfaces that are calculated using different polynomial parameters and the number of specified overlapping neighborhoods until the minimum RMSPE is obtained.

Figure 3.10 shows an example of the contour surfaces developed from the mean +  $\sigma_{\text{inter-event}}$  PGV at equivalent rock sites from the Scenario 175 Verdugo earthquake, as shown in Figure 3.9. Similar to Figure 3.9, high PGV values occur in the upper right quarter of Figure 3.10, where the Verdugo fault is located, and the PGVs decrease as the distance to the Verdugo fault increases. Local polynomial




Figure 3.10. Contour Surface Corresponding to Mean +  $\sigma_{\text{inter-event}}$  PGV at Rock Sites from Scenario 175 Verdugo Earthquake

interpolation is able to develop the contour surfaces that are capable of representing the PGVs at 572 points reasonably well.

### **3.4.2. Correction for Site Conditions**

The strong ground motion data are generated for the rock site conditions, i.e., NEHRP B or BC category site conditions (FEMA, 2003). However, the site conditions in the LADWP water system service areas do not necessarily fall into the NEHRP B or BC site categories. Table 3.2 summarizes the site classification according to the 2003 NEHRP provisions (FEMA, 2003). The site conditions are divided into 6 categories, from A to F, representing the site conditions from hard rock to soft soils, to soils requiring site specific evaluation. Intermediate categories, such as BC, CD, and DE, can also be assigned to accommodate the site conditions that fall close to the category boundary.

Wills et al. (2000) developed a site-condition map for California based on geologic units and the average shear wave velocity in the upper 30-m subsurface layer. Figure 3.11 shows the site-condition map in the greater Los Angeles area, where most site categories are not B or BC, but C, CD, D, and DE. The LADWP pipeline system is superimposed in Figure 3.11 and most of the pipelines are located in either a category C or CD site.

The 2003 NEHRP provision (FEMA, 2003) does not provide the site condition correction coefficients for PGV directly, but supplies the coefficients for  $S_{A1}$ , as reproduced in Table 3.3. The  $S_{A1}$  for category site conditions (other than B and B/C) can be calculated by

Table 3.2. NEHRP Site Classification (after FEMA, 2003)

Site Class	Description	Shear Wave Velocity (m/s)	
		Minimum	Maximum
<b>A</b>	<b>HARD ROCK</b>	1500	
<b>B</b>	<b>ROCK</b>	760	1500
<b>C</b>	<b>VERY DENSE SOIL AND SOFT ROCK</b> Undrained shear strength $s_u > 100$ kPa or SPT-N $> 50$	360	760
<b>D</b>	<b>STIFF SOIL</b> Undrained shear strength $50 \text{ kPa} \leq s_u \leq 100$ kPa or $15 \leq \text{SPT-N} \leq 50$	180	360
<b>E</b>	<b>SOFT SOIL</b> Undrained shear strength $s_u < 50$ kPa or SPT-N $< 15$ , or any profile with more than 3 m of soft clay defined as soil with plasticity index $\text{PI} > 20$ , water content $w \geq 40\%$		180
<b>F</b>	<b>SOIL REQUIRING SITE SPECIFIC EVALUATIONS</b> 1. Soils vulnerable to potential failure or collapse under seismic loading such as liquefiable soils, quick and highly sensitive clays, collapsible weakly cemented soils. 2. Peats and/or highly organic clays with thickness $\geq 3$ m. 3. Very high plasticity clays with thickness $\geq 8$ m and plasticity index $\text{PI} > 75$ . 4. Very thick soft/medium stiff clays with thickness $\geq 36$ m.		

$$S_{A1i} = F_{SA1i} S_{A1B} \quad (3.31)$$

where  $S_{A1i}$  is the  $S_{A1}$  for site condition  $i$  (i.e., site conditions corresponding to A, C, D, or E),  $S_{A1B}$  is the  $S_{A1}$  for site category B, and  $F_{SA1i}$  is the site condition correction factor for various site categories  $i$  and is given in Table 3.3. HAZUS (FEMA, 1999) extends the methodology to the PGV by




Figure 3.11. Map of NEHRP Site Classification in Los Angeles Superimposed by LADWP Pipeline System (after Wills et al., 2000)

Table 3.3. Site Condition Correction Factor  $F_{SAI}$  for  $S_{AI}$  (FEMA, 2003)

Site Class	$S_{AI} \leq 0.1 \text{ g}$	$S_{AI} = 0.2 \text{ g}$	$S_{AI} = 0.3 \text{ g}$	$S_{AI} = 0.4 \text{ g}$	$S_{AI} \geq 0.5 \text{ g}$
<b>A</b>	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
<b>B</b>	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
<b>C</b>	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.3
<b>D</b>	2.4	2.0	1.8	1.6	1.5
<b>E</b>	3.5	3.2	2.8	2.4	2.4
<b>F</b>	--- <sup>a</sup>	--- <sup>a</sup>	--- <sup>a</sup>	--- <sup>a</sup>	--- <sup>a</sup>

Note: a: Site-specific geotechnical investigation and dynamic site response analyses should be performed.

b: Use straight line interpolation for intermediate values of  $S_{AI}$ .

$$V_{pi} = F_{SAIi} V_{pB} \quad (3.32)$$

where  $V_{pi}$  is the PGV for category site condition  $i$  (i.e., site conditions corresponding to A, C, D, or E), and  $V_{pB}$  is the PGV for site category B.

Since the PGVs in the ground motion data are inferred from the  $S_{AI}$  using Eqn 3.29, the  $S_{AI}$  values in Table 3.3, according to which the  $F_{SAI}$  is divided into 5 subcategories, can be converted to corresponding PGV values by Eqn 3.29 as well. Table 3.4 shows the site correction factor,  $F_{PGVi}$ , for PGV with respect to PGV. Similar to Eqn 3.32, the PGV on other category site conditions rather than B category can be calculated by

$$V_{pi} = F_{PGVi} V_{pB} \quad (3.33)$$

Table 3.4. Site Condition Correction Factor  $F_{PGV}$  for PGV

Site Class	PGV $\leq$ 9 cm/sec	PGV = 19 cm/sec	PGV = 28 cm/sec	PGV = 38 cm/sec	PGV $\geq$ 47 cm/sec
<b>A</b>	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
<b>B</b>	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
<b>C</b>	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.3
<b>D</b>	2.4	2.0	1.8	1.6	1.5
<b>E</b>	3.5	3.2	2.8	2.4	2.4
<b>F</b>	--- <sup>a</sup>	--- <sup>a</sup>	--- <sup>a</sup>	--- <sup>a</sup>	--- <sup>a</sup>

Note: a: Site-specific geotechnical investigation and dynamic site response analyses should be performed.

b: Use straight line interpolation for intermediate values of PGV.

where  $F_{PGVi}$  is the site condition correction factor for PGV for various site categories  $i$ . Please note that the  $F_{SAIi}$  in Table 3.3 and  $F_{PGVi}$  in Table 3.4 are identical under the same conditions.

Corrections for site conditions to the PGV data are performed using GIS software, ArcGIS (ESRI, 1999). The PGV contour surface data layer (e.g., Figure 3.10 for Scenario 175 Verdugo earthquake) is intersected with the site condition data layer (i.e., Figure 3.11) to combine both sets of information into the same data layer, after which the corrected PGV values are calculated using Eqn 3.33 and Table 3.4, and the corrected PGV contour surfaces can be generated. The  $F_{PGVi}$  for the intermediate site category, i.e., CD and DE, are taken as the average of the  $F_{PGVi}$  for the two bounded categories, i.e., C and D, and D and E, respectively. Figure 3.12 shows the corrected PGV contour surfaces for the Scenario 175 Verdugo earthquake. Comparison of Figures 3.10 and 3.12 reveals the site amplification effects. High PGV values on the southwest side of the Verdugo fault in Figure 3.12 result from the CD or D category






Figure 3.12. PGV Contour Surface after Site Condition Corrections  
 (Mean +  $\sigma_{\text{inter-event}}$  PGV from Scenario 175 Verdugo Earthquake)



site conditions in those locations, as opposed to the northeast side of the Verdugo fault, where no significant amplification effect is observed as a result of BC category site conditions in those locations.

### **3.4.3. Seismic Demands on Link-type Components**

The components in water supply systems can be divided into two broad categories: link-type components, such as pipelines, and node-type components, such as demand nodes and tanks. The procedures to determine the seismic demands on the link-type components are described in this section and those for the node-type components are given in the next section.

The seismic performance of the pipeline system is of primary concern in this work. The LADWP pipeline system is superimposed on the corrected PGV contour surfaces, as shown in Figure 3.12. To determine the PGV that each pipeline is subjected to, the LADWP pipeline data layer is combined with the corrected PGV contour surfaces in the ArcGIS. The “Intersect” function in ArcGIS not only combines the information from both input data layers into an output layer, but also divides the pipelines according to the PGV contour interval they fall into. Consider, for example, a pipeline that is so long that extends over three PGV contour intervals, saying 40-45, 45-50, and 50-55 cm/sec intervals. The ArcGIS “Intersect” function automatically divides the long pipeline into three new short pipelines and assigns a PGV interval of 40-45, 45-50, or 50-55 cm/sec to each of them according to their locations, respectively. Although PGV values in Figures 3.10 and 3.12 are color-coded with an interval of 20 cm/sec, a relatively small PGV interval of 5 cm/sec is utilized when developing the contour surfaces (i.e., four PGV intervals in each color interval in

Figure 3.10), intending to determine the PGV values to each system component with relatively high accuracy. The mean of the PGV interval (e.g., 22.5 cm/sec for 40-45 cm/sec interval) is taken as the seismic demands for the system components located within the PGV interval. The lengths of the divided pipelines are then calculated in ArcGIS and utilized as input parameter to estimate the seismic performance of pipelines, as described in Chapter 7.

#### **3.4.4. Seismic Demands on Node-type Components**

The procedures for determining seismic demands on node-type components, such as demand nodes and tanks, are relatively straightforward. Figure 3.13 shows the spatial distribution of the demand nodes in the LADWP water supply system superimposing on the corrected PGV contour surfaces generated from the Scenario 175 Verdugo earthquake. The PGVs, which the demand nodes are subjected to, are determined by an ArcGIS function, “Spatial Join”, which combines the information in the two input data layers (i.e., the demand node layer and PGV contour surface layer) into an output data layer according to their spatial positions. Again, the seismic demands, i.e., PGV, assigned to the demand nodes are the mean of the PGV contour interval in which the demand nodes are located.

### **3.5. Summary**

This chapter describes the process for characterizing the seismic hazards in the LADWP water supply system and determining the seismic demand on each system component. The seismic hazard characterization for the Los Angeles area was developed by approximating the aggregate seismic hazard, i.e., USGS 2002 Dataset, in




Figure 3.13. Map of LADWP Demand Nodes Superimposed by Corrected PGV Contour Surfaces (Mean +  $\sigma_{\text{inter-event}}$  PGV from Scenario 175 Verdugo Earthquake)

the area that takes into account all currently identified, potential seismic sources in a probabilistic context. The approximation was accomplished by means of 59 scenario earthquakes that were selected to provide probability of exceedance characteristics for strong ground motion similar to those for all currently identified, potential seismic sources in the area (Lee et al., 2005). Scenario earthquakes that generate ground motion without engineering significance in the LADWP water supply system were screened from the original USGS 2002 dataset. In addition, expert judgments were exercised to screen out other scenario earthquakes in the original USGS 2002 dataset.

The seismic hazard associated with the 59 scenario earthquakes was adjusted to match that of the USGS 2002 dataset over the LADWP water supply system by a multivariate, nonlinear optimization process. The 59 annual occurrence frequencies for the 59 scenario earthquakes are the optimized variables. The target function was selected by minimizing an error function for the sum of the differences between the hazard curves, i.e., the variation of annual exceedance frequency as a function of  $S_{A1}$  at equivalent rock sites, from the 59 scenario earthquakes and USGS 2002 dataset at each of the 56 control points spatially distributed over the LADWP water supply system.

Strong ground motions, e.g., PGV, for each of the 59 scenario earthquakes were generated at 572 points in a grid covering the LADWP water supply system. The PGV contour surfaces were interpolated from these 572 points, and site condition corrections were applied according to the NEHRP-HAZUS procedures. With the aid of GIS software, the spatial distribution of the LADWP system components were superimposed on the PGV contour surfaces to determine the seismic demand on each component in accordance with its respective location.

## **CHAPTER 4**

# **SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS OF LADWP WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM**

### **4.1. Introduction**

The water supply system in Los Angeles, operated primarily by the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP), is utilized as a test bed in this research. The system characteristics necessary for the evaluation of water supply system seismic performance are described in this chapter. The chapter starts with the system physical characteristics, such as system statistics, system structure, and water flow pattern, followed by the system operational characteristics, which are compiled into a hydraulic network model provided by LADWP engineers. The system characteristics described in this chapter are mostly provided by LADWP in the form of hydraulic network model (LADWP, 2002a), water flow diagrams (LADWP, 2002b), water maps (LADWP, 2002c), and Digital Ortho Photographs of the greater Los Angeles area.

### **4.2. Physical Characteristics**

LADWP acts as a water “retailer” in the greater Los Angeles area, supplying water directly to individual customers. The LADWP water supply system provides water to about 660,000 customers, representing 3.8 million people in a service area of

approximately 1,200 km<sup>2</sup>. The total water consumption of the LADWP system in a typical summer and winter day is about  $2.5 \times 10^6$  and  $1.2 \times 10^6$  m<sup>3</sup>, respectively. Two-thirds and one-third of the water consumption is accounted for by residential, and commercial and governmental uses, respectively. Only a very small portion of water is consumed by industries (Toprak, 1998).

#### **4.2.1. System Structure**

The LADWP water service areas are divided into five water districts, namely West Valley, East Valley, Western, Central, and Harbor water districts. Figure 4.1 shows a spatial distribution of these water districts. The whole system can be divided into thirteen subsystems, geographically, each of which consists of various types of system components, such as water tanks, pumps, regulation stations, pipes, and customer demands, and can be treated individually. Each of the thirteen subsystems can be further divided to multiple pressure zones, resulting in a total of 106 pressure zones within the LADWP system. More descriptions on the subsystems and pressure zones are provided in the following subheadings:

##### *4.2.1.1. Subsystems*

Figure 4.2 shows a spatial distribution of the thirteen subsystems, which, from the north to the south, are: Foothills (FH), Granada Hills (GH), Sunland/Tujunga (ST), Valley Floor (VF), Encino Hills (EH), Santa Monica Mountains (SM), Hollywood Hills (HH), Highland Park (HP), Mountain Washington (MW), Santa Ynez (SY), Central City (CC), Westside (WS), and Harbor (H) subsystems. Among the thirteen subsystems, the Valley Floor and Central City are the two largest and serve the highly






Figure 4.1. Map of LADWP Water Districts




Figure 4.2. Overview of LADWP Water Supply System



Table 4.1. Daily Water Consumption of Each Subsystem in LADWP System

<b>Subsystem</b>	<b>Summer Day (m<sup>3</sup>/Day)</b>	<b>Summer Day Percentage (%)</b>	<b>Winter Day (m<sup>3</sup>/Day)</b>	<b>Winter Day Percentage (%)</b>
<b>VF</b>	699531	28	327834	28
<b>CC</b>	661461	26	299777	25
<b>WS</b>	282184	11	131361	11
<b>GH</b>	172806	7	74060	6
<b>H</b>	134172	5	86845	7
<b>FH</b>	125283	5	56113	5
<b>MW</b>	124723	5	55466	5
<b>EH</b>	122292	5	55064	5
<b>HP</b>	58861	2	26130	2
<b>HH</b>	42920	2	20498	2
<b>SY</b>	36836	1	17847	2
<b>SM</b>	35458	1	15787	1
<b>ST</b>	32117	1	13765	1
<b>Sum</b>	2528647	100	1180545	100

populated San Fernando Valley and Los Angeles Central City areas, respectively. The other eleven subsystems are positioned around these two large subsystems, mostly in the mountainous areas with higher elevations with the exception of the Harbor subsystem, which is located in the low elevation Harbor area.

Table 4.1 shows the daily water consumption of each subsystem and the percentage with respect to the water consumption of the whole system in a typical summer or winter day. The water consumption in each subsystem, as well as the water consumption in the whole system, in a typical summer day is about twice that in a typical winter day. However, regardless of winter or summer day, the water consumption percentage of each subsystem with respect to the whole system water consumption remains more or less constant. Corresponding to their largest service areas, the Valley Floor and Central City are the two largest water consumers,

contributing 28% or 26% (in summer or 25% in winter) to total water consumption, respectively. The Valley Floor and Central City together account for more than 50% of total water consumption.

In addition to the thirteen subsystems, there is a special area in the LADWP system known as Van Norman Complex, located in the northern San Fernando Valley, as shown in Figure 4.2. Van Norman Complex does not belong to any of the thirteen subsystems, but serves as the heart of the system, treating roughly 85% of the water circulated in the system. More details on the Van Norman Complex are given under the subheading: 4.2.2.3. Van Norman Complex.

#### *4.2.1.2. Pressure Zones*

LADWP supplies water to its customers with pressures up to 1380 kPa (200 psi). Although some variations could be tolerated, extremely high pressures will cause damage to the system, such as pipe leakages and breaks. On the other hand, extremely low pressures will lead to water outage and fire fighting inadequacy. To meet the pressure requirements in a service area of 1200 km<sup>2</sup> and with significant elevation difference [i.e., 0 to 735 m (1 to 2411 ft)], the thirteen subsystems in the LADWP system is further divided into 106 pressure zones, which are numbered after the highest hydraulic grades, the sum of pressure and elevation heads, in the zones in units of feet. Figure 4.3 shows a spatial distribution of the 106 pressure zones. In general, the hydraulic grades decrease from the north to the south, with the exception of the Santa Monica Mountains area. The hydraulic grades in the Granada Hills and Foothills subsystems, north of San Fernando Valley, are typically higher than 427 m (1400 ft). The hydraulic grades in the Valley Floor subsystem are between 244 m (800 ft) and




Figure 4.3. Spatial Distribution of Pressure Zones in LADWP System

427 m (1400 ft). The hydraulic grades in the Los Angeles Central City and Harbor areas are generally lower than 244 m (800 ft).

The LADWP system has two broad categories of pressure zones: gravity or pumped. The water in a gravity pressure zone is driven by gravitational force resulting from elevation difference, as opposed to those in a pumped pressure zone, where water is driven by external energy provided by pump stations. Since gravity pressure zones do not consume electric energy to deliver water, it is more desirable for water system planners to deploy a water system with as many gravity zones as possible. There is no exception for the LADWP system, in which 75 to 77% of pressure zones, with respect to water consumption, are gravity zones, and water is primarily driven by gravitational force. Seven of the total thirteen subsystems are completely gravity pressure zones, including the three largest water consumption subsystems (Valley Floor, Central City, and Westside subsystems) and other four subsystems (Harbor, Highland Park, Hollywood Hills, and Santa Ynez subsystems). The other six subsystems (Foothills, Granada Hills, Sunland/Tujunga, Encino Hills, Santa Monica Mountains, and Mountain Washington subsystems) located in the mountainous areas, where the elevations are high and the variation in elevation are also significant, are dominated by pumped pressure zones.

In pumped pressure zones, water is provided to customers after a pump station, where different operational strategies may be utilized. The pump station may convey water to a tank for subsequent gravity feed and provide water to a closed service zone directly, or be used in conjunction with a hydro-pneumatic tank. Most frequently, a pump feeds a pressure zone with a tank floating in the zone. A storage tank is considered to be “floating in the pressure zone” if the hydraulic grade of the tank is the

highest hydraulic grade in the pressure zone. The floating tank is normally constructed at a high elevation and served by a pump station. The operation of the pump is dynamically controlled by the water level of the tank. When the water level of the tank is higher than a pre-specified upper limit, the pump station is shut off and the tank supplies water to the customers by gravity. When the water level in the tank is lower than a pre-specified lower limit, the pump station becomes operative and water is pumped from an external source to the tank. For certain small service zones, where there may not be sufficient customers, or enough consumption to justify installing a tank, a pump may feed water to customers directly. A pump station may be used in conjunction with hydro-pneumatic tanks, which are pressure tanks that can be used to store water at the correct hydraulic grade using a pressure head instead of elevation head. Because hydro-pneumatic tanks are expensive, they are only used for small service zones.

#### **4.2.2. Water Flow Pattern**

The critical components that comprise the LADWP water supply system are described in this section. These components are treated according to the general water flow pattern in the system, i.e., water source, aqueduct systems that transfer water from water source to Los Angeles, water treatment and distribution hub, Van Norman Complex, and major trunk lines.

##### *4.2.2.1. Water Sources*

LADWP has three sources to meet its water demands: the local groundwater basins, the Los Angeles Aqueducts, and purchases from Metropolitan Water District

(MWD) that acts as a regional water “wholesaler” providing water to water supply agencies, such as LADWP. Figure 4.4 shows the water sources of Los Angeles.

The local groundwater, most of which is provided by groundwater wells in the eastern San Fernando Valley, contributes about 15% of the total LADWP water supply (Toprak, 1998). The Los Angeles Aqueducts, owned by LADWP, include the First Los Angeles Aqueduct (FLAA) and Second Los Angeles Aqueduct (SLAA), both of which transport water from the Sierra Nevada Mountains in the northern California to Los Angeles. Water from the FLAA and SLAA accounts for roughly 50% of the LADWP water supply. MWD has two water sources: water from the northern California through the California Aqueduct (also known as the State Water Project - West Branch), and water from the Colorado River through the Colorado Aqueduct (also known as the State Water Project - East Branch). The purchased water from the MWD is normally supplied via the California Aqueduct, which connects to the LADWP system through the Foothill feeder. On average, the MWD provides LADWP with approximately 35% of water supply to make up the deficit between demand and supply from the FLAA, SLAA, and local groundwater basins. Water from northern California, including FLAA, SLAA and MWD water source, is the major water source (about 85%) for the LADWP system.

#### 4.2.2.2. *Aqueduct Systems*

Figure 4.5 shows an expanded view of Figure 4.4 in the vicinity of the connection between aqueduct system and LADWP distribution system. The FLAA and SLAA are connected with the Los Angeles Aqueduct Filtration Plant (LAAFP), and the California Aqueduct is connected with the Jensen Filtration Plant through the




Figure 4.4. LADWP System Water Sources

Foothill Feeder. Both filtration plants are located in the Van Norman Complex, a water treatment and distribution hub of the LADWP system.

The FLAA and SLAA originate from Owens Valley in the Sierra Nevada Mountains in northern California and terminate at the southern slope of Terminal Hill, connecting with the LADWP distribution system in Van Norman Complex. The






Figure 4.5. Aqueduct System and LADWP System Connection

FLAA passes beneath Terminal Hill in a tunnel and the SLAA traverses the steep ridge of Terminal Hill. To take advantage of the natural gradient from the Owens Valley (elevation of approximately 1200 meters above sea level) to Los Angeles (elevation near sea level), both aqueducts normally discharge water to the south side of Terminal Hill into above-ground penstocks, which convey water from the FLAA to the San Fernando Power Plant and water from the SLAA to the Foothill Power Plant,



to generate hydroelectricity for the operation of the Van Norman Complex and local residency usage. Water that does not flow to the power plant penstocks is automatically diverted to cascade structures on the southern slope of Terminal Hill to dissipate energy. Thereafter, water flows into the Van Norman Complex for treatment.

#### *4.2.2.3. Van Norman Complex*

As shown in Figures 4.2 and 4.5, Van Norman Complex is located in the northern San Fernando Valley, between the Granada Hills and Foothills subsystems. Van Norman Complex serves as the “heart” of the LADWP water supply system, receiving, treating, storing, and distributing water throughout the LADWP system. It controls about 80% of the water supply for the City of Los Angeles and 100% of the water supply for the northern San Fernando Valley. Figure 4.6 shows a Digital Ortho Photograph of Van Norman Complex. Van Norman Complex contains several critical water facilities, including the Jensen Filtration Plant, Los Angeles Aqueduct Filtration Plant (LAAFP), Van Norman Pump Stations No. 1 and 2, Los Angeles Reservoir, Van Norman Bypass Reservoir, and the origins of eight major trunk lines, i.e. Granada, Rinaldi, Susana, Foothill, Olden Street, Hayvenhurst, Haskell, and LA City Trunk Lines.

The water from the FLAA and SLAA and purchased raw water from MWD are treated in the LAAFP. As mentioned in the previous section, part of the water from the FLAA and SLAA is transported to the San Fernando Power Plant and Foothill Power Plant for generating hydroelectricity, respectively. The locations of the power plants in the Van Norman Complex are shown in Figure 4.7 (LADWP, 1997). After the San Fernando Power Plant, water from the FLAA flows through the Tailrace and




Figure 4.6. Overview of Van Norman Complex




Figure 4.7. Plan View of Water Facilities in Van Norman Complex (After LADWP, 1997)

Bypass Channel to the LAAFP for treatment. After the Foothill Power Plant, water from the SLAA flows through the High Speed Channel and Bypass Channel to the LAAFP for treatment. The other part of water from the FLAA and SLAA, which dissipates energy through the cascade structures, flows through the High Speed Channel and Bypass Channel to the LAAFP for treatment.

The Foothill Feeder, consisting of the Newhall and Balboa Tunnels, transports water from the California Aqueduct to the Jensen Filtration Plant. A plan view of the Jensen Filtration Plant in Van Norman Complex is shown in Figure 4.8 (Toprak, 1998). The Jensen Filtration Plant and Balboa Tunnel are connected by the Balboa Influent Conduit, which begins at the south portal of the Balboa Inlet Tunnel. Raw water purchased from MWD is transported through the Balboa Influent Conduit, the LA-35T, Tailrace, and the Bypass Channel to the LAAFP for treatment, as shown in Figures 4.7 and 4.8.

After treatment, potable water from the LAAFP is divided into three parts, one flowing into the Clearwell Tank, one being conveyed to the Rinaldi Trunk Line directly, and the remaining water filling the Los Angeles Reservoir and Van Norman Bypass Reservoir.

The water flowing into the Clearwell Tank, as shown by red arrows in Figure 4.6, is then pumped by Van Norman Pump Station No. 2 to the Van Norman Pump Station Discharge Line, which extends to the north of Van Norman Complex and supplies the Foothill, Olden Street, and Granada Trunk Lines sequentially. On the north of the connection between the Granada Trunk Line and the Van Norman Pump Station Discharge Line, water is further pumped by the Pen Stock Pump Station to the




Figure 4.8. MWD Transmission and Trunk Lines around Jensen Filtration Plant (After Toprak, 1998)



Susana Trunk Line. The water stored in the Los Angeles Reservoir and Van Norman Bypass Reservoirs, as indicated by blue arrows in Figure 4.6, is transported through the Los Angeles Reservoir Outlet and Van Norman Bypass Reservoir Outlets, supplying the Hayvenhurst, Haskell, and LA City Trunk Lines. The water being conveyed to the Rinaldi Trunk Line, as shown by pink arrows in Figure 4.6, supplies the northern and western San Fernando Valley directly.

Van Norman Complex also contains two critical MWD owned trunk lines, Sepulveda Feeder and LA-25 Trunk Line, both of which can provide potable water to the LADWP system through MWD connections under emergency conditions. The Sepulveda Feeder originates at the Jensen Filtration Plant and extends through Van Norman Complex to the Valley Floor, Encino Hills, Santa Monica Mountains, Westside, and Harbor subsystems. It is one of the major water sources for the Harbor subsystem in daily operation. In emergency situations, it can provide water to other service areas of the LADWP system through MWD/LADWP connections, which is described under subheading, 4.2.2.5 MWD Feeders and MWD/LADWP Connections. The LA-25 is capable of carrying water from the Jensen Filtration Plant and providing water to the eight major LADWP trunk lines mentioned above through the Van Norman Complex Pump Station No.1. To the north, it can supply water to the Granada, Foothill, Olden Street and Susana Trunk Lines through the Van Norman Pump Station Discharge Line. To the south, it can provide water to the Rinaldi, Hayvenhurst, Haskell, and LA City Trunk Lines. Therefore, if necessary, potable water from the Jensen Filtration Plant, operated by MWD, can be distributed to virtually every part of the LADWP system.

#### *4.2.2.4. Major LADWP Trunk Lines*

After treatment in Van Norman Complex, potable water is distributed into eight major trunk lines, the Susana, Granada, Foothill, Olden Street, Rinaldi, Hayvenhurst, Haskell, and LA City Trunk Lines, which transport water to different parts of the LADWP system. Figure 4.9 shows the major LADWP trunk lines, reservoirs and tanks, which serve as the main water source of each subsystem.

The Susana and Granada Trunk Lines both originate from the Clearwell tank in Van Norman Complex and mainly supply the northern and southern part of Granada Hills subsystem, respectively. The Granada Trunk Line also supplies water to part of the Valley Floor subsystem along the western rim of the San Fernando Valley.

The Foothill and Olden Street Trunk Lines also originate from the Clearwell tank in Van Norman Complex, but mainly supply the Foothills subsystem and eastern part of the Valley Floor subsystem. In addition, the Foothill Trunk Line fills the Green Verdugo Reservoir, which serves as the only water source of the Sunland/Tujunga subsystem.

The Rinaldi Trunk Line transports water from the LAAFP to the De Soto Reservoir, supplying water to the northern and western parts of the Valley Floor subsystem through the De Soto Trunk Line. The De Soto Trunk Line also provides water to the Encino Hills subsystem.

The Hayvenhurst Trunk Line transports water from the Los Angeles Reservoir and Van Norman Bypass Reservoir to the Valley Floor subsystem and the Encino




Figure 4.9. Major Trunk Lines, Reservoirs, and Tanks in LADWP System



Reservoir, which serves as the major source of the Encino Hills subsystem.

The Haskell Trunk Line, with the water from the Los Angeles Reservoir and Van Norman Bypass Reservoir, supplies the Valley Floor subsystem and provides a part of water to the Upper and Lower Stone Canyon Reservoirs through the Stone Canyon Trunk Line. The Upper and Lower Stone Canyon Reservoirs supply the Westside subsystem, through the Upper and Lower Stone Canyon Reservoir Outlets, and the Santa Ynez subsystem, through the Westgate Trunk Line.

The LA City Trunk Line transports water from the Los Angeles Reservoir and Van Norman Bypass Reservoir to the Valley Floor subsystem and the Lower Franklin Reservoir No. 2, which supplies the Central City Subsystem through the Venice - Franklin and Franklin - Baldwin Trunk Lines.

Hollywood Inlet and River Supply Conduit collect water from the Haskell and LA City Trunk Lines, as well as the water pumped from local ground water wells in the eastern San Fernando Valley and the water collected in the North Hollywood Forebay. The Hollywood Inlet provides water to the Hollywood Hills and Central City subsystems, and the River Supply Conduit mainly supplies the Eagle Rock Reservoir, Ivanhoe Reservoir, and Silverlake Reservoir. Then, the Eagle Rock Reservoir distributed water to the Highland Park and Mount Washington subsystems through the Eagle Rock-HWD Conduit and East LA Trunk Line. The Ivanhoe Reservoir supplies water to the Mount Washington and Central City subsystems through the Ivanhoe Reservoir Outlet. The Silverlake Reservoir supplies water to the Mount Washington and Central City Subsystems through the Silverlake Reservoir Outlet.

It is noted that, according to LADWP (2002a), the Harbor subsystem is not supplied by LADWP trunk lines (such as the Harbor Trunk Line), but by the MWD feeders, which are discussed in the next Section 4.2.2.5 MWD Feeders and MWD/LADWP Connections.

#### *4.2.2.5. MWD Feeders and MWD/LADWP Connections*

In addition to the major LADWP trunk lines mentioned above, the LADWP system also contains more than ten MWD feeders, spatially distributed among the system. Figure 4.10 shows the spatial distribution of the MWD feeders. The major MWD feeders include the East Valley, West Valley No. 1 and 2, Sepulveda, Santa Monica, and Palos Verdes Feeders. These feeders can supply water to the LADWP system through MWD/LADWP connections, as shown in Figure 4.10. In total, 30 connections in the LADWP system are identified in accordance with the LADWP hydraulic model (2002a). In normal situations, these connections do not supply water to the LADWP system, except for connections 21 and 16, both of which supply water to the Harbor subsystem during daily operation.

The East Valley Feeder receives water from the Colorado Aqueduct and extends along the east and north rim of the San Fernando Valley. In emergencies, it can supply water to the San Fernando Valley through connection LA-32. In addition, the East Valley Feeder connects with the Rinaldi Trunk Line and Sepulveda Feeder at connections LA-34A and LA-34B, respectively.

West Valley Feeder No. 1 and the Rinaldi Trunk Line are essentially the same pipeline, whose western portion, west of the De Soto Reservoir, is called the West




Figure 4.10. Major MWD Feeders and LADWP/MWD Connections

Valley Feeder No.1, as opposed to its eastern portion known as the Rinaldi Trunk Line. The Rinaldi Trunk Line is owned by MWD, but rented to LADWP. Because the Rinaldi Trunk Line supplies water to the LADWP system during daily operation, it is treated as a major LADWP trunk line in Section 4.2.2.4 Major LADWP Trunk Lines. In emergencies, the West Valley Feeder No. 1 can transport water from the MWD water source located in the western part of the San Fernando Valley to the LADWP system. Similarly, West Valley Feeder No. 2 is also capable of transporting MWD water from the west to the LADWP system through the LA-33 connection.

The MWD Sepulveda Feeder originates at the Jensen Filtration Plant and extends through the Valley Floor, Encino Hills, Santa Monica Mountains, Westside, and Harbor subsystems. It is one of the major water sources for the Harbor subsystem during daily operation by supplying water to the Palos Verdes Reservoir, and connecting with the LADWP system via connection LA-21. In emergency situations it can provide water to other LADWP service areas through the LA-29, 30, and 31 connections.

The Santa Monica Feeder transports water from the east of the San Fernando Valley to the LADWP system, extending through the Hollywood Hills, Santa Monica, and Westside subsystems. In emergencies, it can supply water to the LADWP customers through the LA-10 and 7 connections.

The Palos Verdes Feeder follows the eastern rim of the Central City subsystem and can supply water to the LADWP system through the LA-17, 2, 3, 1, 22, 13, 12, 4, 11, 8, 5, and 9 connections.

### **4.3. Operational Characteristics**

The LADWP system operational characteristics, such as the system operating procedure, monitoring, maintenance, and planning, are consolidated into a hydraulic network model (LADWP, 2002a) by LADWP engineers, using a commercial software, H2ONET (MWH Soft, Inc., 1999). H2ONET is an interactive, multi-application software program for the modeling of water distribution piping systems. It combines a point and click interface for network construction, drawing, and database management, highly advanced and computationally efficient hydraulic and water quality simulation modules based on EPANET (EPA, 2005), and a graphical interface running within the AutoCAD (Autodesk, 2005) for the Windows environment. H2ONET not only is capable of construction and maintenance of the comprehensive water supply system data inventory with reference to spatial coordinates, but also offers flexible data exchange with other software, such as EPANET and GIS, enabling integration with other relevant information and data.

The LADWP H2ONET hydraulic network model used in this research is developed under the supervision of LADWP engineers for system planning and management purposes. It contains all kinds of physical components in the system, such as tanks, reservoirs, pump stations, regulation stations, pipe, and user demands, as well as operational aspects of the system, such as behavior and control parameters for pump stations and regulation stations. It also contains twelve simulation scenarios, enabling hydraulic simulations of the entire LADWP system or parts of the system individually. More descriptions on the H2ONET hydraulic network model are provided in the following subheadings:

#### **4.3.1. Physical Components of H2ONET Hydraulic Network Model**

The H2ONET hydraulic network model contains 9,287 nodes and 10,665 links, representing about 2,186 km of pipelines, 230 regulation stations, 110 tanks and reservoirs, 151 local groundwater wells, and 73 pump stations. To control the water flows in different pipes or to provide redundancy to increase the performance reliability of the regulation stations, a regulation station usually contains multiple control valves, resulting in 591 valves in the 230 regulation stations, including 493 pressure reducing valves, 50 throttle control valves, 35 flow control valves, 8 user defined valves, and 5 pressure sustaining valves. Similarly, 73 pump stations contain 284 pumps, in addition to 151 pumps in 151 local groundwater wells.

Figures 4.11 and 4.12 show the statistics regarding pipe diameters and pipe materials, respectively. As shown in Figure 4.11, 90% of the pipelines, with respect to pipe length, in the H2ONET hydraulic network model have diameters larger than or equal to 305 mm (12 inch) and roughly half of pipelines have diameters larger than or equal to 610 mm (24 inch). Most of the pipelines with diameters smaller than 305 mm (12 inch) are in the mountainous areas where the water demand is small. Since the H2ONET hydraulic network model was originally used by LADWP engineers for system planning and management purposes, only pipelines with relatively large diameters or significant serviceability are included in the model. Most local distribution pipelines with relatively small diameters are included implicitly in the H2ONET hydraulic model by aggregating them to demand nodes. Figure 4.12 shows that 75% of the pipelines in the model are composed either of steel with slipped joints or cast iron.




Figure 4.11. Statistics on Pipe Diameter in LADWP H2ONET Hydraulic Model




Figure 4.12. Statistics on Pipe Material in LADWP H2ONET Hydraulic Model

#### 4.3.2. Operational Aspects of H2ONET Hydraulic Network Model

The H2ONET hydraulic network model also contains a comprehensive data inventory describing operational aspects of the LADWP system and other relevant information required for hydraulic analysis. The operational aspects include the pre-defined setting parameters for each regulation valve, such as pressure setting for

pressure reducing valves, pump characteristic curves for each pump representing the relationship between the variations of hydraulic heads as a function of the flow rate through the pump, pump net positive suction head curves used in the design and evaluation of pumping systems for cavitations avoidance, and controls on links (pipes, valves, or pumps) indicating a change in the operational status of the links.

Controls on links (pipes, valves, or pumps) include initial status, operational and logic controls. The most common types of controls include pipes and pumps going on/off line, and changes in pump speed and valve setting. Initial status controls specify the operational status of the link at the outset of simulation. Operational controls allow for pipe, pump, and valve settings to be changed at specific times (time switch), pressures (pressure switch), link flow rates (flow switch), or tank water levels (grade switch). With logic controls, control rules can be defined using decision logic to permit more flexibility and robustness in the ways that operation of water distribution networks can be simulated. They can be combined using standard If, Elseif, and Else logic statements, and logical connectors such as Not, And, and Or. The logic controls in the daily operation of the LADWP system are mostly applied to pumps. General control rules for pumps are as follows: a pump will be turned on if the downstream nodal pressure or the water level of the tank it serves is lower than a specific level; the pump will be turned off if the downstream nodal pressure and tank water level are higher than specific levels, or the net positive suction head on the upstream side of the pump is lower than the required level. The pump net positive suction head curve is based on pump performance tests and is normally available from pump manufacturers.



Other relevant information required for hydraulic analysis includes:

- Geocoordinates and elevation of every node, as well as nodal demands, typically given by demand patterns used to characterize the variation of demands with time.
- Length, diameter, and friction loss coefficient of each pipe.
- Bottom elevation and location of each reservoir and local groundwater well.
- Bottom elevation, location, shape characteristics, and minimum and maximum level of each tank.

#### **4.3.3. Simulation Scenarios of H2ONET Hydraulic Network Model**

H2ONET allows for users to develop multiple specific simulation scenarios for one water distribution system model, or to simulate the entire system or parts of the system individually. When modeling parts of the system, some virtual components are added to represent the other parts of the system, based on the flow input-output relationships. For example, if the parts of the system simulated receive water from other parts of the system, which are not included in the model, then a virtual tank is added to represent them as an external water source.

To model different operational scenarios with different demands, the LADWP H2ONET hydraulic network model contains twelve scenarios as follows:

- PLANNING\_MODEL\_NO\_CV, All thirteen Subsystems without closed valves
- SUMMER, All thirteen Subsystems without closed valves

- S\_12 SUBMODELS, Entire planning model except Harbor
- SUMMER-12, Entire planning model except for Harbor
- S\_HARBOR, Subsystem Harbor only
- SUMMER\_HARBOR, Subsystem Harbor only
- S\_VALLYISIX, Subsystems VF, GH, FH, ST, SM, and EH
- SUMMER\_VALLYISIX, Subsystems VF, GH, FH, ST, SM, and EH
- S\_CITYSIX, Subsystems CC, HH, HW, HP, WS, and SY
- SUMMER\_CITY, Subsystems CC, HH, HW, HP, WS, and SY
- S\_RESERVOIRS, Subsystems VF, SM, HH, WS, and CC
- SUMMER\_RESERVOIRS, Subsystems VF, SM, HH, WS, and CC

The twelve scenarios can be used to simulate the entire LADWP system or parts of the system individually for summer and winter, respectively. The PLANNING\_MODEL\_NO\_CV scenario is a planning model for the entire system including all of the thirteen subsystems. The other five scenarios are used to model the system without the Harbor subsystem (S\_12 SUBMODELS), only the Harbor subsystem (S\_HARBOR), six subsystems, VF, GH, FH, ST, SM, and EH, around the San Fernando Valley (S\_VALLYISIX), six subsystems, CC, HH, HW, HP, WS and SY, around the Central City (S\_CITYSIX), five subsystems, VF, SM, HH, WS, and CC, which are supplied by water from the Los Angeles and Van Norman Bypass Reservoirs (S\_RESERVOIRS). Two different demand sets, winter or summer demands, respectively, are simulated for the whole LADWP system or each subsystem set, resulting in twelve simulation scenarios in total. It is noted that the LADPW hydraulic network model also contains the third set of demand data, historical high demand, 70% or 30% of which are considered as typical summer or winter demands,

respectively, except for the larger users, whose summer and winter demands are considered the same as the historical high demand.

#### **4.4. Summary**

This chapter describes the characteristics of the LADWP water supply system. The LADWP system provides water to about 3.8 million people in a service area of approximately 1,200 km<sup>2</sup>. The total water consumption of the LADWP system in a typical summer and winter day is about  $2.5 \times 10^6$  and  $1.2 \times 10^6$  m<sup>3</sup>, respectively. About 85% of the water is transferred from northern California and treated in the Van Norman Complex before distribution, primarily by gravity flow from north to south throughout the LADWP service area. The system is divided into five water districts, thirteen subsystems, and 106 pressure zones. The system characteristics are embodied in a H2ONET hydraulic network model. The H2ONET hydraulic network model was developed under the supervision of LADWP engineers. It contains 9,287 nodes and 10,665 links, representing about 2,186 km of pipelines, 1,052 demand nodes, 591 control valves, 110 tanks and reservoirs, 151 local groundwater wells, and 284 pumps. The H2ONET hydraulic network model contains both typical winter and summer demand sets. It is capable of simulating the entire LADWP system, as well as various portions of the system.



## CHAPTER 5

### SEISMIC BODY WAVE EFFECTS ON PIPELINES

#### 5.1. Introduction

The earthquake performance of a water supply system is often closely related to the performance of water trunk and transmission lines, whose seismic wave interactions are examined in this chapter. The chapter starts with characterizing the seismic body waves, followed by analytical and finite element (FE) modeling of seismic wave-pipeline interactions. Attention is then directed to a particular class of pipelines, used for trunk and transmission facilities in North America, referred to collectively in this work as jointed concrete cylinder pipelines (JCCPs). The performance of JCCPs during previous earthquakes and typical JCCP joint characteristics are reviewed. Both simplified and FE models are developed to characterize seismic body wave effects on pipelines with or without existing cracked joints. The effect of the mortar cracking strain at the joints is discussed. Models for JCCP interaction with seismic body waves are expanded to accommodate other pipelines containing locally weak joints, such as cast iron pipelines, by appropriate modification of the joint characteristics. This chapter focuses on seismic body wave effects on pipelines, and a parallel study on seismic surface wave effects on pipelines is reported by Shi (2006).

## **5.2. Seismic Body Wave Characteristics**

Two types of seismic waves occur during earthquakes: body waves which propagate within a body of earth, and surface waves whose motion is restricted to near the ground surface. The body waves are generated by seismic faulting, while for the simplest case surface waves are generated by the reflection and refraction of body waves at the ground surface. There are two types of body waves: P-waves (compressional wave) and S-waves (shear waves). P-waves, whose ground motion is in the same direction as the wave propagation, generate alternating compressional and tensile strain. In contrast, the ground motion of S-waves is perpendicular to the direction of wave propagation. Surface waves include Rayleigh waves and Love waves. Most of the seismic surface wave motion is located near the ground surface, and as the depth below this surface increases, wave displacements decrease.

Since pipelines are typically buried within the shallow depth, i.e., 1 to 3 m, below the ground surface, both body and surface waves may influence the performance of pipelines during earthquakes. A systematic study on the seismic body wave effects on pipelines is presented in this chapter. For counterpart study of the seismic surface wave effects on pipelines, please refer to Shi (2006).

### **5.2.1. Typical Strong Motion Ground Velocity Record**

Figure 5.1 shows the ground velocity record at Rinaldi receiving substation during the 1994 Northridge earthquake (Trifunac et al., 1998). P-waves firstly arrived the site at about Time = 1.5 sec, quickly followed by S-waves at about Time = 2.0 sec, which generated the largest velocity pulse in the record. Please note that no surface




Figure 5.1. Ground Velocity Record at Rinaldi Station during 1994 Northridge Earthquake

waves can be discerned from the record. Generally speaking, if surface waves are present because of certain local geological setting, such as large sedimentary basins, they occur a certain time after the arrival of direct body waves when the ground motion generated from body waves is diminishing. Therefore, strong velocity pulses at the beginning of a record are general distinct and recognizable with respect to surface wave effects.

Figure 5.1 also indicates that S-waves carry much more energy and generate much larger ground motion than P-waves. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider only the S-waves and neglect the P-waves in seismic body wave interaction with pipelines, as recommended by O'Rourke and Liu (1999).

### 5.2.2. Near Source Strong Ground Motion Characteristics

To characterize further the near source seismic body waves, 18 near source strong ground motion records were collected from Consortium of Organizations for Strong-Motion Observation Systems (COSMOS) Virtual data center (COSMOS, 2004), as summarized in Table 5.1. The collected strong ground motion records include eight records from the 1994 Northridge earthquake, four records from the 1995 Kobe earthquake, five records from the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, and one from the 1992 Landers earthquake. All the recording stations are rested on soils, subjected to free field motion, and located within 12 km to the faults generating the earthquakes. COSMOS performed baseline correction, which accounts for the error caused by the level of motion at the time of record triggering, for all records. The records with seismic surface wave presence were screened out to allow the concentration on the characteristics of the seismic body waves.

Two horizontal components of the strong ground motion records, which are perpendicular to each other, are combined to determine the maximum vector peak ground velocity,  $V_p$ , and the corresponding direction. As shown in Figure 5.1, the typical records are characterized by the first arrival of P-waves, followed by a single pulse with an amplitude of  $V_p$  generated by the S-waves, and then diminish gradually. In the context of seismic body wave interaction with pipeline, where the maximum pipeline strain depends only on the  $V_p$  and apparent wave propagation velocity,  $C$  (please refer to Section 5.3 for details), the waveform of the strong ground motion records can be simplified as a sinusoidal pulse with the same  $V_p$  and  $C$ . The direction of particle motion for the S-waves can be defined by the direction of  $V_p$ , whose perpendicular direction also defines the wave propagation direction. Wald et al. (1996)



Table 5.1. Near Source Strong Ground Motion Characteristics

Earthquake	Station	Latitude (°)	Longitude (°)	Closest Distance To Fault (km)	Max. PGV (cm/sec)	Max. Vector Azimuth	Original Pulse Period T <sub>0</sub> (sec)	Sine Pulse Period T (sec)	T/T <sub>0</sub>
<b>Northridge</b>	Arleta - San Valley	34.236	-118.439	9.5	41	S82W	0.96	0.84	0.87
	Jensen Filtration Plant Admin. Bldg	34.312	-118.496	8.6	106	S20W	1.92	1.55	0.81
	Newhall - LA County Fire Station	34.387	-118.530	10.9	119	S38W	0.92	0.75	0.82
	Pacoima -Kagel Canyon	34.288	-118.375	10.6	56	S26W	0.76	0.66	0.87
	Rinaldi Receiving Station	34.281	-118.479	8.6	179	S31W	1.52	1.09	0.72
	Sun Valley 13248 Roscoe Blvd	34.221	-118.421	10.5	43	S78W	1.00	0.86	0.86
	Sylmar Converter Station (Valve Group 1-6)	34.311	-118.490	8.7	130	S13W	1.86	1.65	0.89
	Sylmar Converter Station (Valve Group 7)	34.311	-118.490	8.7	122	S58W	1.65	1.46	0.89
	Nishi - Osaka	34.664	134.964	11.1	39	S71W	0.60	0.54	0.90
	OSAJ	34.678	135.520	8.5	20	N32W	2.04	1.87	0.92
<b>Kobe</b>	Takarazuka	34.809	135.344	1.2	90	N18E	0.92	0.83	0.90
	Takatori	34.649	135.612	0.3	170	N43W	1.56	1.45	0.93

Table 5.1. (Continued)

Earthquake	Station	Latitude (°)	Longitude (°)	Closest Distance To Fault (km)	Max. PGV (cm/sec)	Max. Vector Azimuth	Original Pulse Period $T_0$ (sec)	Sine Pulse Period T (sec)	$T/T_0$
<b>Loma Prieta</b>	Corralitos	37.046	-121.803	2.8	56	S10E	0.56	0.50	0.89
	Gilroy # 1	36.973	-121.572	2.8	39	N39E	0.72	0.64	0.89
	Gilroy # 2	36.982	121.556	4.5	46	N47E	1.52	1.35	0.89
	Gilroy # 3	36.987	-121.536	6.3	49	N46E	1.44	1.18	0.82
<b>Landers</b>	Gilroy # 4	37.005	-121.522	7.9	40	N65E	1.28	1.13	0.88
	Joshua Tree	34.131	-116.314	10	46	S29W	1.04	1.02	0.98




Figure 5.2. Original and Simplified Sinusoidal Pulses for Strong Ground Motion Record at Rinaldi Station during 1994 Northridge Earthquake

studied the strong ground motion records from previous California earthquakes and crustal conditions and estimated the  $C$  equal to 2.5 km/sec for west coast earthquakes.

Figure 5.2 shows the original waveform for strong ground motion at Rinaldi station during the 1994 Northridge Earthquake (Figure 5.1) and the corresponding simplified sinusoidal pulse. The sinusoidal pulse is simplified in such that both  $V_p$ s occur at the same time and the areas under both pulses are the same. Table 5.1 summarizes the periods for both original and simplified sinusoidal pulses,  $T_0$  and  $T$ , and the ratio between them. The simplified sinusoidal pulse represents the characteristics of the original strong ground motion record reasonably well, indicating by the same  $V_p$  value at the same time and a high value of period ratio, 0.72-0.98.

### 5.2.3. Resolution of Particle and Wave Velocities Relative to Pipeline

Figure 5.3 shows a pipeline subjected to shear wave propagation with an angle of incidence,  $\gamma_i$ , with respect to the normal of the pipelines. The S-wave propagation velocity,  $C$ , and particle velocity,  $V$ , can be resolved into apparent S-wave propagation velocity,  $C_a$ , and particle velocity,  $V_a$ , directed along the longitudinal axis of the pipeline, respectively. The  $C_a$  and  $V_a$  can be expressed as:

$$C_a = C/\sin\gamma_i \quad (5.1)$$

$$V_a = V\cos\gamma_i \quad (5.2)$$

The  $C_a$  and  $V_a$  induce ground strain parallel to the pipeline, which can be derived as the ratio of  $V_a$  over  $C_a$  and results in the axial strain along the pipeline. The detailed description of the seismic wave-pipeline interaction is discussed in the next Section: Seismic Wave Interactions with Pipelines.

The magnitudes of  $V_a$  and  $C_a$  depend on the incidence angle  $\gamma_i$ . Particle motion in S-waves occurs at the right angle to the direction of wave propagation. If a seismic S-wave intersects the longitudinal axis of a pipeline at  $\gamma_i = 0^\circ$ , all particle motion is imposed along the longitudinal axis of the pipeline at the same magnitude in the same direction simultaneously. This leads to a  $C_a$  that is infinite and the strain along the pipeline that is zero. As  $\gamma_i$  changes from a  $0^\circ$  angle of incidence to an acute angle that becomes increasingly larger,  $C_a$  decreases until it equals  $C$ , the wave propagation velocity in the free field, while  $V_a$  also decreases from  $V$  to 0. This occurs when both the seismic wave propagation and pipeline are in the same direction, resulting in zero




Figure 5.3. Pipeline Subjected to Shear Wave Propagation

axial strain along the pipeline.

### 5.3. Seismic Wave Interactions with Pipelines

Simplified procedures for assessing seismic wave interaction with pipelines were first developed by Newmark (1967), and have since been used and/or extended by a number of researchers. The study presented in this chapter follows some basic assumptions proposed by Newmark (1967). The first assumption is that the seismic ground motions (i.e., acceleration, velocity and displacement time histories) at two points along the propagation path differ only by a time lag. That is, the excitation is modeled as a traveling wave. The second assumption is that pipeline inertia terms are small and may be neglected. Experimental evidence (Kubo, 1974) as well as analytical studies (Sakurai and Takahashi, 1969; and Shinozuka and Koibe, 1979) indicates that

this is a reasonable engineering approximation. The assumptions lead to the expression of ground strain parallel to pipe axis,  $\epsilon_g$ , as following:

$$\epsilon_g = V_a/C_a \quad (5.3)$$

where  $V_a$  and  $C_a$  are the ground velocity and the apparent wave propagation velocity along the axial direction of the pipeline and defined by Eqns 5.1 and 5.2, respectively. Combining Eqns 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 leads to

$$\epsilon_g = \frac{V \sin \gamma_i \cos \gamma_i}{C} \quad (5.4)$$

which can be rewritten as

$$\epsilon_g = \frac{V \sin 2\gamma_i}{2C} \quad (5.5)$$

Eqn 5.5 implies that  $\epsilon_g$  varies as the  $\gamma_i$  changes. When the pipeline is oriented with an incidence angle,  $\gamma_i = 45^\circ$ , maximum ground strain,  $\epsilon_{g\max} = V/2C$ , occurs along the axial direction of the pipeline. Minimum ground strain,  $\epsilon_{g\min} = 0$ , occurs when  $\gamma_i = 0^\circ$  or  $90^\circ$ .

When the direction of  $C_a$  is in the same direction as the polarity, or direction of  $V_a$ , the longitudinal strain imposed on the pipe is compressive. When the direction of  $C_a$  is in the opposite direction as the polarity, or direction of  $V_a$ , the longitudinal strain imposed on the pipe is tensile. Pipelines may have different resistance against compressive or tensile loads because of their structure and joint characteristics.

Consider, for example, JCCPs which are more vulnerable under tension than under compression as a result of low pullout capacity at the joints (see Section 5.4.2).

### 5.3.1. Analytical Model

An analytical model for the pipeline interactions with seismic waves, which are simplified as sinusoidal waves, is presented in the section. Section 5.2 shows that the seismic body wave can be simplified as a single S-wave pulse. Similarly, Shi (2006) studied the seismic surface wave characteristics and found that the seismic surface waves can be characterized by several cycles of sinusoidal waves with constant amplitude and period. Therefore, the model described in this section is applicable for both seismic body and surface waves.

Figure 5.4 shows an incremental section of a continuous buried pipeline,  $dx$ , subjected to a seismic wave, simplified as a sinusoidal wave with maximum amplitude of ground strain  $\epsilon_{gmax} = V_{ap}/C_a$ , where  $V_{ap}$  and  $C_a$  are the peak ground velocity and apparent wave propagation velocity along the axial direction of the pipeline, respectively. The shear transfer between pipe and soil is  $f$ , and the pipe axial stiffness is equal to the product of the pipe material modulus,  $E$ , and cross-sectional area,  $A$ . The rate of pipe strain,  $\epsilon_p$ , accumulation is given by

$$\frac{d\epsilon_p}{dx} = \frac{f}{EA} \quad (5.6)$$

If the ratio of  $V_{ap}/C_a$  to the rise distance,  $\lambda/4$ , is defined as  $R$




Figure 5.4. Sinusoidal Wave Interaction with Pipe Element

$$R = \frac{4V_{ap}}{\lambda C_a} \quad (5.7)$$

where  $\lambda$  is the wave length along the axial direction of the pipeline, expressed as

$$\lambda = TC_a \quad (5.8)$$

where  $T$  is predominant period of the seismic waves.  $R$  characterizes the seismic body waves and can be rapidly discerned from strong motion records.

When the pipeline is axially flexible with respect to ground strain accumulation, no relative displacement occurs between the surrounding soils and the pipeline, and the pipeline deforms coincidentally with the ground surrounding the pipeline, resulting in  $\epsilon_p = \epsilon_g$  everywhere the pipeline is continuous. The ratio between maximum pipe strain,  $\epsilon_{pmax}$ , and  $\epsilon_{gmax}$ , is equal to 1:



$$\frac{\epsilon_{p \max}}{\epsilon_{g \max}} = 1 \quad (5.9)$$

On the other hand, when the pipeline is relatively rigid with respect to axial ground strain accumulation, relative displacement occurs between soil and pipeline. The strain in the continuous pipeline will accumulate linearly at a slope of  $f/EA$ . The soil-pipeline interaction for the relatively rigid pipeline subjected to seismic waves is shown in Figure 5.5. Please note that the pipeline is a linear structure, which may be considered symmetric at each location along the pipeline. Also, the seismic sinusoidal wave is symmetric at each amplitude and anti-symmetric at each location of  $\epsilon_g = 0$ . Therefore, as a result of the symmetric structure subjected to symmetric loading or anti-symmetric loading, the pipeline strain will attain its maximum value,  $\epsilon_{p \max}$ , at each seismic wave amplitude and will be zero at each location of  $\epsilon_g = 0$ . The  $\epsilon_{p \max}$  can be calculated as:

$$\epsilon_{p \max} = \frac{f \lambda}{EA 4} \quad (5.10)$$

This leads to a ratio between  $\epsilon_{p \max}$  and  $\epsilon_{g \max}$  expressed as:

$$\frac{\epsilon_{p \max}}{\epsilon_{g \max}} = \frac{\frac{f \lambda}{EA 4}}{\frac{V_{ap}}{C_a}} = \frac{f \lambda C_a}{EA 4V_{ap}} = \frac{f}{EAR} \quad (5.11)$$

Combining Eqns 5.9 and 5.11 not only unites the relationship between  $\epsilon_{p \max}/\epsilon_{g \max}$  and  $f/EAR$  for both flexible and rigid pipeline, but also establishes the criterion on




Figure 5.5. Seismic Wave-pipeline Interaction for Rigid Pipeline

determining the pipeline is either flexible or rigid. When  $f/EAR \geq 1$ , the pipeline is axially flexible with respect to ground deformation induced by seismic waves and

$$\frac{\epsilon_{p \max}}{\epsilon_{g \max}} = 1 \quad (5.12)$$

When  $f/EAR < 1$ , the pipeline is relatively rigid and the pipe strain is less than ground strain. The ratio of maximum strains can be expressed as

$$\frac{\epsilon_{p \max}}{\epsilon_{g \max}} = \frac{f}{EAR} \quad (5.13)$$

### 5.3.2. Finite Element Model

A set of finite element (FE) simulations were performed, using the program BSTRUCT (Chang, 2006; and Goh and O'Rourke, 2000), to verify both the seismic wave-pipeline interaction model and  $\epsilon_{pmax}/\epsilon_{gmax}$  and  $f/EAR$  relationship described above.

#### 5.3.2.1. FE Analysis Setup

Figure 5.6 shows a schematic of the FE model. The pipeline was modeled with beam column elements that were connected to the ground by spring-slider elements capable of representing shear transfer as an elasto-plastic process. Strong motion time history, which is simplified as a sinusoidal wave, was converted to displacement versus distance records by assuming that  $X = C_a t$ , in which  $X$  is distance,  $t$  is time from the strong motion recording, and  $C_a$  is calculated from Eqn 5.1 with  $C$  equals to 2.5 km/sec. The seismic displacement versus distance record was superimposed on the spring-slider elements, which then conveyed ground movement to pipeline by means of the elasto-plastic properties utilized to characterize the spring-sliders. As recommended by the ASCE Committee on Gas and Liquid Fuel Lifelines (CGLFL, 1984), Figure 5.7 shows that the relation between  $f$  and relative pipe-soil displacement was modeled as a bilinear relationship with linear rise to  $f$  at a relative displacement of 3 mm and constant  $f$  thereafter. In total, 12 FE simulations with  $f/EAR$  varying from 0.01 to 11 were performed to verify the seismic wave-pipeline interaction model. The variation of  $f/EAR$  is achieved by changing either  $f$ ,  $EA$ , or  $R$  intentionally.




Figure 5.6. Finite Element Model for Seismic Wave and Pipeline Interaction




Figure 5.7. Shear Transfer and Soil-pipe Relative Displacement Relationship

#### 5.3.2.2. Flexible Pipe Behavior

In total 12 FE simulations, flexible pipe behavior is expected in 5 FE simulations, which have  $f/EAR \geq 1$ . Figure 5.8 shows the typical results of the 5 simulations. The pipe strain,  $\epsilon_p$ , and ground strain,  $\epsilon_g$ , are shown by open triangles and rectangles, respectively. It is evident that the pipeline moves together with the ground and  $\epsilon_p = \epsilon_g$  everywhere along the pipeline. No relative displacement occurs between the surrounding soils and the pipeline, and the pipeline deforms coincidentally with the ground surrounding the pipeline. The FE results confirm that the analytical model for the flexible pipe behavior is appropriate.

#### 5.3.2.3. Rigid Pipe Behavior

Figure 5.9 shows a FE simulation result with a  $f/EAR = 0.559$ . Relative displacement occurs between the pipeline and the surrounding soils, and  $\epsilon_p$  does not




Figure 5.8. FE Results for Flexible Pipes




Figure 5.9. FE Results for Rigid Pipes




Figure 5.10.  $\epsilon_{pmax}/\epsilon_{gmax}$  and  $f/EAR$  Relationship

equal to the  $\epsilon_g$  of surrounding soils. The  $\epsilon_p$  varies linearly at a slope of  $f/EA$  with the maximum occurred at amplitudes of the  $\epsilon_g$  and  $\epsilon_p = 0$  occurred at  $\epsilon_g = 0$ . The  $\epsilon_{pmax}/\epsilon_{gmax}$  ratio from the FE result is about 0.553, which is remarkably consistent with  $f/EAR$ , i.e., 0.559. The FE simulation results indicate that the analytical model is able to depict the rigid pipe behavior reasonable well.

#### 5.3.2.4. $\epsilon_{pmax}/\epsilon_{gmax}$ and $f/EAR$ Relationship

Figure 5.10 plots the data pairs of  $\epsilon_{pmax}/\epsilon_{gmax}$  and  $f/EAR$  from the twelve FE simulations by triangles. The FE results show that  $\epsilon_{pmax}/\epsilon_{gmax}$  increases as the  $f/EAR$  increases from 0 to 1, and remains constant, i.e., 1, after  $f/EAR$  is greater than 1. The proposed  $\epsilon_{pmax}/\epsilon_{gmax}$  and  $f/EAR$  relationship in accordance with the analytical model is

also plotted in Figure 5.10. It is evident that the FE results are consistent with the proposed relationship.

### 5.3.3. Calculating Shear Transfer $f$

O'Rourke (1998) summarized the approaches of calculating shear transfer between soils and pipelines, which is generally adopted in soil-pipeline interaction modeling. For a pipeline buried in cohesionless soil, the maximum shear transfer per unit distance,  $f$ , is

$$f = 0.5(1 + K_0)\gamma z_p \pi D \tan \delta \quad (5.14)$$


in which  $z_p$  is the depth to pipe centerline,  $\gamma$  is soil unit weight,  $K_0$  is the coefficient of at-rest horizontal soil stress (generally  $0.5 \leq K_0 \leq 1.0$  for pipe in backfilled trenches),  $\delta$  is the angle of interface frictional resistance, and  $D$  is the outside pipe diameter. The angle of interface friction for sands between pipe and soil generally varies between  $25^\circ$  and  $45^\circ$

If the pipeline is buried in cohesive soil, the maximum  $f$  is


$$f = \alpha s_u \pi D \quad (5.15)$$

in which  $s_u$  is the undrained shear strength of the surrounding soil and  $\alpha$  is an adhesion factor that accounts for the degree of bonding between the pipe and soil. Figure 5.11 shows the relationship between  $\alpha$  and  $s_u$  developed by Chen and Kulhawy (1994), Kulhawy and Chen (2003), and ASCE Committee on Gas and Liquid Fuel Lifelines





(a) Chen and Kulhawy (1994) and Kulhawy and Chen (2003)



(b) CGLFL (1984)

Figure 5.11. Relationship between  $\alpha$  and  $s_u(CIUC)/p_a$

(CGLFL, 1984). Following the format of Chen and Kulhawy (1994) and Kulhawy and Chen (2003),  $s_u$  determined from isotropically consolidated undrained triaxial compression, CIUC, tests is normalized with respect to atmospheric pressure,  $p_a = 101.3 \text{ kN/m}^2$ . For shallow buried pipelines in recompacted, overconsolidated clay, a reasonable range for  $s_u(\text{CIUC})/p_a$  would be 0.5 to 1.0, for which the adhesion between pipe and soil,  $\alpha_{s_u}$ , varies between 25 and 60  $\text{kN/m}^2$ .

It is worthwhile to point out that Goh et al. (2005) reanalyzed the database from Chen and Kulhawy (1994) using a Bayesian neural network approach and found that there is a clear trend of decreasing  $\alpha$  value with increasing mean effective overburden stress,  $\sigma'_{vm}$ , and increasing undrained strength ratio,  $s_u/\sigma'_{vm}$ . Because pipelines are typically buried at a shallow depth, i.e., 1 to 3 m, below the ground surface, the  $s_u/\sigma'_{vm}$  ratio might be relatively large, resulting in relatively small  $\alpha$  value.

Please also note that the effects of the constructions can be accounted for by properly modifying Eqns 5.14 and 5.15, although the detailed discussion regarding the effects of constructions on the pipe performance is beyond the scope of this study. The  $K_0$  value in Eqn 5.14 or  $\alpha$  value in Eqn 5.15 can be modified to consider the effects of constructions. A suite of modification factors for  $K_0$ , originally developed by Kulhawy et al. (1983) for pile foundations, might be applicable for the calculation of shear transfer between the pipe and the surrounding soil.

#### **5.3.4. Typical Range of f/EAR for Water Trunk Lines**

The typical range of f/EAR for water trunk lines when affected by seismic body waves can be estimated by considering the typical ranges for all the input

parameters necessary for calculating  $f/EAR$ , which include  $\alpha_{su}$  (25 to 60 kN/m<sup>2</sup>) for cohesive soils,  $K_0$  (0.5 to 1.0),  $\gamma$  (or  $\gamma'$ , 6 to 20 kN/m<sup>3</sup>),  $z_p$  (1 to 3 m), and  $\delta$  (25° to 45°) for cohesionless soils, pipe diameter  $D$  (610 to 2540 mm), pipe wall thickness (4 to 254 mm),  $E$  ( $200 \times 10^6$  kPa for steel and  $26 \times 10^6$  kPa for concrete),  $V_p$  (up to 200 cm/sec),  $C$  (2500 m/sec), and  $T$  (1 to 2 sec). When the pipe is oriented with a 55° incidence angle with respect to the shear wave propagation direction, the maximum  $R$  occurs. Combining 55° incidence angle with ranges for other input parameters results in a minimum  $f/EAR$  of about 8, as indicated in Figure 5.10. It is evident that the typical range is much greater than 1 and that the water trunk lines tend to behave as flexible pipes when affected by seismic body waves. Rigid pipe behavior only occurs under extremely adverse conditions, such as surrounding by liquefied soils, where the  $f$  approaches 0, resulting in  $f/EAR$  less than 1.

Rigid pipe behavior tends to occur when the water trunk lines are affected by the seismic surface waves, which are characterized by moderate  $V_p$  with low  $C$ , resulting in a much larger  $\epsilon_p$ , larger  $R$ , and smaller  $f/EAR$  (Shi, 2006). For more details on the seismic surface wave interaction with pipelines, please refer to Shi (2006).

### 5.3.5. Model Applications

With known ground conditions, pipeline properties, and seismic wave characteristics,  $f/EAR$  can be calculated and the pipe behavior under seismic wave loading can be predicted in accordance with the model described in the previous sections. Consider, for example, a steel pipe with 1524-mm diameter and 10-mm wall thickness subjected to a near source velocity pulse with  $V_p = 200$  cm/sec,  $C = 2500$

m/sec, and  $T = 1$  sec. The pipeline is oriented with a  $45^\circ$  incidence angle with respect to the S-wave propagation direction and buried at a depth of 1.69 m to the center of pipeline in soils with  $\gamma = 18.5 \text{ kN/m}^3$  and  $\delta = 25^\circ$ . The  $f$  and  $f/\text{EAR}$  are calculated as 54.3 kN/m and 13, respectively. Because  $f/\text{EAR}$  is larger than 1, the steel pipe behaves as a flexible pipe.  $\epsilon_p = \epsilon_g$  everywhere along the pipe and the variation of  $\epsilon_p$  also follows a sinusoidal function of distance. The maximum pipe strain equals to the maximum ground strain, which is  $V_{ap}/C_a = 0.0004$ . If the surrounding soils liquefy and the shear transfer  $f$  between the liquefied soils and the pipe is reduced to 2 kN/m,  $f/\text{EAR}$  reduces to 0.45 and the pipe behaves as a rigid pipe. The  $\epsilon_p$  varies linearly with the maximum occurred at amplitudes of the  $\epsilon_g$  and  $\epsilon_p = 0$  occurred at  $\epsilon_g = 0$ , as shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.9. The  $\epsilon_{p\text{max}}/\epsilon_{g\text{max}}$  ratio is about 0.45 and  $\epsilon_{p\text{max}} = 0.00018$ .

## **5.4. Seismic Body Wave Interaction with JCCPs**

The seismic body wave interaction with a particular class of pipelines used for trunk and transmission facilities in North America, referred to collectively in this work as jointed concrete cylinder pipelines (JCCPs), is further studied in this section. In this work the term JCCPs is used to represent pipelines composed of reinforced concrete and steel cylinders that are coupled with mortared, rubber-gasket bell-and-spigot joints. Pipe lengths are generally 6 to 12 m. Governing standards for the current design of such pipelines include AWWA C301 (AWWA, 1999) and C303 (AWWA, 2003).

### **5.4.1. Performance of JCCPs during Previous Earthquakes**

The performance of JCCPs during previous earthquakes has varied significantly, depending on their structural and joint characteristics and on the location

and nature of the transient ground deformation (TGD) and permanent ground deformation (PGD) they were subjected to. Ayala and O'Rourke (1989) reported significant repairs in JCCPs after the 1979 Guerrero and 1985 Michoacan earthquakes. Repairs were concentrated at the joints of the trunk and transmission pipelines, and were especially severe for the 1985 Michoacan earthquake. For example, there were 60 repairs in Federal District JCCP transmission lines, which conveyed water to Mexico City, resulting in a relatively high repair rate of 1.7 repair/km. Ayala and O'Rourke (1989) reported that most of the water system damage did not coincide with locations of PGD, but was due to the effects of seismic wave propagation.

Damage to JCCP trunk lines after the 1994 Northridge earthquake was also high. Lund and Cooper (1995) reported that significant damage was sustained by 1370-mm- and 838-mm-diameter JCCP trunk lines in the Santa Clarita Valley at welded compound bends and as pullout of rubber gasket joints on long horizontal reaches. They further reported that there were fifteen to twenty major pulled joints on a 1980-mm-diameter JCCP trunk line in Simi Valley. In all cases, there is strong evidence that significant damage was caused by TGD.

In contrast, damage to JCCP trunk lines after the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake was low (Eidinger, 1998). The significantly different performance of JCCPs when subjected to seismic wave propagation invites a systematic study on the seismic wave interaction with JCCPs, which includes studies on the typical JCCP joint characteristics, on developing both simplified and FE models to characterize the seismic body wave effects on the JCCPs with or without existing cracked joints, and on the effect of the mortar cracking strain at the joints.


## 5.4.2. JCCP Characteristics

### 5.4.2.1. JCCP Joint Details


Figure 5.12 shows representative cross-sections of pipeline joints collected from design and as-built drawings of trunk lines investigated as part of this study. There is a variety of JCCPs in service. The concrete cylinder pipe (CCP) in Figure 5.12a relies primarily on a relatively thick steel cylinder with supplemental reinforcement and protection provided by exterior and interior concrete layers. In contrast, the reinforced concrete cylinder pipe (RCCP), bar wrapped concrete cylinder pipe (BWCCP), and prestressed concrete cylinder pipe (PCCP), shown in Figures 5.12b, 5.12c, and 5.12d, respectively, utilize either circumferential steel coil or helically wrapped steel bar or prestressed circumferential steel reinforcement in addition to a relatively thin steel cylinder for structural support of internal pipe pressure. Among the varieties of JCCPs, the RCCPs and PCCPs prevail in current practices.

### 5.4.2.2. Axial Pullout Capacity Immediately after Construction

All designs and methods of construction rely on a rubber-gasket bell-and-spigot connection. The rubber gasket is often 18 to 22 mm wide when compressed to form a water-tight seal. Cement mortar is poured in the field to further seal the joint. The pullout capacity of the joint in terms of axial slip to cause leakage depends on how much movement can occur before the rubber gasket loses its compressive seal. The design and as-built drawings examined in the previous section (Figure 5.12) show that the forward end of the gasket is ideally positioned between 20 to 60 mm from a




(a) Concrete Cylinder Pipe (CCP)




(b) Reinforced Concrete Cylinder Pipe (RCCP)

Figure 5.12. Cross sections of Representative Joints on JCCPs (Unit: mm)

Figure 5.12. (Continued)



(c) Bar Wrapped Concrete Cylinder Pipe (BWCCP)



(d) Prestressed concrete cylinder pipe (PCCP)



location where the bell is angled outward away from the spigot. For RCCPs and PCCPs, the prevailing form of JCCPs, the forward end of the gasket is ideally positioned about 26 mm, and hence, approximately 26 mm of outward movement is required before the gasket starts to decompress, assuming that the gasket is positioned as shown on design and as-built drawings.

In this work, there are several different states identified with respect to joint position in RCCPs and PCCPs. Outward spigot movement of 26 mm will result in initial loss of gasket compression, and outward spigot movement of 37 mm and 48 mm will lead to significant loss of gasket compression and substantial loss of gasket compression, respectively. Significant loss of gasket compression may be associated with leakage at minor to severe levels, whereas substantial loss of gasket compression is likely to be associated with severe leakage and potentially full pullout of the joint. Figure 5.13 illustrates the various pullout states and a close-up view of the region around the gasket which the slip distances of 26, 37, and 48 mm are shown, corresponding to initial, significant, and substantial loss of gasket compression, respectively.

It is important to account for variation in the initial gasket position. As illustrated in Figure 5.13, the maximum inward position (MIP) of the spigot is about 13 mm. This MIP establishes the deepest penetration that is possible during construction. Please note that some JCCPs (e.g., Figure 5.12d) are equipped with field bond jumpers to promote electrical conductivity along the pipeline for cathodic protection. Although the bond jumpers are connected by weak tack welds that do not provide significant resistance against pullout, they might result in a MIP value as low as 6 mm.




Figure 5.13. Close-up Views of Joints and Probability Density Functions for Gasket Positions

It is assumed that construction control would have resulted in initial positioning of the gasket to avoid initial loss of compression. Hence, the maximum outward position (MOP) can be selected at any location short of initial compression loss. In the model this position is treated as a parameter that can be varied.

The actual initial position of the gasket is modeled probabilistically by treating the position of the gasket as a random variable that ranges between the MIP and MOP and has the highest probability of occurring at the gasket position shown in the as-built drawings. The MIP is fixed at 13 mm.

Because the actual probability density function is not known, a beta function was selected to characterize the uncertainty with respect to joint position. Beta functions can be tailored to all joint conditions and allow for testing the sensitivity of the results to the assumed shape of the probability density function. The beta function was defined for 75%, 85%, and 95% of all candidate positions falling inside 75% of the distance from the MIP to the MOP. The beta functions for these conditions are referred to as  $75\%\beta$ ,  $85\%\beta$  and  $95\%\beta$ . A  $75\%\beta$  refers to a uniform probability distribution function, whereas  $85\%\beta$  and  $95\%\beta$  correspond to distributions that are increasingly skewed towards the position of the gasket shown on the as-built drawings.

Figure 5.13 shows the beta function,  $75\%\beta$ , corresponding to MOP = 13 mm and 26 mm. When MOP = 13 mm, it is identical to the MIP. As a result, the probability density function is symmetrical. When MOP = 26 mm, the probability density function is asymmetrical.

A cumulative probability function,  $F(X)$ , can be obtained for each beta distribution. The probability of exceedance,  $1 - F(X)$ , is plotted to evaluate the chances that the gasket position will be located beyond the as-built target location. The probabilities of exceedance are plotted for MOP = 26 mm and  $75\% \beta$ ,  $85\% \beta$  and  $95\% \beta$  in Figure 5.14. The  $a$  and  $b$  coefficients for the beta distributions are shown in the legend.

The model for joint pullout capacity is based on the as-built dimensions of the JCCP joints. Various serviceability states are defined relative to the position of the gasket shown on the as-built drawings. The initial position of the gasket is characterized probabilistically by means of beta functions that vary from a maximum outward to a maximum inward position. The maximum values of the beta functions correspond to the as-built position of the gasket. The model accounts for the actual joint dimensions, uncertainty in the initial gasket position, and variations in the value selected for the maximum outward position of the gasket.

When the initial position of the gasket during construction is modeled by a  $75\% \beta$  distribution, i.e., a uniform distribution, the 90% exceedance value is the distance of the gasket inside the joint that is exceeded by nine out of ten JCCP joints, and corresponds to 3-4 mm of axial slip before initial loss of compression. Subsequent operational loads and pipeline movement, as described in next section, will subtract from this slip capacity. As a minimum, therefore, about one of every ten joints cannot reliably accommodate more than 3-4 mm of axial slip. Given this level of tolerance, JCCP joints are sensitive to seismic wave interaction, which has the potential to induce leakage and even complete disengagement of adjoining pipe sections under severe seismic motions.




Figure 5.14. Probabilities of Exceedance for Initial Gasket Position with MOP = 26 mm

#### 5.4.2.3. Joint Movement after Construction and Existing Cracked Joints

Subsequent to the initial positioning of the gasket during construction, additional pullout at the joint can occur because of mortar shrinkage during curing, thrust near bends, pipe adjustment to bedding, subsidence, influence of adjacent construction, and many other factors. To provide an estimate of these types of movement, the inspection records in the JCCPs of Bay Division Pipelines (BDPLs), the major water trunk lines for the San Francisco Bay area, were examined as part of this study. The observed separations at cracked joints are summarized in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2. Summary of Observed Joint Separation in BDPLs

BDPL Location	Length Inspected (m)	No. of Gasket Joints	Observed Joint Separation (mm)				
			2	3	6	13	19
<b>BDPL2_R1</b>	2147	514	0	3	1	0	0
<b>BDPL2_R2</b>	3598	862	25	0	3	0	0
<b>BDPL2_R5</b>	2426	581	0	0	0	1	1
<b>BDPL3_R1</b>	11022	1760	0	0	12	0	0
<b>BDPL4_R1</b>	13792	1982	0	6	2	1	0
<b>Totals</b>	32984	5699	25	9	18	2	1
<b>% Total Joints</b>	55/5699 = 0.98%		0.44	0.16	0.32	0.04	0.02

Table 5.2 lists various inspection reaches of the JCCPs for which documentation in the inspection records can be found. Five inspection reaches along 3 different JCCPs, i.e., BDPL2, 3, and 4, with a total length of about 33 km and 5699 gasket joints are included in Table 5.2. The observed joint separations are listed by aggregating the number of observations at the maximum observed separation. For example, when the separations at several joints were reported as being less than or equal to a particular dimension, the number of observed separations are listed under the maximum recorded dimension. Although this method of reporting the available data is conservative, it is warranted because the inspection records are infrequent and are performed under conditions where access is limited and only approximate estimates of separation are acquired.

Table 5.2 shows that about 1% of the joints, 55 joints over 5699 joints in about 33 km JCCPs, are cracked and separated with a maximum separation up to 19 mm. Comparing with the as-designed capacity of 20 mm to 60 mm with a typical value of 26 mm, only small additional joint displacement is required to cause pullout at these existing cracked joints when subjected to seismic body waves.




Figure 5.15. Subsequent Field Displacement Exceedance Probability

The data in Table 5.2 are plotted in terms of probability of exceedance with respect to observed separation during inspection, as shown in Figure 5.15. These data can be used in conjunction with the probability of exceedance plots for the initial gasket position discussed in Section 5.4.2.2 (see Figure 5.13). Because the initial gasket position and subsequent outward slip are independent random variables, the probability of encountering the gasket at a distance  $y$  from the as-built location is given by

$$P(Y > y) = \sum_{j=1}^6 P(X_i > y - x_{sj})P(X_s = x_{sj}) \quad (5.16)$$

in which  $X_i$  is the initial gasket position,  $X_s$  is the subsequent slip after construction, and  $x_{sj}$  is a discrete subsequent slip value for  $X_s$ , taken as 0, 2, 3, 6, 13, and 19 mm for  $j$  equals 1 to 6, respectively.

When the probability of initial position is combined with the probability of subsequent slip, the probability of exceedance is computed as illustrated in Figures 5.16 and 5.17. Figure 5.16 is obtained by combining the  $75\% \beta$  probability of exceedance in Figure 5.14 with Figure 5.15 in accordance with Eqn. 5.16. Because the field inspection records show that subsequent slip occurs in a very low percentage of the joints, the effect of slip after construction is rather small and relegated to the tail portion of the plot, as shown in Figure 5.17.

#### 5.4.2.4. Axial Tensile Resistance

The axial tensile resistance of the joint depends on the tensile strength of the poured mortar connection, which is relatively low, and pullout resistance of the gasket, which is much lower compared with the tensile strength of mortar and can be ignored practically. In other words, the pullout capacity of the joints relies on the tensile behavior of the cement mortar at the joints. Figure 5.18 shows a typical stress strain relationship for mortar under tension. The mortars experience a brittle failure immediately after the peak, before which the tensile stress increases almost linearly as the tensile strain increases. The cracking strain,  $\epsilon_T$ , varies typically between  $0.5 \times 10^{-4}$  and  $1.5 \times 10^{-4}$  (Avram et al., 1981; and Carino, 1974). For modeling purposes, the stress strain relationship can be simplified as linearly elastic behavior before the peak and no tensile strength after the peak, as shown by the dash lines in Figure 5.18. Please note that the  $\epsilon_T$  is relatively low and the axial tensile strain generated by the seismic body waves (i.e.,  $\epsilon_p = V_a/C_a$ , which can be up to  $4 \times 10^{-4}$ ) is sufficient to crack the mortars as the seismic body waves propagate.






Figure 5.16. Probability of Exceedance for Combined Initial Position and Subsequent Slip




Figure 5.17. Expanded View of Probability of Exceedance for the Tail Portion of Figure 5.16




Figure 5.18. Typical Stress Strain Relationship for Mortars under Tension

#### 5.4.3. Simplified Model for JCCPs with Existing Cracked Joints

When seismic body waves propagate along the axial direction of the pipes, ground strain,  $\epsilon_g$ , is generated along axial direction of the pipes, as defined by Eqn 5.3. As described in the Section 5.3, when affected by seismic body waves, water trunk lines, including JCCPs, behave as flexible pipes and  $\epsilon_p = \epsilon_g$  everywhere the pipe is continuous. Therefore,  $\epsilon_p = \epsilon_g$  everywhere along the JCCPs except in the vicinity of the cracked joints, if there is any. If the maximum pipe strain,  $\epsilon_{pmax}$ , is smaller than the tensile cracking strain of mortar,  $\epsilon_T$ , no additional cracked joint occurs, and relatively joint displacement only occurs at the existing cracked joints. On the other hand, when  $\epsilon_{pmax} \geq \epsilon_T$ , the mortar at joints may be cracked and the pipe transfers from a continuous pipe to a segmented pipe as the seismic body waves propagate along the pipe. Simplified and FE models for the seismic body wave interaction with JCCPs containing existing cracked joints for the case of  $\epsilon_{pmax} < \epsilon_T$  are presented in this

section and Section 5.4.4, respectively; while a simplified model for the case of  $\epsilon_{pmax} \geq \epsilon_T$  is described in Section 5.4.5.

Figure 5.19 illustrates seismic displacement and ground strain interaction with a JCCP with an existing cracked joint. As discussed previously, joints in the field are occasionally cracked and separated because of mortar shrinkage during curing, thrust near bends, pipe adjustment to bedding, subsidence, influence of adjacent construction, and many other factors. Such joints, being cracked and separated, have such low axial pullout resistance that for modeling purposes can be taken as negligible. Please note that in Figure 5.19 the ground strain at vertical axis,  $\epsilon_g$ , is expressed as  $V_a/C_a$ , while the distance along the pipeline at horizontal axis,  $X$ , is expressed as the product of wave propagation time,  $t$ , and  $C_a$ . Joint displacement during wave interaction is a consequence of variable pullout resistance among the joints in the pipelines.

It is assumed that the joints on either side of the cracked joint have full mortar connectivity to mobilize tensile capacity across the joint. Because the pipeline is fully flexible,  $\epsilon_p = \epsilon_g$  everywhere the pipeline is continuous. At the cracked joint, the pipeline cannot sustain strain, so  $\epsilon_p = 0$ . As the wave passes across the cracked joint, strain in the continuous pipeline on each side of the joint will accumulate linearly at a slope of  $f/EA$  until  $\epsilon_p = \epsilon_g$ , after which pipe and ground strain are indistinguishable. The shaded area in Figure 5.19 represents the integration of the differential strain between the pipeline and ground from the cracked joint to the positions in the pipe where no relative displacement occurs between the pipe and the soils. The integration equals to the sum of the relative displacement at both ends of the cracked joint with respect to the soil at the cracked joint, or the relative joint displacement at the cracked




Figure 5.19. Seismic Displacement and Velocity Interaction with JCCPs with Existing Cracked Joint

joint, which in this case occurs as axial slip.

As illustrated in Figure 5.20, the area between the  $\epsilon_p$  and  $\epsilon_g$  versus distance plots can be approximated as the area of two right triangles to provide a simplified expression for relative joint displacement,  $\delta_j$ , as

$$\delta_j = \left[ \frac{V_{ap}}{C_a} \right]^2 \frac{EA}{f} \quad (5.17)$$




Figure 5.20. Simplified Model for Seismic Wave Interaction with JCCPs

Eqn 5.17 indicates that the relative joint displacement at cracked joints increases proportionally to  $V_p^2$ , which is consistent with the regressions developed by O'Rourke et al. (2001) and O'Rourke et al. (2004b) according to water pipeline performance records during the 1994 Northridge earthquake. The regression analyses show the repair rate for the water pipelines increases approximately proportionally to  $V_p^a$ , where parameter  $a$  ranges from 1.82 to 2.42 for the pipelines composed of different materials.

It should be pointed out that relative joint displacement obtained is a conservative estimation corresponding to the worst case scenario. It is assumed that the joints on either side of the cracked joint remain integrity to mobilize tensile capacity across the joint. However, the existing cracked joints in the fields are

distributed stochastically, and therefore, it is possible for multiple cracked joints to occur within a distance that is necessary for pipe strain accumulation to reach  $\epsilon_p = \epsilon_g$ . As the number of cracked joints increases, relative joint displacement decreases (please refer to Section 5.4.6).

#### **5.4.4. Finite Element Model for JCCPs with Existing Cracked Joints**

FE model for seismic body wave interaction with JCCPs containing existing cracked joints is developed, using the program BSTRUCT (Chang, 2006; and Goh and O'Rourke, 2000). The FE model is similar to that described in Section 5.3.2.

##### *5.4.4.1. FE Analysis Setup*

Figure 5.21 shows a schematic of the FE model, similar to Figure 5.6. The pipeline was modeled with beam column elements that were connected to the ground by spring-slider elements capable of representing shear transfer as an elasto-plastic process. The existing cracked joint on the JCCP was also modeled with a spring-slider element representing a brittle failure mode of mortar (Figure 5.18). Time histories of strong motion recorded for the 1994 Northridge earthquake were converted to displacement versus distance records by assuming that  $X = C_a t$ , in which  $X$  is distance,  $t$  is time from the strong motion recording, and  $C_a$  is calculated from Eqn 5.1 with  $C$  equal to 2.5 km/sec. The bilinear relationship between  $f$  and relative pipe-soil displacement shown in Figure 5.7 is utilized to characterize the spring-slider elements. Figure 5.22 shows the pullout force and joint displacement relationship adopted for the existing cracked joint. The pullout force at the existing cracked joint,  $P_u$ , is generally taken as low as 1 kN, while the corresponding displacement is taken as low as 0.01




Figure 5.21. Finite Element Model for JCCPs with Existing Cracked Joints




Figure 5.22. Pullout Force and Joint Displacement Relationship for Existing Cracked Joints

mm. As illustrated in Figure 5.21, when the maximum slope of the displacement versus distance record (corresponding to  $V_{ap}$  in the velocity record) was superimposed on the cracked pipeline joint, the maximum axial slip of the joint occurred.

#### 5.4.4.2. FE Analysis Example

The FE analysis was used to evaluate seismic body wave interaction with a 1370-mm-diameter PCCP trunk line in Santa Clarita Valley during the 1994 Northridge earthquake, where there is documented evidence of multiple joint pullouts. Figure 5.23 shows the shear waves intersect a section of pipeline oriented at N25W, where the joint pullouts were documented, with an incidence angle of  $63^\circ$  and  $V_p = 119$  cm/sec. The strong motion recording at Newhall Station, approximately 4.0 km from this section of pipeline, was resolved in the direction of the pipeline and used in the analysis. Since the direction of  $C_a$  is in the opposite direction as the polarity, or






Figure 5.23. Shear Wave Record at Newhall Station Intersect a Section of Pipeline Oriented at N25W

direction of  $V_a$ , the longitudinal strain imposed on the pipe is tensile, resulting in the potential pull-out at the existing cracked joint.


The pipeline was assumed to be buried at a depth of 1m to the top of pipe in sand with unit weight,  $\gamma = 18.9 \text{ kN/m}^2$ , and angle of shearing resistance  $\phi' = 35^\circ$ . It was further assumed that the interface friction angle,  $\delta$ , between soil and pipe is  $\delta = \phi'$ . The finite element model was composed of 200 pipe elements and 203 spring-slider elements over a distance of 11 km for an element length of 56 m. The length of the element is consistent with the time intervals, i.e., 0.02 sec, of the strong motion time history used in the analysis

The FE results are presented in Figure 5.24. Figure 5.24a shows the maximum relative joint displacement, which represents pullout for the field condition of wave propagation at this site. The maximum analytical pullout is 9.1 mm, which is distributed somewhat asymmetrically either side of the cracked joint to reflect the slightly asymmetric shape of the ground strain pulse. Figure 5.24b shows the pipe and ground strains on the same plot. It can be seen that, away from the cracked joint,  $\epsilon_g = \epsilon_p$ , as the characteristic of a flexible pipeline. The area between the  $\epsilon_g$  and  $\epsilon_p$  plots in the vicinity of the cracked joint represents the relative joint displacement.


When accounting for a typical as-designed capacity of 25 mm with a 90% exceedance capacity of 3-4 mm (please refer to Section 5.4.2.2), and subsequent operational loads and pipeline movement (please refer to Section 5.4.2.3), the predicted displacement is consistent with pullout of sufficient magnitude to cause leakage and occasional disengagement of the pipeline, as observed in the field.

#### 5.4.4.3. Parametric Studies

The FE model was used to simulate seismic wave interaction for various ground conditions, pipeline properties, and seismic body wave characteristics. Table 5.3 summarizes the parameters adopted in the FE analysis. The ground conditions studied included clay with undrained strength from 1 to 200 kPa, saturated or dry sands with various friction angles from 25° to 45°. Four pipelines with various diameter and wall thickness were modeled and the axial deformation stiffness, EA, of the three of them was varied intentionally to study the effect of EA. The parameters characterizing the seismic body waves included  $V_{ap}$  (177 cm/sec or 150 cm/sec),  $C_a$  (1000 to 3000 m/sec), and T (1 sec or 1.5 sec). Similar FE analyses for the effects of



(a) Ground-pipeline Relative Displacement



(b) Ground and Pipe Strains

Figure 5.24. FE Results for PCCP in Santa Clarita Valley Subjected to 1994 Northridge Earthquake

Table 5.3. Summary of FE Modeling Parameters Characterizing Seismic Wave Interaction with JCCPs with Existing Cracked Joints

<b>Ground Conditions</b>	<p>Clay With Undrained Strength <math>S_u</math>: 1~200 kPa</p> <p>Dry Sand With Friction Angle <math>f</math>: 25°~43°</p> <p>Saturated Sand With Effective Friction Angle <math>\phi'</math>: 35°</p>
<b>Pipeline Properties</b>	<p>1370-mm Diameter and 146-mm wall thickness Pipe With Axial Deformation Stiffness EA: <math>1.87 \times 10^7</math> kN</p> <p>1829-mm Diameter and 178-mm wall thickness Pipe With Axial Deformation Stiffness EA: <math>1.97 \times 10^6 \sim 6.29 \times 10^9</math> kN</p> <p>1981-mm Diameter and 146-mm wall thickness Pipe With Axial Deformation Stiffness EA: <math>3.25 \times 10^5 \sim 3.25 \times 10^9</math> kN</p> <p>2438-mm Diameter and 216-mm wall thickness Pipe With Axial Deformation Stiffness EA: <math>3.12 \times 10^6 \sim 4.99 \times 10^{10}</math> kN</p>
<b>Seismic Body Wave Characteristics (Sinusoidal Wave)</b>	<p>Peak Particle Velocity Along Pipe Axial Direction <math>V_{ap}</math>: 150 cm/sec or 177 cm/sec</p> <p>Wave Propagation Velocity Along Pipe Axial Direction <math>C_a</math>: 1000 ~ 3000 m/sec</p> <p>Predominant Period T: 1 sec or 1.5 sec</p>
<b>Seismic Surface Wave Characteristics (Sinusoidal Wave)*</b>	<p>Peak Particle Velocity <math>V_p</math>: 10 ~ 60 cm/sec</p> <p>Phase Velocity C: 50 ~ 2500 m/sec</p> <p>Predominant Period T: 1 ~ 20 sec</p>

\*: Please refer to Shi (2006) for details

seismic surface waves on JCCPs were performed by Shi (2006). The parameters used by Shi (2006), which include  $V_p$  from 10 to 60 cm/sec,  $C$  from 50 to 2500 m/sec, and  $T$  from 1 to 20 sec, were also summarized in Table 5.3. In total, 320 FE runs were performed to account for different combinations of ground conditions, pipeline properties, and seismic body wave and surface wave characteristics.

#### 5.4.4.4. Universal $\delta_i/\delta_0$ and $f/EAR$ Relationship

The finite element results are summarized in Figure 5.25 with two dimensionless parameters,  $\delta_i/\delta_0$  and  $f/EAR$ .  $\delta_0$  is defined as the area under the seismic sinusoidal ground strain pulse and can be calculated by

$$\delta_0 = \int_0^{\lambda/2} \frac{V_{ap}}{C_a} \sin\left(\frac{2\pi x}{\lambda}\right) dx \quad (5.18)$$

When combined with Eqn 5.8,  $\delta_0$  can be expressed as

$$\delta_0 = \frac{V_{ap} T}{\pi} \quad (5.19)$$

The dimensionless parameter,  $\delta_i/\delta_0$ , is the relative joint displacement normalized with respect to a displacement index of the seismic wave characteristics. The dimensionless parameter,  $f/EAR$ , represents a combination of key ground conditions, pipeline properties, and seismic wave characteristics, and determines whether the pipelines behave as flexible or rigid pipes, as described in Section 5.3.




Figure 5.25. Universal Relationship between  $\delta_j/\delta_0$  and  $f/EAR$

Figure 5.25 shows the relationship between  $\delta_j/\delta_0$  and  $f/EAR$  based on the results from 320 FE simulations. When  $f/EAR$  is greater than 100 or less than 0.001,  $\delta_j/\delta_0$  approaches 0. The  $\delta_j/\delta_0$  increases to a maximum at  $f/EAR$  of approximately  $2/\pi$ , after which it decreases to zero at  $f/EAR$  of 100. Practical ranges of  $f/EAR$  for water trunk lines affected by seismic body waves, as well as those by seismic surface waves (Shi, 2006), are shown in Figure 5.25. Water trunk lines tend to behave as relatively flexible pipelines when affected by body waves, and act as relatively rigid pipelines when affected by surface waves.

With known ground conditions, pipeline properties, and seismic wave characteristics,  $f/EAR$  and  $\delta_0$  can be calculated and joint displacement  $\delta_j$  can be estimated directly using Figure 5.25. Consider, for example, a JCCP with 1575-mm diameter and 157-mm wall thickness subjected to a near source velocity pulse with  $V_p$


= 150 cm/sec,  $C = 2500$  m/sec, and  $T = 1$ sec. The pipeline is oriented with an incidence angle  $\gamma_i = 45^\circ$  with respect to seismic wave propagation direction and is buried at a depth of 1.86 m to the center of pipeline in soil with unit weight  $\gamma = 18.8$  kN/m<sup>3</sup> and friction angle  $\phi' = 35^\circ$ , which is assumed equal to the pipe-soil interface friction angle,  $\delta$ . The EA, R, f, and  $\delta_0$  are calculated as  $2.7 \times 10^7$  kN,  $3.4 \times 10^{-7}$  m<sup>-1</sup>, 103.9 kN/m, and 333 mm, respectively, resulting in  $f/EAR = 11.3$ . Using Figure 5.25,  $\delta_j/\delta_0$  is estimated as 0.072, and the relative joint displacement,  $\delta_j$ , is about 24 mm.

#### 5.4.5. Simplified Model for JCCPs without Existing Cracked Joints


Sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4 describe the simplified and FE models for JCCPs with existing cracked joints when  $\epsilon_{pmax} < \epsilon_T$  and relative joint displacement only occurs in the vicinity of the cracked joints. When  $\epsilon_{pmax} < \epsilon_T$  occurs in a JCCP without existing cracked joints, the JCCP is a continuous pipe and deforms coincidentally with the ground, and hence, no relative joint displacement occurs. The section proposes a simplified model for JCCPs without existing cracked joints but with a  $\epsilon_{pmax} \geq \epsilon_T$ . The continuous JCCPs without existing cracked joints may crack at joints as a result that  $\epsilon_{pmax}$  induced by seismic body waves exceeds the  $\epsilon_T$  at the joints. The cracking of joints transforms the pipeline from a continuous structure to a segmented one. Therefore, geometric nonlinearity has to be accounted for in the modeling.

##### 5.4.5.1. Seismic Body Wave Propagation along JCCPs


Figure 5.26 illustrates seismic ground strain by body wave interaction with a continuous JCCP without existing cracked joints. Each part of Figure 5.26 shows the ground strain,  $\epsilon_g$ , expressed as  $V_a/C_a$ , plotted on the vertical axis. The horizontal axis




(a) Seismic wave interaction with pipeline (Overview)




(b) Seismic wave interaction with pipeline ( $t = t_1$ )



(c) Seismic wave interaction with pipeline ( $t = t_2$ )



(d) Seismic wave interaction with pipeline ( $t = t_3$ )



(e) Seismic wave interaction with pipeline ( $t = t_4$ )

Figure 5.26. Seismic Wave Interaction with JCCPs Without Existing Cracked Joints



is the distance,  $X$ , along the longitudinal axis of the JCCP. The distance is expressed as the product of the wave propagation velocity,  $C_a$ , and the wave propagation time,  $t$ . The velocity pulse shown in Figure 5.26 corresponds to half of a sinusoidal wave, and develops tensile strains in the ground. It is assumed that no joint is cracked before the seismic wave interaction and the JCCP joints have full mortar connectivity so that the tensile capacity of each joint is mobilized.

Figure 5.26a shows the progression of a seismic wave at various times,  $t_0$  through  $t_4$ , as it approaches and moves into the ground surrounding a JCCP that terminates at an anchor point. Because the pipeline is flexible,  $\epsilon_g = \epsilon_p$  everywhere on the pipeline until  $t_1$ , when the first joint next to the anchor point reaches its tensile strain capacity,  $\epsilon_T = V_T/C_a$ , and cracks (Figure 5.26b). The threshold velocity,  $V_T$ , is the velocity that generates ground strain equal to the tensile strain capacity of the pipeline joint. A joint, which is cracked and separated, has very low axial pullout resistance that for modeling purpose can be taken as negligible. At the cracked joint, the pipeline cannot sustain strain, so  $\epsilon_p = 0$ . As the wave passes across the cracked joint, the strain in the continuous pipeline on the downstream side of that joint will accumulate linearly at a slope of  $f/EA$  until  $\epsilon_p = \epsilon_g$ , after which pipe and ground strain are indistinguishable and no relative displacement occurs between the pipe and soils. On the upstream side, the pipeline is anchored so that the pipe and ground move together.

The shaded area in Figure 5.26b represents the integration of the differential strain between the pipeline and ground from the cracked joint to the position in the pipe where no relative displacement occurs between the pipe and the soil, which equals the relative joint displacement and occurs as axial slip. In a similar fashion, the

shaded areas in the subsequent figures represent relative joint displacement or axial slip. As the seismic wave propagates, another joint downstream of the first cracked joint is also subjected to its tensile strain limit at  $t_2$  (Figure 5.26c). The distance between these two joints,  $L$ , can be determined by:

$$L = \frac{V_T EA}{C_a f} \quad (5.20)$$

The joint cracks when its tensile strain capacity is exceeded (Figure 5.26d) at  $t_3$ , which occurs immediately after  $t_2$ . Since the pipeline strain at the newly cracked joint is zero, the strain in the continuous pipeline on the downstream side of that joint will accumulate linearly from  $\epsilon_p = 0$  to  $\epsilon_p = \epsilon_g$  at a slope of  $f/EA$ . On the upstream side of the cracked joint, the pipeline segment between the two cracked joints must have zero strain at each cracked end. To satisfy equilibrium, the strain will accumulate linearly from both ends at the same slope of  $f/EA$ , but in opposite directions, until  $\epsilon_p = \epsilon_T/2$  at the midpoint of  $L$ , where shear transfer between the pipe and soils reverses to its opposite direction and no relative displacement occurs between the pipe and soil. The relative joint displacement in the newly cracked joint at  $t_3$  is the sum of the relative displacement at both ends of the cracked joint with respect to the soils at the location of the cracked joint, as indicated by the shaded area in Figure 5.26d. With continued wave propagation, the next joint will crack at a distance,  $L$ , downstream of the previously cracked joint (Figure 5.26e). This process repeats itself as the wave moves forward along the pipeline. The cracking of joints transforms the pipeline from a continuous structure to a segmented one.

#### 5.4.5.2. Relative Joint Displacement

The two most critical cases for relative joint displacement are illustrated in Figure 5.26e. The relative joint displacement attains its first local maximum at  $X_a$  just before another joint downstream of  $X_a$  cracks. The joint displacement,  $\delta_a$ , can be calculated from the shaded area on the left of Figure 5.26e. The shaded area on the right of Figure 5.26e at  $X_b$  illustrates the second possible maximum joint displacement,  $\delta_b$ . This movement occurs when the peak ground velocity,  $V_p$ , passes across the upstream end of the cracked pipeline. The maximum relative joint displacement is the larger of the two possible joint displacements.

Figure 5.27 illustrates a simplified procedure for calculating the shaded areas in Figure 5.26e. The relative joint displacement for the first potentially maximum case,  $\delta_a$ , can be decomposed into four area components

$$\delta_a = A'_1 + A'_2 + A'_3 + A'_4 \quad (5.21)$$

in which the subscripts of  $A'$  correspond to the triangles or rectangle at  $X_a$ , the areas  $A'_1$ ,  $A'_2$ ,  $A'_3$ , and  $A'_4$ , are calculated as

$$A'_1 = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{V_T}{C_a} \right)^2 \frac{EA}{f} \quad (5.22)$$

$$A'_2 = \frac{9}{2} \left( \frac{V_T}{C_a} \right)^2 \frac{EA}{f} \frac{EAV_{ap}}{fC_a^2 T} \quad (5.23)$$




Figure 5.27. Simplified Model for Seismic Wave Interaction with JCCPs Without Existing Cracked Joints

$$A'_3 = \frac{1}{4} \left( \frac{V_T}{C_a} \right)^2 \frac{EA}{f} \quad (5.24)$$

$$A'_4 = \frac{1}{8} \left( \frac{V_T}{C_a} \right)^2 \frac{EA}{f} \quad (5.25)$$

Combining Eqns. 5.22 through (5.25) results in

$$\delta_a = A'_1 + A'_2 + A'_3 + A'_4 = \left( \frac{V_T}{C_a} \right)^2 \frac{EA}{f} \left[ \frac{9EA V_{ap}}{2f C_a^2 T} + \frac{7}{8} \right] \quad (5.26)$$

Please note that  $A'_2$  is simplified as a triangle with a slope  $4V_{ap}/C_a^2T$ . The error associated with this simplification for the calculated joint displacement is very small, generally less than 2%.

The value of  $V_T/C_a$  is equivalent to the tensile cracking capacity of the JCCP joints,  $\epsilon_T$ . Combining  $\epsilon_T = V_T/C_a$  and Eqn 5.26, results in

$$\delta_a = \epsilon_T^2 \frac{EA}{f} \left[ \frac{9EA V_{ap}}{2f C_a^2 T} + \frac{7}{8} \right] \quad (5.27)$$

Similarly, the relative joint displacement for the alternative maximum case,  $\delta_b$ , can be decomposed into two area components

$$\delta_b = A'_5 + A'_6 \quad (5.28)$$

where  $A'_5$ , and  $A'_6$  are calculated as

$$A'_5 = \left( \frac{V_T}{C_a} \right)^2 \frac{EA}{f} \left[ \frac{V_{ap}}{V_T} - \frac{1}{2} \right] \quad (5.29)$$

$$A'_6 = \frac{1}{4} \left( \frac{V_T}{C_a} \right)^2 \frac{EA}{f} \quad (5.30)$$

Combining Eqns 5.28 through 5.30 results in

$$\delta_b = A'_5 + A'_6 = \left( \frac{V_T}{C_a} \right)^2 \frac{EA}{f} \left[ \frac{V_{ap}}{V_T} - \frac{1}{4} \right] \quad (5.31)$$

Again, combining  $\epsilon_T = V_T/C_a$  and Eqn 5.31, results in

$$\delta_b = \epsilon_T^2 \frac{EA}{f} \left[ \frac{V_{ap}}{C_a \epsilon_T} - \frac{1}{4} \right] \quad (5.32)$$

The relative magnitude of  $\delta_a$  with respect to  $\delta_b$  is determined by the ratio  $V_{ap}/V_T$  and  $C_a T$ . For each section of pipeline affected by a different  $V_{ap}$ , the largest relative joint displacement is chosen from either Eqn 5.27 or 5.32.

When  $V_{ap}/C_a < \epsilon_T$ , which implies that no joint will be cracked by the seismic body waves and relative joint displacement only occurs at existing cracked joints, the joint displacement,  $\delta_b$ , contains only component  $A'_6$  with the  $V_T$  replaced by  $V_{ap}$ , and can be simplified as Eqn 5.33, which is the same as Eqn 5.17 that gives the joint displacement at existing cracked joints.


$$\delta_b = \left( \frac{V_{ap}}{C_a} \right)^2 \frac{EA}{f} \quad (5.33)$$

#### 5.4.6. Effect of Mortar Cracking Strain


The seismic wave pipeline interaction models depend on the relative magnitude of the cracking strain and maximum pipe strain induced by seismic waves. When  $\epsilon_{pmax} \geq \epsilon_T$ , the mortar at joints may be cracked and the pipe transfers from a continuous pipe to a segmented pipe. In contrast, when  $\epsilon_{pmax} < \epsilon_T$ , no joint will be cracked by the seismic body waves and relative joint displacement only occurs at existing cracked joints.

For relatively flexible pipes, the  $\epsilon_{pmax}$  is the same as  $\epsilon_{gmax}$ , which can be expressed as the ratio of  $V_{ap}/C_a$ . Therefore, when  $V_{ap} \geq \epsilon_T \times C_a$ , resulting  $\epsilon_{pmax} \geq \epsilon_T$ , the mortar at joints may be cracked by the seismic body waves. The whole sequence of transformation from continuous pipe to segmented pipe, as described in the Section 5.4.5, occurs and the pipe transfers from a continuous pipe to a segmented pipe as the seismic body waves propagate across the pipeline. The joint displacement occurs along the pipe with an interval of  $L$  given by Eqn 5.20. The maximum relative joint displacement is the larger of the two possible joint displacements calculated from Eqn 5.27 or 5.32. In contrast, when  $V_{ap} < \epsilon_T \times C_a$ , and hence,  $\epsilon_{pmax} < \epsilon_T$ , no joint will be cracked by the seismic body waves and relative joint displacement only occurs at existing cracked joints. The pipeline is considered as continuous pipeline with existing cracked joint and the analytical approach and finite element results described in Sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4 are applicable.

The magnitude of mortar cracking strain not only determines the appropriate model to apply but also affects the magnitude and occurrence frequency of the relative joint displacement. Figure 5.28 shows an illustration of the effect of mortar cracking strain on the magnitude of joint displacement. Figures 5.28a and 5.28b show the similar pipelines subjected to the same seismic body wave except that the  $\epsilon_T$  in Figure 5.28a is larger than that in Figure 5.28b. It is obvious that actual strain accumulation length in Figure 5.28a is greater than that in Figure 5.28b and the shaded areas at both  $X_a$  and  $X_b$  in Figure 5.28a are larger than those in Figure 5.28b. Therefore, as  $\epsilon_T$  decreases, the strain accumulation length decreases, resulting in an increased number of cracked joints for a given pipe length, and a decrease of relative joint displacement at each cracked joint. In other word, lower  $\epsilon_T$  causes smaller relative joint



(a)  $V_T = V_{T1}$  ( $V_{T1} > V_{T2}$ )



(b)  $V_T = V_{T2}$  ( $V_{T1} > V_{T2}$ )

Figure 5.28. Effects of  $V_T$  on Magnitude of Relative Joint Displacement



displacement with higher occurrence frequency. The joint displacement distributes more evenly along the pipeline with a smaller interval. In contrast, higher  $\epsilon_T$  results in larger relative joint displacements concentrated at fewer locations of cracked joints.

The effect of mortar cracking strain on the magnitude and occurrence frequency of joint displacement suggests an innovative design and construction principle for JCCPs. The JCCPs may be designed and constructed such that all the joints have zero or very low axial pullout resistance, i.e.,  $\epsilon_T = 0$ . This condition allows very small displacements to occur at each joint, with no appreciable strain accumulation along pipe segments or displacement concentrations at existing cracked joints. The absence of mortar cracking strain or low strain capacity may be accomplished by cracking each joint intentionally or reducing the adhesion between mortar and pipe segments by inserting some low adhesion materials, such as Teflon or high density polyethylene (HDPE) at the mortar and pipe segment interface.

## **5.5. Seismic Body Wave Interaction with Pipelines Containing Locally Weak Joints**

The seismic wave - JCCP interaction model described in Section 5.4 can be modified to assess the seismic wave effects on pipelines composed of other materials and with different structure and joint characteristics. This section describes a modification to account for the locally weak joints in pipelines composed of other materials, such as cast iron.

### 5.5.1. Locally Weak Joint Characteristics

JCCPs rely on the cement mortar poured in the field to seal the rubber-gasket bell-and-spigot joints and to resist the axial pullout. Therefore, the joint behavior is dictated to the behavior of the cement mortar, which demonstrates a brittle failure mode under tension (see Figure 5.18), as opposed to the ductile failure mode in the joints of pipelines composed of other materials, such as cast iron.

O'Rourke et al. (1996) performed pullout tests to investigate the repetitive resistance and ultimate pullout capacity of cast iron pipelines with lead-caulked bell and spigot joints. Figure 5.29 shows the axial force and displacement relationship for a 305-mm diameter pipe. The equivalent monotonic envelop for the axial force and displacement relationship can be characterized by a rapid increase of axial force as axial displacement increases from 0 to about 2.5 mm (0.1 inch) and a more or less constant axial force thereafter. Prior (1935) conducted pullout tests on cast iron pipelines with lead caulked joints. Figure 5.30 shows the axial force vs. displacement data on 450- and 600-mm diameter pipelines from Prior (1935) and the equivalent monotonic envelop for the axial force and displacement relationship from O'Rourke et al. (1996). The axial force is expressed in terms of kN per circumferential distance to accommodate the data for different pipe diameter. The axial force increases rapidly up to a maximum of 0.15 kN/mm as the axial displacement increases from 0 to about 2.5 mm, and remains more or less constant thereafter. The force-displacement behavior can be characterized by a bilinear elasto-plastic model with a pullout force,  $P_u$ , of 0.15 kN per circumferential distance in units of mm and pullout displacement,  $\delta_u$ , of 2.5 mm, as shown in Figure 5.30. Because the actual force-displacement relationship shows some strain hardening behavior (O'Rourke et al., 1996), a bilinear characterization




Figure 5.29. Cast Iron Joint Pullout Test Results (O'Rourke et al., 1996)




Figure 5.30. Axial Force and Displacement Relationship for Cast Iron Pipeline with Lead Caulked Joints

can be adjusted to provide a small conservative bias in the representation of maximum pullout capacity.

### 5.5.2. Simplified Model

Figure 5.31 shows a simplified model of seismic body wave interaction with a pipeline with a locally weak joint. The joints on either side of the weak joint are assumed to mobilize full tensile capacity across the joints, and the pipelines on either side of the weak joint behave as continuous pipelines. Because the pipeline is fully flexible,  $\epsilon_p = \epsilon_g$  everywhere the pipeline is continuous. At the weak joint, the maximum axial force the pipeline can sustain corresponds to the pullout strain  $\epsilon_u = P_u/EA$ . After  $P_u$  occurs at the weak joint, the weak joint yields and deforms similarly to a free end. As the seismic wave passes across the weak joint, strain in the pipeline on each side of the joint will accumulate linearly at a slope of  $f/EA$  from  $\epsilon_p = \epsilon_u = P_u/EA$  to  $\epsilon_p = \epsilon_g$ , after which pipe and ground strain are indistinguishable. The shaded area in Figure 5.31 represents the integration of the differential strain between the pipeline and ground, which equals to the relative joint displacement because of the plastic deformation of the weak joint. As the elastic deformation of the weak joint becomes an increasingly smaller fraction of the plastic deformation, the relative joint displacement because of plastic deformation will converge on the total relative joint displacement.

### 5.5.3. Finite Element Model

Similar to JCCPs, the seismic body wave interaction with pipelines containing locally weak joints was modeled by a set of finite element analyses. The FE model




Figure 5.31. Seismic Displacement and Velocity Interaction with Pipeline Containing Locally Weak Joints

was similar to those described in Section 5.4.4.1, except for the adoption of elasto-plastic force-displacement behavior (Figure 5.30) for the locally weak joints. In total, 55 FE simulations with  $\epsilon_u/\epsilon_{pmax}$  [i.e.,  $(P_u/EA)/(V_{ap}/C_a)$ ] varying from 0 to 1 were performed and the results are summarized in Figure 5.32, plotting the relative joint displacement correction factor,  $\delta_d/\delta_j$ , as a function of strain ratio,  $\epsilon_u/\epsilon_{pmax}$  [i.e.,  $(P_u/EA)/(V_{ap}/C_a)$ ], where  $\delta_d$  is the relative joint displacement in a locally weak joint and  $\delta_j$  is the relative joint displacement for pipelines with an existing cracked joint, i.e.,  $P_u = 0$ . The value of  $\delta_j$  can be estimated directly from Figure 5.25.




Figure 5.32. Joint Displacement Correction Factor As a Function of Strain Ratio

Figure 5.32 shows that, in general,  $\delta_d/\delta_j$  decreases as  $\epsilon_u/\epsilon_{pmax}$  increases. When  $\epsilon_u$  is much smaller than the maximum pipe strain,  $\epsilon_{pmax}$ , generated by an earthquake, i.e.,  $(P_u/EA)/(V_{ap}/C_a)$  approaches 0, the weak joint yields at a relatively small strain and the resulting joint displacement,  $\delta_d$ , is approximately equal to that of a cracked joint,  $\delta_j$ . In contrast, when  $\epsilon_u$  at the weak joint is larger than the  $\epsilon_{pmax}$ , i.e.,  $(P_u/EA)/(V_{ap}/C_a)$  is greater than 1. The joint does not yield, and the joint displacement is limited to elastic deformation. The ratio,  $\delta_d/\delta_j$ , depends on the deformation characteristics, i.e.,  $\delta_u$ , of weak joints before yielding.

Figure 5.32 shows  $\delta_d/\delta_j$  and  $\epsilon_u/\epsilon_{pmax}$  relationships associated with 5 different  $\delta_u$ , i.e.,  $\delta_u/\delta_j = 0.40, 0.25, 0.10, 0.05$ , and  $0.01$ . When  $\delta_u/\delta_j$  is smaller than  $\delta_d/\delta_j$ , i.e.,  $\delta_u < \delta_d$ , all 5 relationships converge to a single line. On the other hand, when  $\delta_u/\delta_j$  is

larger than  $\delta_d/\delta_j$ , i.e.,  $\delta_u > \delta_d$ , the joint does not yield, and only elastic deformation occurs. It is, therefore, conservative to use the maximum elastic deformation,  $\delta_u$ , as  $\delta_d$ .

The line that all  $\delta_d/\delta_j$  and  $\epsilon_u/\epsilon_{pmax}$  relationships converge to in Figure 5.32 can be used to estimate  $\delta_d$ . The  $\delta_d/\delta_j$  can be determined in accordance with the strain ratio  $\epsilon_u/\epsilon_{pmax}$ , and checked with  $\delta_u/\delta_j$ . If  $\delta_u/\delta_j$  is larger than  $\delta_d/\delta_j$ ,  $\delta_u/\delta_j$  should be taken as  $\delta_d/\delta_j$ .

With known properties of a locally weak joint, as well as known ground conditions, pipeline properties, and seismic wave characteristics, the displacement at a locally weak joint,  $\delta_d$ , can be estimated directly with Figures 5.25 and 5.32. Consider, for example, a pipeline similar to that described in Section 5.4.4.4 with a locally weak joint with  $P_u = 1620$  kN and  $\delta_u = 2.5$  mm. The displacement at the cracked joint,  $\delta_j$ , is estimated as 24 mm as described in Section 5.4.4.4. The strain ratio,  $\epsilon_u/\epsilon_{pmax}$ , i.e.,  $(P_u/EA)/(V_{ap}/C_a)$ , is calculated as 0.2. Using Figure 5.31,  $\delta_d/\delta_j$  is estimated as 0.66. Because  $\delta_u/\delta_j$  is about 0.1,  $\delta_u/\delta_j$  is smaller than  $\delta_d/\delta_j$ , and the relative displacement at the locally weak joint,  $\delta_d$ , is about 16 mm.

It should be pointed out that Figure 5.32 is only applicable for flexible pipes, i.e.,  $f/EAR \geq 1$ , such as water pipelines affected by seismic body waves. A family of  $\delta_d/\delta_j$  vs.  $\epsilon_u/\epsilon_{pmax}$  relationships for rigid pipes, i.e.,  $f/EAR < 1$ , was been developed by Shi (2006), based on the interaction of seismic surface waves with pipelines.

## **5.6. Model Applications to Other Linear Structures**

Although the models described in this chapter are intended for the analysis of seismic wave interaction with pipelines, they are applicable to seismic wave interaction with other linear structures, as long as the two basic assumptions proposed by Newmark (1967) are deemed acceptable. As discussed in Section 5.3, Newmark (1967) proposed two basic assumptions for assessing seismic wave interaction with pipelines: 1) the seismic ground motions, i.e., acceleration, velocity and displacement time histories, at two points along the propagation path differ only by a time lag; 2) pipeline inertia terms are small and may be neglected.

The models can be applied to other linear structures, such as deformation at flexible connections between subaqueous tunnels and shore facilities when subjected to near source strong motion. For example, recent work to retrofit the Bay Area Rapid Transit System has focused on the potential slip of seismic joints connecting the Transbay Tube with ventilation structures on either side of San Francisco Bay (Wu et al., 2003). Concerns about relative joint displacement during seismic wave interaction, similar to those for pipelines, have a strong influence on the retrofitting requirements for this transportation lifeline.

## **5.7. Summary**

The earthquake performance of a water supply system is often closely related to the performance of water trunk and transmission lines, whose seismic wave interactions were studied in this chapter. Examinations of near-source strong ground motion records during previous earthquakes indicate that seismic waves can be



approximated by sinusoidal waves, and it is reasonable to simplify the seismic body waves as a single sinusoidal pulse in seismic wave-pipeline interactions.

Depending on the seismic wave characteristics,  $R$ , ground conditions,  $f$ , and pipeline properties,  $EA$ , pipelines behave either flexibly or rigidly in the axial dimension. When  $f/EAR > 1$ , the pipeline is axially flexible with respect to ground strain accumulation. No relative displacement occurs between the pipeline and the surrounding soil, and the pipeline deforms coincidentally with the ground surrounding the pipeline, resulting in  $\epsilon_p = \epsilon_g$  everywhere the pipeline is continuous. The ratio between maximum pipe strain,  $\epsilon_{pmax}$ , and maximum ground strain,  $\epsilon_{gmax}$ , is equal to 1. When  $f/EAR < 1$ , the pipeline is relatively rigid with respect to axial ground strain accumulation, and relative displacement occurs between soil and pipeline. The strain in the continuous pipeline will accumulate linearly at a slope of  $f/EA$ . The  $\epsilon_{pmax}$  occurs at the locations corresponding to the amplitude of the sinusoidal seismic wave, and the ratio between  $\epsilon_{pmax}$  and  $\epsilon_{gmax}$  is equal to  $f/EAR$ .

The typical range of  $f/EAR$  values for water trunk lines, when affected by seismic body waves, is much greater than 1, and the water trunk lines tend to behave as flexible pipes when affected by seismic body waves. Rigid pipe behavior only occurs under extremely adverse conditions, such as where surrounded by liquefied soils, where the  $f$  approaches 0, resulting in  $f/EAR$  less than 1.

Attention is drawn to the seismic body wave interaction with jointed concrete cylinder pipelines (JCCPs), the performance of which has varied significantly during previous earthquakes. Close examinations of the design and as-built drawings of the JCCPs reveal that the pullout capacity of the JCCP joints depends on the tensile

behavior of the cement mortar at the joints. Moreover, it is not uncommon to observe cracks in the cement mortar and separation at the joints before earthquakes because of shrinkage of mortar cement during curing and subsequent operational loads and movements in the field.

A simplified model for seismic body wave interactions with JCCPs containing existing cracked joints was developed to estimate relative joint displacements. The relative joint displacement at a cracked joint equals the integration of the differential strain between the pipeline and ground from the cracked joint to the positions in the pipe where no relative displacement occurs between the pipe and the soil.

Extensive parametric studies with various ground conditions, seismic body wave parameters, and pipe properties were performed using finite element models. In total, 320 finite element runs were performed, and the results were summarized by a universal relationship between two dimensionless parameters,  $\delta_j/\delta_0$  and  $f/EAR$ . With known ground conditions, pipeline properties, and seismic wave characteristics,  $f/EAR$  and  $\delta_0$  can be calculated, and the joint displacement,  $\delta_j$ , can be estimated directly using the universal relationship.

The continuous JCCPs without existing cracked joints may crack at joints as a result of seismic body wave propagation when  $\epsilon_{pmax}$  exceeds the cracking strain,  $\epsilon_T$ , at the mortar joints. The cracking of joints transforms the pipeline from a continuous structure to a segmented one. Therefore, geometric nonlinearity has to be incorporated in the modeling. The relative joint displacement varies as the seismic body waves pass through the pipelines. The two most critical cases for relative joint displacement were found to be immediately before the joint cracks and when the  $\epsilon_{pmax}$  occurs at the

cracked joint. The equations for calculating the corresponding relative joint displacement were derived.

The JCCP response to seismic body waves depends on the relative magnitude of the mortar cracking strain and maximum pipe strain induced by seismic waves. When  $\epsilon_{pmax} \geq \epsilon_T$ , the mortar at the joints may be cracked and the pipe changes from a continuous pipe to a segmented pipe. In contrast, when  $\epsilon_{pmax} < \epsilon_T$ , no joint will be cracked by the seismic body waves and the relative joint displacement only occurs at existing cracked joints. The mortar cracking strain also has significant effect on the magnitude and occurrence frequency of relative joint displacement. Low  $\epsilon_T$  causes small relative joint displacement to occur frequently with a small interval along the pipeline. In contrast, high  $\epsilon_T$  results in large relative joint displacement concentrated at fewer locations of cracked joints.

Understanding the interaction of seismic waves and JCCPs leads to some design and construction concepts that may improve earthquake performance. The JCCPs may be designed and constructed such that all the joints have zero or very low axial pullout resistance, i.e.,  $\epsilon_T = 0$ . The zero or low axial pullout resistance allows very small displacements to occur at each joint, with no appreciable strain accumulation along pipe segments or displacement concentrations at existing cracked joints. The absence of mortar cracking strain or low strain capacity may be accomplished by cracking each joint intentionally or reducing the adhesion between mortar and pipe segments by inserting some low adhesion materials, such as Teflon or high density polyethylene (HDPE) at the mortar and pipe segment interface.

The model for seismic body wave interaction with JCCPs was extended for the locally weak joints in pipelines composed of other materials, such as cast iron. A relative joint displacement correction factor,  $\delta_d/\delta_j$ , was introduced and the relationship between  $\delta_d/\delta_j$  and strain ratio,  $\epsilon_u/\epsilon_{pmax}$  [i.e.,  $(P_u/EA)/(V_{ap}/C_a)$ ], was provided. The relative joint displacement at the locally weak joint is a product of the relative joint displacement at the existing cracked joint and the correction factor.

The models for seismic wave interaction with pipelines also have application to other linear structures, such as displacement at flexible connections between subaqueous tunnels and shore facilities when subjected to near-source strong motions.

## CHAPTER 6

### SYSTEM RESPONSE EVALUATION WITH GIRAFFE

#### 6.1. Introduction

Water supply systems provide water to their customers, and hence, the seismic performance of water supply systems, given the earthquake-induced damage scenario at component levels, should be evaluated with respect to the flow and pressure available for fire protection and water consumption for domestic and industrial use. The evaluation of flow and pressure at various locations requires hydraulic analysis. This chapter provides a brief description of a special hydraulic analysis computer program, Graphical Iterative Response Analysis of Flow Following Earthquakes (GIRAFFE), developed at Cornell University for hydraulic network analysis of damaged water supply systems. It starts by describing the limitations of commercial hydraulic network analysis software for simulating damaged water supply systems. It then describes a special algorithm for the treatment of negative node pressures in damaged water supply systems to provide a more accurate assessment of the performance. A discussion is provided for the structure and capability of GIRAFFE, which incorporates the special algorithm for simulating damaged systems. Finally, the LADWP water supply system performance during the 1994 Northridge earthquake is modeled with GIRAFFE and simulation results are compared with measurement of flow after the earthquake. Only the most prominent features of GIRAFFE are

described in this chapter. For more details on the development, capability, and validation of GIRAFFE, please refer to Shi (2006).

## 6.2. Hydraulic Analysis For Damaged Water Supply Systems

Hydraulic network analysis is governed by two sets of well-known equations, the equations of continuity and energy conservation. The equations of continuity are simple implications of the law of conservation of mass, which requires that in every junction of water systems, there must be a balance between the sum of the flows coming in and going out. Consider the equation of continuity at node  $i$  of water systems:

$$\sum_{k=1}^{n_i} Q_{ik} - \bar{Q}_i = 0 \quad (6.1)$$

where  $Q_{ik}$  is the flow in pipe  $k$  at node  $i$ , which connects to  $n_i$  pipes in total, and  $\bar{Q}_i$  is the demand or supply at node  $i$ .

The energy equation for a pipe  $k$  connecting nodes  $i$  and  $j$  can be expressed as

$$H_i - H_j = h_{fk} + h_{mk} \quad (6.2)$$

where  $H_i$  and  $H_j$  are the hydraulic heads, i.e., the sum of pressure heads and elevation heads, at nodes  $i$  and  $j$ , respectively,  $h_{fk}$  is the friction head loss in pipe  $k$ , and  $h_{mk}$  is the minor loss in pipe  $k$ , associated with the additional turbulence that occurs at bends, fittings, junctions, contractions, expansions, meters, and valves.

### **6.2.1. Limitation of Hydraulic Analysis for Damaged Water Supply Systems**

A fundamental but implicit assumption imbedded in the equations of continuity is that flows are continuous everywhere in the systems and all customer demands must be satisfied. Although this assumption holds true for undamaged water supply systems, quite often it is violated when the systems sustain damage and water outage occurs, indicating occurrence of unsatisfied customer demands and discontinuous flows in the systems. It is quite likely that, after some pipe breakage and/or leakage occur in the systems, water flows out from the systems through the pipe breaks and/or leaks, and parts of the water systems have no water flows, leaving some customer demands unsatisfied. However, if the commercial hydraulic analysis software is utilized to simulate the damaged water supply systems, it will provide a prediction of all customer demands satisfied with unrealistic negative node pressures in the systems, as a result of the violation of the continuous flow assumption. When the commercial hydraulic analysis software solves two sets of energy equations and continuity equations, to provide the simulation results, the software reduces the hydraulic heads at the nodes, where the customer demands are not satisfied in reality, to satisfy the demands mathematically, resulting in negative pressures at the nodes. Because water systems are not airtight, particularly for damaged water systems, air can be admitted when the pressure falls below the atmospheric pressure, no negative pressure can actually occur in the systems. The hydraulic analysis for the damaged water supply systems may provide misleading results if the violation of the continuous flow assumption is not accounted for.

### 6.2.2. Negative Pressure Analysis

Markov et al. (1994) developed an iterative approach on the treatment of negative node pressures to account for the violation of continuous flow assumption, and applied this method to assess the seismic serviceability of the auxiliary water supply system in the city of San Francisco. Similar approach was also described by Tanaka (1996) and Hwang et al. (1998). A brief review on the negative pressure analysis approach by Markov et al. (1994) is provided as follows.

Consider, for example, a node  $i$ , as shown in Figure 6.1, in water systems with pressure  $P_i < 0$ , where zero stands for the atmospheric pressure. If air is allowed into the systems, node  $i$  will have a pressure equal to the atmospheric pressure, i.e.,  $P_i = 0$ , and no flow will occur in node  $i$  and pipe  $k$  connecting nodes  $i$  and  $j$ . Markov et al. (1994) proposed an iterative approach to eliminate the nodes with negative pressures, such as node  $i$  in Figure 6.1, in the damaged water supply systems systematically. The elimination of negative pressure nodes from the damaged water systems starts with the identification of nodes with negative pressure. The negative pressure nodes and the pipes converging to these nodes are eliminated sequentially, starting with the node with the lowest negative pressure. Flows and pressures are recalculated for the adjusted systems after elimination of each single negative pressure node. If the negative pressure nodes isolate a portion of the systems, that portion of the systems is simply taken out from the systems.

Markov et al. (1994) validated the negative pressure analysis algorithm by simulating both small-scale artificial water systems and a full-scale water supply system, i.e., San Francisco Auxiliary Water Supply System. It was shown that the






Figure 6.1. Negative Pressure Analysis

negative pressure analysis algorithm was able to eliminate nodes with negative pressures and simulate the flow pattern in the small-scale water systems properly. The negative pressure analysis algorithm was then utilized in the assessment of seismic serviceability of the San Francisco Auxiliary Water Supply System and was capable of reproducing the flow and pressure distributions in the System during the experimental tests performed by San Francisco Fire Department as well as the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake.

### 6.3. GIRAFFE

A special hydraulic analysis program, Graphical Iterative Response Analysis of Flow Following Earthquakes (GIRAFFE), equipped with the negative pressure analysis algorithm (Markov et al., 1994), is developed at Cornell University (Shi, 2006), dedicating for the hydraulic analysis of the damaged water supply systems.

This Section provides a brief description of GIRAFFE, starting with the overall structure of GIRAFFE, followed by system damage simulation, treatment of local distribution system damage, and Monte Carlo simulations. Only the most prominent features of GIRAFFE are described here, and more details on the development, capability, and verification of GIRAFFE are given by Shi (2006).

### **6.3.1. Structure of GIRAFFE**

GIRAFFE, equipped with the negative pressure analysis algorithm (Markov et al., 1994), is built on an open source hydraulic analysis program, EPANET (EPA, 2005). EPANET was developed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and is available in its website (<http://www.epa.gov/ORD/NRMRL/wswrd/epanet.html>). Figure 6.2 shows the flowchart of GIRAFFE, which contains three major components: preprocessor, analysis module, and postprocessor. Water systems can be defined and edited through the EPANET Windows interface (Rossman, 2000) or imported directly from other hydraulic network analysis software, such as H2ONET (MWH Soft, Inc., 1999). GIRAFFE then imposes the system damage scenarios, either deterministically or probabilistically, and proceeds to hydraulic network analysis, using the EPANET hydraulic engine, which firstly checks the connectivity of the damaged systems. If parts of the systems are isolated from water sources as a result of the imposed system damage scenario, these parts of the systems have no flow and are eliminated from the systems sequentially. If no connectivity error occurs in the systems, hydraulic analysis is conducted and the simulation results regarding the flow and pressure in the systems are generated. GIRAFFE then assesses the simulation results and eliminates the negative pressure nodes (i.e.,  $P_i < P_{\text{limit}} = 0$ ) accordingly until no negative pressure occurs in the system. Finally, GIRAFFE compiles the simulation results in a tabulated




Figure 6.2. GIRAFFE Flow Chart

format which can be directly linked to Geographic Information System (GIS) software, and enables visualization and manipulation in a GIS platform. The simulation results include flow and/or pressure at each system component (i.e., junction, pipe, control valve, pump, tank, and reservoir) and system serviceability index (SSI), which is defined as:

$$SSI = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n_i} \overline{Q}_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{n_{i0}} \overline{Q}_i} \quad (6.3)$$

where  $\overline{Q}_i$  is the customer demand at node  $i$ ,  $n_{i0}$  and  $n_i$  are number of satisfied customer demands before and after imposing damage scenario, respectively.

### 6.3.2. System Damage Simulations

GIRAFFE offers two options for system damage simulations: deterministic and probabilistic. The deterministic option enables users to specify damage to any specific component, including pipe, pump, control valve, tank, and reservoir, anywhere in the systems. The damaged pumps, control valves, tanks, and reservoirs are turned off and disconnected from the systems. The damaged pipes can be further categorized into pipe break and pipe leak, which are simulated accordingly using the approaches described in Sections 6.3.2.2 and 6.3.2.3, respectively. The probabilistic option utilizes a Poisson process to simulate the occurrence of pipe damage and divides the pipe damage into pipe break and pipe leak stochastically. More descriptions on this regard are provided in the following sections:


### 6.3.2.1. Probabilistic Pipe Damage Occurrence Simulations

If the randomly distributed pipe damage in the systems is assumed to follow a Poisson process with a mean pipe damage rate,  $\lambda$ , which is a function of seismic demands, such as peak ground velocity, along the pipes, the distance from the pipe origin to the first pipe damage or the distance between two consecutive pipe damages can be simulated by an exponential random variable,  $L_k$ , expressed as:

$$L_k = -\frac{1}{\lambda} \ln[\text{rand}(0,1)] \quad (6.4)$$

where  $\text{rand}(0,1)$  is the uniform random variable between  $[0,1]$  available in many computer language packages, such as C++ and Matlab. Consider, for example, a pipe with length  $L$  and mean damage rate  $\lambda$ , as shown in Figure 6.3. A series of exponential random numbers,  $L_1, L_2, \dots, L_n$ , are generated using Eqn 6.4 and compared with the pipe length  $L$  until  $\sum_{k=1}^n L_k > L$ . Pipe damage occurs at location with a distance  $\sum_{k=1}^n L_k$  from the pipe origin when  $\sum_{k=1}^n L_k < L$ . In the pipe shown in Figure 6.3, two damages in total occur in the pipe, the first one at point A with a distance  $L_1$  from the pipe origin, and the second one at point B with a distance from  $L_1 + L_2$  from the pipe origin.

The pipe damage is further categorized into pipe break and pipe leak in accordance with the characteristics of pipe damage during previous earthquakes. Shi (2006) evaluated the characteristics of pipe damage during previous earthquakes reported in literature and found that about 80% of the pipe damages in cast iron, ductile iron, rivet steel, or concrete pipes are leak, and only about 20% of the pipe damages may be characterized as pipe break, a complete loss of water conveyance



Pipe with length L and mean damage rate  $\lambda$

$$L_k = -\frac{1}{\lambda} \ln[\text{rand}(0,1)], k = 1, 2, 3, \dots, n \text{ until } \sum_{k=1}^n L_k > L$$

Figure 6.3. Probabilistic Pipe Damage Occurrence Simulations

capability. The majorities of the reported damage in steel pipes are described as extensive deformation on the pipes. However, only about 20% of the reported steel pipe damages are associated with water leakage and it is quite unlikely that pipe break may occur in the steel pipes.

An uniform random number,  $P_1$ , between  $[0,1]$  is utilized to classify each pipe damage as pipe leak, pipe break, or no hydraulic damage in accordance with the material types of the pipes in which the damage occurs. If the damage occurs in cast iron, ductile iron, rivet steel, or concrete pipes, and  $P_1 > 0.2$ , the damage is classified as a pipe leak. The damage in cast iron, ductile iron, rivet steel, or concrete pipes, with  $P_1 \leq 0.2$ , is considered as a pipe break. Similarly, for steel pipes, damage with  $P_1 \leq 0.2$  is classified as pipe leak, while damage with  $P_1 > 0.2$  is labeled as no hydraulic damage, in which no water conveyance capability is compromised and no damage is simulated in hydraulic analysis, although extensive pipe deformations may occur. No break in steel pipes is considered possible in this research.

### 6.3.2.2. Hydraulic Simulations of Pipe Break

After the occurrences of pipe breaks and/or leaks are determined, the hydraulic models for pipe break and leak are implemented, as described in this and the next sections, respectively.

Figure 6.4 shows a schematic diagram for the hydraulic simulation of pipe break. Consider, for example, a break A occurred in a pipe with a length of  $L$  connecting nodes  $i$  and  $j$  and located at a distance  $L_1$  from the upstream node of the pipe, i.e., node  $i$ . At point A, the pipe is divided into two pipes with lengths  $L_1$  and  $L - L_1$  connecting nodes  $i$  and  $j$  to two new reservoirs 1 and 2, respectively. The pressure heads,  $P$ , at the reservoirs 1 and 2 are fixed at atmospheric pressure, i.e., 0, to simulate the fact that the pipe is open to atmosphere at the location of break. Therefore, the hydraulic heads,  $H$  (i.e., elevation head,  $E$ , plus pressure head,  $P$ ) at reservoirs 1 and 2 are equal to their respective elevation heads, which can be interpolated from the elevations at nodes  $i$  and  $j$  as follows:

$$H_{reservoir1} = H_{reservoir2} = E_{nodei} + \frac{L_1 \times (E_{nodej} - E_{nodei})}{L} \quad (6.5)$$

In order to prevent water from back-flowing from the reservoirs to the water system, two check valves, which only allow for one-way flow from the system to the reservoirs, are added in the divided pipes, as shown in Figure 6.4.




Figure 6.4. Schematic Diagram of Pipe Break Hydraulic Simulation

### 6.3.2.3. Hydraulic Simulations of Pipe Leak

In the context of hydraulic simulations, pipe leakage induced by earthquakes can be considered as an analogy of sprinklers, which are governed by the following hydraulic equation:

$$Q = C_D P^{0.5} \quad (6.6)$$

where  $Q$  is the flow rate through the sprinklers,  $C_D$  is the sprinkler discharge coefficient, and  $P$  is the sprinkler operating pressure. Shi (2006) found that the equivalent sprinkler discharge coefficient for a pipe leak with an open area of  $A_1$  in the pipe wall can be expressed as:

$$C_D = \left( \frac{2g}{\gamma_w} \right)^{0.5} A_1 \quad (6.7)$$






Figure 6.5. Schematic Diagram of Pipe Leak Hydraulic Simulation

where  $\gamma_w$  is the unit weight of water and  $g$  is gravitational acceleration.

In hydraulic simulations, a sprinkler is implemented as a fictitious pipe connecting to a fictitious reservoir which has the same elevation as the immediate upstream of the sprinkler. The friction loss,  $h_f$ , along the fictitious pipe is zero and the head loss,  $h$ , is due to the minor loss,  $h_m$ , calculated by:

$$h = h_m = \frac{1}{\gamma_w C_D^2} Q^2 \quad (6.8)$$

Following the implementation for sprinklers, Figure 6.5 shows the implementation of pipe leakage model in hydraulic simulations. If a pipe leak occurs at point A, a fictitious pipe connecting to a fictitious reservoir with the same elevation as point A is added to point A. The fictitious pipe contains a check valve to prevent water from back-flowing from reservoir to point A. The fictitious pipe diameter is the equivalent diameter corresponding to the leakage area  $A_1$  and the pipe friction loss coefficient is taken as infinite to eliminate any potential friction loss along the pipe. The minor loss,  $h_m$ , and hence head loss,  $h$ , is calculated by combining Eqns 6.7 and 6.8, resulting in

$$h = h_m = \frac{1}{2gA_1^2} Q^2 \quad (6.9)$$

Comparing Eqn 6.9 with the minor loss equation in hydraulic textbook (Lencastre and Holmes, 1987)

$$h_m = \frac{K}{2gA_1^2} Q^2 \quad (6.10)$$

where K is minor loss coefficient, results in  $K = 1$ . Therefore, the K value for the fictitious pipe is taken as 1 in the pipe leak hydraulic simulations.

The only unspecified hydraulic parameter in the abovementioned hydraulic model for the pipe leak is the leakage area  $A_1$ , which is estimated after Shi (2006). Shi (2006) evaluated the characteristics of pipe leakage reported in literature during previous earthquakes, categorized them into 5 different types (i.e., annular disengagement, round crack, longitudinal crack, local loss of pipe wall, and local tear of pipe wall), and provided a set of empirical equations to estimate the leakage area  $A_1$  in accordance with pipe dimensions, such as pipe diameter and wall thickness, for different types of leakage. For more details on the development of empirical equations, please refer to Shi (2006). Shi (2006) also provide estimation of the occurrence probability of different types of leakage in the pipes composed of different materials, such as cast iron, ductile iron, riveted steel, welded steel, and concrete, as shown in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1. Occurrence Probability of Different Leak Types

<b>Pipe Material</b>	<b>Annular Disengagement</b>	<b>Round Crack</b>	<b>Longitudinal Crack</b>	<b>Local Loss of Pipe Wall</b>	<b>Local Tear of Pipe Wall</b>
<b>Cast Iron</b>	0.3	0.5	0.1	0.1	N/A
<b>Ductile Iron</b>	0.8	N/A	0.1	0.1	N/A
<b>Riveted Steel</b>	0.6	N/A	0.3	0.1	N/A
<b>Welded Steel</b>	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1.0
<b>Concrete</b>	1.0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

N/A: Not Applicable; this type of leakage does not occur in the pipe composed of the corresponding type of material

GIRAFEE can simulate a pipe leak either deterministically or probabilistically. In deterministic simulations, specific leakage type or leakage area  $A_1$ , needs to be specified by the users, as opposed to probabilistic simulations, in which GIRAFEE utilizes the occurrence probabilities in Table 6.1 and a uniform random number,  $P_2$ , between  $[0,1]$  to determine the leakage type, and hence leakage area  $A_1$ . Consider, for example, probabilistic simulation of a leak in a cast iron pipe. If  $0 \leq P_2 < 0.3$ , annular disengagement type leak occurs; if  $0.3 \leq P_2 < 0.3 + 0.5 = 0.8$ , round crack type leak occurs; if  $0.8 \leq P_2 < 0.8 + 0.1 = 0.9$ , longitudinal crack type leak occurs; if  $0.9 \leq P_2 \leq 0.9 + 0.1 = 1.0$ , local loss of pipe wall occurs; and no local tear of pipe wall may occur in cast iron pipe. Uniform random number  $P_2$  is generated for each pipe leak and the type of leakage, and hence, the leakage area  $A_1$  is determined accordingly.

### **6.3.3. Treatment of Local Distribution System Damage**

The LADWP water supply system contains about 12,000 km of both distribution (diameter < 600 mm) and trunk (diameter  $\geq$  600 mm) pipelines. There are about 2,800 km pipelines and 1,052 demand nodes, i.e., customers, in the hydraulic network model used by LADWP engineers (LADWP, 2002a) for planning operation and future modification of the system. Most distribution are not modeled explicitly in the hydraulic network model, but are accounted for implicitly by aggregating them into demand nodes. From this perspective, each of the 1,052 demand nodes in the LADWP hydraulic network model represents a small-scale local distribution system. Because of the lack of details on the local distribution systems in the LADWP hydraulic network model, the damage to the local distribution system can not be simulated explicitly using the pipe break and leak model described in the previous sections, and some implicit approaches are necessary.

Shi (2006) describes an implicit approach to account for the damage to local distribution systems using demand fragility curves generated from multi-scale simulations on the LADWP system. It is assumed that each of the 1,052 demand nodes in the LADWP hydraulic network models corresponds to a small-scale local distribution system. As the distribution pipelines are modeled implicitly by demand nodes, the damage to the local distribution systems, which generally accompanies with additional water outflow from the distribution systems, should lead to an increase of the nodal demands in the LADWP hydraulic network models. Monte Carlo simulations on local distribution systems were performed to develop a fragility curve type of relationship between the local distribution line damage, measured by repair rate, i.e., number of repair per kilometers, and the increase of nodal demands in

LADWP hydraulic network models. Finally the developed relationship is applied to adjust the nodal demands in the LADWP hydraulic network models in accordance with the distribution line repair rate after earthquakes. By utilizing the relationship and adjusting nodal demands, the damage to the local distribution systems is accounted for implicitly.

Six LADWP local distribution systems were acquired from LADWP, which are pressure zone 1449, 1000, 579, 426, 448&462, and 205 distribution systems, as shown in Figure 6.6. The six pressure zone distribution systems are spatially distributed over the LADWP system and are considered as a significant amount of sample from the overall LADWP local distribution systems, and hence, are capable of characterizing the behavior of LADWP local distribution systems. Each pressure zone distribution system contains distribution lines as well as trunk lines. Monte Carlo simulations were performed on the six pressure zone distribution systems by adding the distribution line damage, both pipe break and leak, probabilistically, using the simulation process described in the previous sections. The trunk lines in the pressure zone distribution systems were kept undamaged intentionally and the flows in the trunk lines before and after the damages were monitored. It is assumed that the ratio of the flows in the trunk lines before and after the damages is equivalent to the ratio of nodal demands before and after damages, which can not be measured directly as a result of the hydraulic analysis constraints that the demands during the hydraulic analysis must be specified.

Linear regression analysis, based on the simulation results from five of the six pressure zone distribution systems (i.e., 1449, 1000, 579, 426, and 448&462), was performed to develop a relationship between normalized demand, ND, i.e., the ratio




Figure 6.6. Spatial Distribution of Six Pressure Zone Distribution Systems

of nodal demands after and before damages, and the repair rate,  $\lambda$ , in units of repair number per kilometers. The regression can be expressed as

$$ND = c + m\lambda \quad (6.11)$$

where  $c$  and  $m$  are regression constants, further correlated with the mean pressure,  $P_m$ , of the pressure zone distribution systems, using a similar linear regression process. Two sets of linear regression constants, corresponding to a 90% confidence and mean level, respectively, are implemented in GIRAFFE to estimate the  $c$  and  $m$  values associated with the  $P_m$  in various pressure zones. Since the 90% confidence level regression constants are conservative estimates and account, at least partially, for the data variability that regression analysis was unable to incorporate, one approach is to estimate  $c$  and  $m$  from  $P_m$ , as

$$c = 1.1412 + 0.0055P_m \quad (6.12)$$

$$m = -0.0514 + 0.0347P_m \quad (6.13)$$

in which  $P_m$  is in units of psi.

Another approach is to use the linear regression for the population mean to estimate  $c$  and  $m$  from  $P_m$ , as

$$c = 0.9012 + 0.0036P_m + N(0, \sigma_c) \quad (6.14)$$

$$m = -0.8770 + 0.0248P_m + N(0, \sigma_m) \quad (6.15)$$

in which  $N(0, \sigma_c)$  is a normally distributed random variable with 0 mean and  $\sigma_c$ , standard deviation, and  $N(0, \sigma_m)$  is a normally distributed random variable with 0 mean and  $\sigma_m$ , standard deviation. Both  $\sigma_c$  and  $\sigma_m$  are a function of  $P_m$ , expressed as

$$\sigma_c = -0.0198 + 0.0015P_m \quad (6.16)$$

$$\sigma_m = -0.3510 + 0.0094P_m \quad (6.17)$$

The pressure zone 205 distribution system was analyzed independently to provide a check on the predictive capability of the regression models. Monte Carlo simulations were performed on the pressure zone 205 distribution systems by stochastically adding pipe break and leak to the distribution lines and monitoring the flow ratios in the trunk lines before and after the damages. The ratio of the flows in the trunk lines before and after the damages is assumed equivalent to the ratio of nodal demands before and after damages, and is compared with the ratio predicted using these two sets of regressions (Eqns 6.11, 6.12, and 6.13, or Eqns 6.11, 6.14, 6.15, 6.16, and 6.17), respectively. It was found that the simulation results are consistent with the predictions from both sets of regressions. Details on the distribution system simulations, regression analysis, and regression verifications are provided by Shi (2006).

#### **6.3.4. Monte Carlo Simulations**

Monte Carlo simulations can be performed using GIRAFFE, which performs each simulation following the flowchart shown in Figure 6.2. In each simulation,



GIRAFFE generates a series of random numbers to determine the occurrence of pipe damages in trunk lines, the types of damage (i.e., break or leak), and the types of leak, as described in the previous sections. Then GIRAFFE implements the hydraulic models for the pipe breaks and leaks in the systems and adjusts the nodal demands to account for the local distribution system damage implicitly. After the damages are implemented, GIRAFFE utilizes the EPANET hydraulic engine to check network connectivity, perform hydraulic analysis, and eliminate negative node pressure until no negative node pressure exists in the system. Finally, GIRAFFE compiles the results from each simulation and provides result statistics, such as mean system serviceability index.

The number of Monte Carlo Simulations can be either specified by users or automatically determined in accordance with the GIRAFFE's self-termination algorithm (Grigoriu, 1995). GIRAFFE monitors the variations of the simulation results, i.e., the mean and coefficient of variation (COV) of system serviceability index, as the number of Monte Carlo simulations increases. If the variation is insignificant, i.e., the mean and COV of the system serviceability index with additional five simulations are both within  $\pm 0.02$  difference when compared with those without additional five simulations, GIRAFFE considers that sufficient number of Monte Carlo Simulations are performed such that representative simulation results are generated. However, GIRAFFE's self-termination algorithm requires at least fifteen simulations before the program is automatically terminated, and automatically terminates the simulations if the number of simulations exceeds 100. This ultimate termination number was never reached in the simulation performed for this report. The number also can be adjusted.

## **6.4. GIRAFFE Simulations of LADWP System Performance during 1994 Northridge Earthquake**

The GIRAFFE capabilities were validated by one of the most severe water system damage case histories, i.e., the performance of the LADWP water supply system during the 1994 Northridge earthquake. This section provides a brief description on the observed LADWP system performance, GIRAFFE simulation procedure, and the comparison between the performance observation and the GIRAFFE simulation results. It is found that GIRAFFE is able to predict the flow patterns and water outage areas reasonably well. The favorable agreement between simulation results and system measurements shows that GIRAFFE is capable of modeling severely damaged water supply systems, and provides confidence in applying GIRAFFE in future studies. A full treatment on the case history, GIRAFFE simulation procedure, and result comparison is given by Shi (2006).

### **6.4.1. LADWP System Performance during the 1994 Northridge Earthquake**

The Northridge earthquake ( $M_w = 6.7$ ) struck the densely-populated Northridge area in Los Angeles at 4:30 a.m. local time on January 17, 1994. The damage to the water supply system resulted from the Northridge earthquake is among the most extensive experienced in the U.S. history, being comparable to the damage sustained after the 1906 San Francisco and 1971 San Fernando earthquakes. The Northridge earthquake caused 70 repairs on trunk lines, 1,013 repairs on distribution lines, and damage to 5 water tanks. Figure 6.7 shows a spatial distribution of the damaged tanks and trunk line repairs. Most damage and repairs, and hence, the water outage occurred in the northern San Fernando Valley (Lund et al., 2005), as shown in




Figure 6.7. Damaged Tank, Trunk Line Repairs, and Water Outage Areas Induced by 1994 Northridge Earthquake

Figure 6.7. Approximately 15% of the population was subjected to water outage, and it took about 8 days to restore the disrupted water service after the earthquake. The cost of repairs to the LADWP water systems was about \$44 million (Eguchi and Chung, 1995).

To monitor its system performance, LADWP deployed a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system (SCADA) covering the whole system. 37 flow meters are located in the San Fernando Valley, where most damage and water outage occurred, and provided first-hand records on how the system behaved before and after the earthquake. The flow meter data were utilized to provide clues on the emergency operations and system reconfiguration after the earthquake and to compare the numerical simulation results. However, as the quality of the 37 monitor data is not consistent among each other, screening process is necessary before their utilization. Three screening criteria are adopted to assure the quality of the monitor data: 1) The meters indicating zero flow before and after the earthquake are considered either malfunctioned or out of service; 2) The meters with a maximum recording flow less than 1000 gpm are discarded; and 3) The constant reading (i.e., constant reading up to the last fourth digit after the decimal point) following the earthquake is considered as malfunction because of the electricity outage after the earthquake. After applying these criteria, thirteen monitor data remain and were utilized further in this study, which is discussed in more details in the following section.

#### **6.4.2. GIRAFFE Simulation Procedure**

Since most damage and water outage occurred in the San Fernando Valley, the simulation focuses on the northern half of the LADWP system, including six subsystems: Granada Hills (GH), Foothills (FH), Sunland/Tujunga (ST), Valley Floor (VF), Encino Hills (EH), and Santa Monica Mountains (SM) subsystems. Figure 6.8 shows the northern half of the LADWP system, together with a spatial distribution of the thirteen SCADA flow meters. The flow meter readings at River Supply Conduit,




Figure 6.8. GIRAFFE Simulation of the Northern Half of LADWP System

Upper Hollywood Reservoir Inflow, Upper Franklin Reservoir Inflow, and Stone Canyon Reservoir Inlet, which act as the connectors between the northern and southern halves of the LADWP system, were utilized as boundary conditions for the northern half of the system, as illustrated by green dots in Figure 6.8.



The hydraulic network for the northern half of the system was exported from H2ONET database used by LADWP engineers. Since the Northridge earthquake occurred in January, a typical winter demand is applied in the simulation. The virtual demands at River Supply Conduit, Upper Hollywood Reservoir Inflow, Upper Franklin Reservoir Inflow, and Stone Canyon Reservoir Inlet, representing the water demands of the southern half of the system, were recalibrated in accordance with the actual flow readings at the four locations, respectively.

As mentioned in Chapter 4, the LADWP hydraulic network model was developed for planning purposes and contains only pipelines with relatively large diameter. Therefore, only water tank damage and trunk line repairs are simulated directly. After a careful review on the 70 trunk line repair records, a repair on LA City Trunk Line in the lower Van Norman Complex, and two repairs on Granada Trunk Line and Rinaldi Trunk Line, respectively, in the intersection of Rinaldi St. and Balboa Blvd., as shown in Figure 6.8, are modeled as pipe break, a complete loss of the pipe connectivity. Other repairs are modeled as pipe leak, as described in Section 6.3.2.3. The hydraulic model parameters for the pipe leakage are determined in accordance with the characteristics of the repairs. To simplify the simulation, multiple nearby repairs on the same trunk line are lumped together. For example, twenty-eight repairs on the Granada Trunk Line, except for the one modeled as a pipe break, are simplified as four pipe leaks. Thirteen repairs on the Roscoe Trunk Line are lumped together as two pipe leaks. In total, twenty pipe leaks were used to simulate the trunk line performance after the earthquake, as shown in Figure 6.8.

As illustrated by red dots in Figure 6.8, three flow meters monitoring the flow in LA City, Haskell, and Hayvenhurst Trunk Lines in the lower Van Norman Complex,

respectively, are utilized to provide guidance on how the system was reconfigured shortly after the earthquake. The three flow meter data show that the flows decreased to zero shortly after the earthquake, suggesting that these three pipe segments, which sustained severe damage, were isolated promptly to prevent water loss. Please note that the isolated section in the LA City Trunk Line is located upstream of the connection between the LA City Trunk Line and the LA Reservoir Outlet, the main water source for LA City Trunk Line. Therefore, the isolation had little impact on the water flow southward through the LA City Trunk Line (Please refer to Chapter 4).

Four of the five damaged water tanks were simulated by disconnecting them from the system. The Granada High Tank located in the northern San Fernando Valley collapsed completely during the Northridge earthquake and was removed permanently after the earthquake. The current LADWP hydraulic network model does not include the Granada High Tank, and, it was therefore not simulated in this study. The Kittridge Tank on the western rim of the San Fernando Valley and De Soto Reservoir on the northern rim of the San Fernando Valley, as shown by pink symbols in Figure 6.8, were removed from the GIRAFFE simulation because they were depleted shortly after the earthquake. Hydraulic simulation shows that the Kittridge Tanks and De Soto Reservoir were empty within several hours after the earthquake. The depletion of the tanks and reservoir was confirmed by the LADWP engineers (Vargas, 2005).

The interaction between the water supply and electric power systems was accounted for in the simulation. The longest power outage, i.e., 27 hours (LADWP, 1994), occurred in the northern San Fernando valley, where the most important water system facility, i.e., Van Norman Complex, is located. The power outage rendered the pump stations in the Van Norman Complex inoperable. Accordingly, the pump

stations in the Van Norman Complex were turned off in the simulations after the earthquake.

### **6.4.3. GIRAFFE Simulation Results**

Figure 6.9 shows the GIRAFFE simulation results, superimposed by the observed water outage areas. The original no-flow pipes in the intact system and the damage-induced no-flow pipes are color coded by pink and red, respectively. The unsatisfied demands are illustrated by yellow dots. Most damage-induced no-flow pipes and unsatisfied demands occurred in the northern and western San Fernando Valley, consistent with the areas of observed water outage for more than one day.

Figure 6.9 illustrates the locations of 6 SCADA flow meters providing data pertaining to the LA Reservoir Outlet, Encino Reservoir outflow, Granada Trunk Line, Morella & Van Owen Regulation Station, Astoria Pump Station, and Green Verdugo Pump Station, respectively. Figure 6.10 shows comparisons between the GIRAFFE simulation results and the monitored data at each flow meter. In general, the simulation results compare favorably with the monitored data at each location.

The earthquake-induced damage had different effects on the water supply system components at different locations in the system. The earthquake led to flow decrease in some components, such as LA Reservoir Outlet and Morella & Van Owen Regulation Station, or even complete loss of component functionality, such as zero flow in Granada Trunk Line and Astoria Pump Station. On the other hand, some components were little affected by earthquake-induced damage. Consider, for example, Green Verdugo Pump Station, which is located far away from the major damage in the








Figure 6.9. GIRAFFE Simulation Results


San Fernando Valley and was not influenced by the damage. The damage may result in flow increase in some components, such as Encino Reservoir, to compensate the loss of functionality of other damaged components. The Encino Reservoir had to provide more water to the southern San Fernando Valley after the earthquake to compensate for the loss of water that normally flows from the north. Despite of this variability, the difference between the monitored data and simulation results is




(a) LA Reservoir Outlet




(b) Encino Reservoir Outflow




(c) Granada Trunk Line Flow Station



(d) Morella & Van Owen Regulation Station



(e) Astoria Pump Station



(f) Green Verdugo Pump Station

Figure 6.10. Comparisons between GIRAFFE Results and Monitored Data

generally less than 10%. The favorable agreement between simulation results and system measurements shows that GIRAFFE is capable of modeling severely damaged water supply systems, and provides confidence in applying GIRAFFE in future studies.

## **6.5. Summary**

This chapter briefly describes the special hydraulic analysis computer program (GIRAFFE) used in this work. GIRAFFE is able to compensate for the limitations of commercially available hydraulic analysis software in predicting unrealistic negative pressures in a heavily damaged system by eliminating portions of the network containing negative pressures. GIRAFFE simulates trunk line damage explicitly by a Poisson process to model the occurrence of pipe damage and hydraulic models for both pipe break and leak to model the water outflow from the system. In addition, damage to distribution lines is simulated implicitly by adjusting the nodal demands in the trunk line system. GIRAFFE is capable of performing Monte Carlo simulations and compiling the simulation results in a format that can be used in GIS. The LADWP water supply system performance during the 1994 Northridge earthquake was modeled using GIRAFFE, and it was found that GIRAFFE provided simulation results consistent with the observed water outage and the recorded flows in the system after the earthquake. The favorable agreement between simulation results and system measurements shows that GIRAFFE is capable of modeling severely damaged water supply systems, and provides confidence in applying GIRAFFE in future studies.



## **CHAPTER 7**

# **PROBABILISTIC SEISMIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF LADWP WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM**

### **7.1. Introduction**

The framework for evaluating earthquake effects on lifeline systems outlined in Chapter 2 is applied to evaluate the seismic performance of the LADWP water supply system. This chapter summarizes the implementation of the evaluation framework and presents the evaluation results. It starts with the evaluation procedures employed, assumptions adopted, and input parameters or analysis models utilized, then proceeds to an illustration of the evaluation process using the performance of the LADWP water supply system subjected to one (i.e., the Scenario 175 Verdugo earthquake) of the 59 scenario earthquakes described in Chapter 3. The results of the probabilistic evaluation for the 59 scenario earthquakes are aggregated in the form of risk curves, for both the entire LADWP system and the five water districts, respectively. Key contributing scenario earthquakes for the system risks are identified by deaggregation plots. Finally, the evaluation results are organized such that they can be utilized in the consequence analysis, such as economic loss, community impacts, and emergency response and restoration.

## 7.2. Evaluation Procedures

The basic chain of activities in the seismic performance evaluation of the LADWP water supply system includes the seismic hazard characterizations, system property characterizations, analyses of the interaction between seismic demand and lifeline component or facility response, and the assessment of system response and its consequences for the regional economy and community institutions, which are described in the following subheadings, respectively.

### 7.2.1. Seismic Hazards

For each of the 59 scenario earthquakes described in Chapter 3, ground motions were generated at 572 points in a grid covering the LADWP system and interpolated to develop contour surfaces, which were then corrected for site conditions following the NEHRP-HAZUS approach. The seismic demands on system components, e.g., peak ground velocity for pipelines, were determined from the corrected contour surfaces according to their locations. This allows for the performance evaluation of the system components as well as for the entire system when subjected to the scenario earthquakes. Ground motions, corresponding to mean +  $\sigma_{\text{inter-event}}$  level, were used in this work.  $\sigma_{\text{intra-event}}$  describes the variation of ground motion resulting from different earthquake source characteristics, as discussed in Section 3.2.1.5.

Similar processes were applied for the 59 individual scenario earthquakes and the results, together with the corresponding annual frequencies of occurrence, were integrated to develop the risk curves, as discussed in Section 7.4. It is assumed that

when the seismic hazards from the 59 scenario earthquakes match those from the USGS 2002 dataset, the LADWP system seismic performance evaluation using the 59 scenario earthquakes is representative of the system seismic performance according to the USGS 2002 dataset.

### **7.2.2. System Characteristics**

The system characteristics of the LADWP water supply system are embodied in a H2ONET hydraulic model, as described in Chapter 4. The H2ONET hydraulic model is provided by LADWP engineers and contains 9,287 nodes and 10,665 links, representing about 2,186 km of pipelines, 1,052 demand nodes, 591 control valves, 110 tanks and reservoirs, 151 local groundwater wells, and 284 pumps. Since the H2ONET hydraulic model was originally developed for planning purposes, it contains only pipelines with relatively large diameter. The H2ONET hydraulic model contains twelve different simulation scenarios representing either the whole or part of the LADWP system with various system valving and control strategies and demand sets simulating either summer or winter demands. Because the summer demand is the highest demand likely to be experienced by the system, the scenario “SUMMER, All thirteen Subsystems without closed valves”, which contains the entire LADWP water supply system with the typical summer valving and control strategies and summer demand set, was utilized in the system seismic performance evaluation.

Using the export function in the H2ONET software, the selected scenarios in H2ONET hydraulic model were exported into a standard EPANET format, which is the input data format for GIRAFFE. Two independent hydraulic simulations for the selected scenario were performed using H2ONET and GIRAFFE (i.e., EPANET

hydraulic engine), respectively, and the results were compared. It is found that the overwhelming majority of the links and nodes have identical flows or pressures from both simulations using different software packages. However, because of the inevitable difference in numerical procedures inherent in two different software packages, minor difference exists in a small portion of links and nodes. The maximum flow difference in links is less than  $0.38 \text{ m}^3$  per minute (100 gpm) or 1% and the maximum pressure difference in nodes is less than 13.8 kPa (2 psi) or 1%. It was verified that GIRAFFE provides virtually identical results for the undamaged LADWP system when comparing with results from H2ONET.

### **7.2.3. System Component Performance Evaluation**

This work focuses on seismic wave (TGD) interactions with pipelines, which have an important impact on system performance. The seismic performance evaluation of other components, such as pump stations, regulation stations, ground water wells, and tanks and reservoirs, is not included in this work. Procedures are available for modeling the seismic performance of these facilities by means of fragility curves (ALA, 2001), which relate the probability of reaching or exceeding a particular damage state to a particular level of earthquake hazard. Such procedures can be readily incorporated in future simulations. Localized and relatively minor PGD effects are implicitly covered by the regression relationships between repair rate and PGV, but locally large PGD events are not. Models exist for soil-structure interaction under various PGD scenarios (e.g., O'Rourke, 1998; and O'Rourke and Liu, 1999), and can be easily incorporated in the approach developed in this work. PGD characterization generally depends on explicit information about subsurface soil conditions and ground failure hazards. Moreover, the risk of ground failure at specific locations will be linked



to specific scenario earthquakes because of proximity and level of TGD needed to trigger PGD. Accounting for PGD in a probabilistic format that is consistent with PSHA approach adopted (see Section 2.3.1 and Chapter 3) for TGD is beyond the scope of this work. The framework for PSHA evaluation of lifeline system performance has nonetheless been established, and provides a sound basis for incorporating both PGD and TGD hazards in subsequent development.

Chapter 5 presents models on seismic wave interaction with pipelines, which can be utilized to evaluate the seismic performance of pipelines. However, to apply those models, details are required on seismic wave characteristics, e.g., predominant period and apparent wave velocity, pipeline properties, e.g., cross-sectional area and axial deformation stiffness, and ground conditions, e.g., burial depth, unit weight of soils, and pipe-soil interface friction angle. This information is quite often not available, particular for such a large and complex system as the LADWP system, which contains about 12,000 km pipes covering an area of approximately 1,200 km<sup>2</sup>. One alternate method, which requires minimal input parameters, for estimating pipeline damage during earthquakes is to use regressions between observed repair rates and measured seismic parameters during previous earthquakes. The regressions adopted in this research are summarized in Sections 7.2.3.1.

As described in Chapter 4, the H2ONET hydraulic model contains only pipelines with relatively large diameter and includes the majority of local distribution lines by aggregating them to demand nodes. The damage to the pipelines included directly in H2ONET model was simulated explicitly, as summarized in Section 7.2.3.2. In contrast, as the H2ONET contains no explicit information on the majority of local

distribution lines, an implicit approach to simulate their damage was applied, as described in Section 7.2.3.3.

#### *7.2.3.1. Regressions for Estimating Pipeline Damage*

The damage to cast iron and ductile iron pipelines was estimated using the regressions developed by Jeon (2002). Empirical data were collected about pipeline repairs and locations of repairs after the 1994 Northridge earthquake and incorporated in a large GIS database, consisting of over 12,000 km of pipelines in greater Los Angeles area and more than 240 strong motion records. Records from over 240 strong motion stations throughout the earthquake-affected area were analyzed with respect to various seismic parameters (Toprak, 1998). The spatial distributions of different seismic parameters were estimated by interpolation and superimposed on the pipeline network and spatially distributed database of pipeline damage. Where possible, pipeline repairs in zones of documented PGD were screened from the repair rates so that the resulting statistics would reflect principally the effects of seismic waves or TGD. Using the GIS software, the repair rate was calculated for areas influenced by specific seismic parameters. Correlations then were developed through regression procedures to obtain the most statistically significant relationships among repair rate and values of different seismic parameters. It was found that the most statistically relevant parameter for correlation with repair rate is PGV. Figure 7.1 shows the linear regressions developed by Toprak (1998) and Jeon (2002) and utilized in this work to calculate the repair rates from PGVs for cast iron and ductile iron pipelines.

Following the procedures developed by Jeon (2002), regressions of repair rate vs. PGV for trunk lines composed of other materials were developed and included in




Figure 7.1. Regressions of Repair Rate vs. PGV for Cast Iron and Ductile Iron Pipelines (after Jeon, 2002)

Appendix A. Figure 7.2 shows the regressions for concrete, riveted steel, and steel pipelines.

The repair rates of pipelines composed of different materials were calculated in accordance with PGV using the regressions shown in Figures 7.1 and 7.2. An equal-weight average of five repair rates using the five regressions in the figures was applied to the pipelines (about 7% of total length in the LADWP system) without composition information available in the H2ONET database.




Figure 7.2. Regressions of Repair Rate vs. PGV for Concrete, Riveted Steel and Steel Pipelines

### 7.2.3.2. Explicit Trunk Line Damage Simulations

The occurrence of damage to the pipelines included directly in the H2ONET hydraulic model was simulated by a Poisson process in GIRAFFE. The details on the Poisson process simulation are given in Chapter 6 of this work and by Shi (2006). The repair rate, i.e., number of repairs per km, for each pipe was calculated according to the repair rate vs. peak ground velocity regressions described in Section 7.2.3.1. As

described in Chapter 3, if the pipeline is so long that extends over several PGV contour intervals, the GIS “Intersect” function divides the pipeline into several new short pipes, each of which falls into a single PGV contour interval. The repair rates for these short pipes were calculated individually, using the repair rate vs. PGV regressions, and integrated by a weighted average according to the pipe lengths to obtain the repair rate for the original long pipe. GIRAFFE can simulate multiple damages along one pipe and further divides the pipe damage into either pipe break or leak.

Two different hydraulic models for pipe break and leak were implemented, respectively, in GIRAFFE after the simulation of pipe damage occurrence and the determination of damage category, i.e., pipe break or leak. The pipe leak was further categorized into five types according to pipe materials and the occurrence of leak types was determined stochastically. More details on the hydraulic models and the determination of leak types are given in Chapter 6 and by Shi (2006).

#### *7.2.3.3. Implicit Simulations of Local Distribution Line Damage*

As mentioned in Chapter 4, the H2ONET hydraulic model used in this work was used by LADWP engineers (LADWP, 2002a) for system planning and management purposes, and hence, contains only pipelines with relatively large diameter or water delivery significance. Figure 7.3 shows about 12,000 km pipelines operated by LADWP, as opposed to about 2,800 km pipelines included in the H2ONET database. Most distribution lines in the LADWP system, as color-coded by red in Figure 7.3, are not directly included in the H2ONET hydraulic model, which contains mainly trunk lines, as color-coded by blue in Figure 7.3. Most distribution




Figure 7.3. Simplifications of LADWP Water Supply System in H2ONET Database

lines are accounted for implicitly in the H2ONET database by aggregating them into demand nodes, as shown by green dots in Figure 7.3. From this perspective, each of the 1,052 demand nodes in the LADWP hydraulic network model represents a small-scale local distribution system.

Because of the lack of details on the local distribution systems in the LADWP hydraulic model, the damage to the local distribution system can not be simulated explicitly, as described in Section 7.2.3.2 for trunk lines. The GIRAFFE simulates the damage to local distribution system damage by adjusting the water demands in the demand nodes according to the distribution system damage after earthquakes, as described in Section 6.3.3.

The PGVs to the demand nodes are determined by superimposing the spatial distribution of demand nodes on PGV contour surfaces, as described in Section 3.4.4. A demand node is typical linked to a local distribution system that is sufficiently small that strong motion effects can be modeled with sufficient accuracy by a single representative seismic parameter. The repair rate in the local distribution systems represented by the demand nodes was estimated using the repair rate vs. PGV regressions. Since majority, i.e., 72% (Jeon, 2002), of the local distribution pipelines in the LADWP system is composed of cast iron, the cast iron regression was utilized to estimate the repair rate. The increases in nodal demands were calculated using Eqn 6.11, the regression constants  $c$  and  $m$  of which were estimated from the mean pressure,  $P_m$ , of the local distribution systems, using the 90% confidence linear regressions, i.e., Eqns 6.12 and 6.13. Figure 7.4 shows a spatial distribution of  $P_m$  for local distribution system. The demand nodes are color-coded by the  $P_m$  of the local distribution systems they represent. The high mean pressure occurs in the mountainous






Figure 7.4. Spatial Distribution of Mean Pressures for Local Distribution Systems



areas, i.e., Santa Susana Mountains, Simi Hills, and Santa Monica Mountains, to accommodate large elevation difference in those areas. Since  $c$  and  $m$  are linear function of  $P_m$  (refer to Eqns 6.12 and 6.13), more nodal demand increases are expected in those areas, given the PGVs or the repair rates are similar in the local distribution systems.

#### **7.2.4. System Performance Evaluation**

The seismic system performance of the LADWP water system was evaluated using GIRAFFE. Monte Carlo simulations were performed for each of the 59 scenario earthquakes. In each simulation, GIRAFFE simulated the trunk line damage explicitly by implementing the hydraulic models for pipe breaks and leaks, and modeled the damage to local distribution system implicitly by adjusting the nodal demands according to the repair rates in the local distribution systems. Then, GIRAFFE utilized the EPANET hydraulic engine to check network connectivity, perform hydraulic analysis, and eliminate negative node pressures until no negative node pressures are present in the system. Finally, GIRAFFE compiled the results from each simulation and provided result statistics, such as the mean system serviceability index, as defined in Section 6.3.1.

In addition, GIRAFFE was utilized to study the effects of water loss from storage tanks. Leaking and ruptured pipelines will draw down the water levels in tanks and local reservoirs, thereby further reducing flow and pressure in the pipeline network. Evaluating the effects of water losses from tanks and reservoirs may provide a more representative model for post-earthquake performance because it will take

water utility crews some time to isolate leaks and pipeline breaks to reduce their impact on local water sources.

For each simulation that accounts for tank water losses, after all negative pressure nodes were eliminated and the simulation results were compiled, the water levels of the storage tanks in the system were updated according to the flow rates determined from the hydraulic analysis to simulate the impact of leakage from damaged pipelines for a 24-hour period after the earthquake. The system with the updated tank water level was reanalyzed in GIRAFFE to eliminate additional negative pressure nodes resulting from the loss of storage water in tanks, and the second set of simulation results with a 24-hour period of running tanks was generated. For more details about the implementation of the storage water loss effects in GIRAFFE simulations, please refer to Shi (2006).

The number of Monte Carlo simulations was automatically determined in accordance with the GIRAFFE's self-termination algorithm (Grigoriu, 1995) with a convergence tolerance of  $\pm 0.02$  difference for both mean and COV of the system serviceability index. It is found that the Monte Carlo simulations for all 59 scenario earthquakes terminated at a number of fifteen, resulting in 885 simulations in total.

An example of the simulations is given in Section 7.3, using the Scenario 175 Verdugo earthquake. Similar procedures apply for each of the 59 scenario earthquakes and the simulation results from the 59 individual scenario earthquakes are integrated in the form of risk curves, as described in Section 7.4.

### **7.2.5. Social and Economic Consequence Evaluation**

The social and economic consequence evaluations for the LADWP water supply system are performed by other MCEER researchers, and are beyond the scope of this report. As described in Chapter 2, Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models have been developed to assess the economic impacts caused by earthquake-induced lifelines losses (e.g., Rose and Liao, 2003 and 2005; and Rose and Guha, 2003). The community impacts of the seismic-induced lifeline loss have been evaluated by other researchers (e.g., Chang and Miles, 2003; and Chang and Chamberlin, 2004). Davidson and Cagnan (2004) and Cagnan (2005) modeled lifeline system restorations after earthquakes and simulated system repair and recovery operations for both the LADWP water supply and electric power systems. Each of these simulations relies on information about damage states, as provided by the system simulation model developed in this work. For example, input for evaluating regional economic consequence of damage is provided in the form of water availability in the 13 subsystems after earthquakes, as described in Section 7.5.

### **7.3. Evaluation Example: Scenario 175 Verdugo Earthquake**

The simulation processes described in Section 7.2 are illustrated using the Scenario 175 Verdugo earthquake. PGV contour surfaces generated in Chapter 3 (refer to Figures 3.12 and 3.13) were utilized to determine the PGV for each trunk line and demand node representing the local distribution system, and the repair rate for each pipe was estimated accordingly. The damage to the pipelines, included directly in the H2ONET database, were simulated explicitly, while those to the local distribution systems were modeled implicitly by adjusting the nodal demands, as described in

Section 6.3.3. The damage scenarios were imposed on the LADWP water system and the hydraulic network analysis was performed using GIRAFFE.

Figure 7.5 shows the spatial distribution of breaks and leaks simulated explicitly for the trunk lines and included in the H2ONET database, superimposed on the PGV contour surfaces. In this simulation, breaks occur in 25 pipes, as shown by red crosses in Figure 7.5, and leakage occurs in 143 pipes, as shown by triangles in Figure 7.5. The pipes with one leak are color-coded by green, as opposed to those with two or three leaks by yellow and red, respectively. Most pipe breaks and leaks occur in the upper right quarter of the figure, corresponding to the high PGV values in those locations. Pipe damage also occurs sparsely in the other parts of the system. It should be recognized that this specific simulation applies to one damage scenario triggered by one of the 59 scenario earthquakes. To capture properly the statistics of performance for a particular scenario earthquake, Monte Carlo simulations were performed, as described in Section 6.3.4.

Figure 7.6 shows the spatial distribution of demand nodes superimposed on the PGV contour surfaces. The demand nodes are color-coded according to the ratio of water demands after the earthquake normalized to those before the earthquake for implicitly modeling the damages to local distribution systems. High normalized demand ratios, indicating severe damage and water losses, occur in the upper right quarter of the figure, corresponding to the high PGV values in those locations. Because of the high mean pressures in the mountainous areas, i.e., Santa Susana Mountains, Simi Hills, and Santa Monica Mountains (please refer to Figure 7.4), high normalized demand ratios are also observed around Santa Monica Mountains and the rims of San Fernando Valley.




Figure 7.5. Spatial Distribution of Pipe Breaks and Leaks for Scenario 175 Verdugo Earthquake




Figure 7.6. Spatial Distribution of Increasing Demands for Scenario 175 Verdugo Earthquake



Figure 7.7 shows the spatial distribution of water outage areas after the earthquake according to GIRAFFE simulations. The unsatisfied demand nodes are shown by yellow dots and the pipes with no flow as a result of earthquake-induced damage are shown by red lines. Please note that the pipes with no flows in the undamaged LADWP system to provide redundancy in the system are shown by pink lines. As a results of high PGV values in the upper right quarter of the figure and concentrated damage in those areas, most water outage clusters in the upper right quarter. Sparse water outage also occurs in other parts of the system and the overall system serviceability index (SSI) is 0.81.

Figure 7.8 shows the spatial distribution of water outage areas after a 24-hour period of running tanks using the same legend as Figure 7.7. The system deteriorates rapidly and a significant increase of water outage occurs, particularly in the Santa Monica Mountain areas and the west rim of the San Fernando Valley. As described in Chapter 4, the water in the LADWP system starts from Van Norman Complex and flows from the north to the south. Water is pumped into the storage tanks in the Santa Monica Mountain areas (please refer to Figure 4.2), serving the communities in those high elevation areas by those tanks. Similarly, several water tanks in the west rim of the San Fernando Valley receive water from Granada Trunk Line and/or Rinaldi Trunk Line and provide water to the west rim of the valley. In addition to the impaired capability of those areas to receive water directly from the source, i.e., Van Norman Complex, most tanks are empty after a 24-hour period of outflow, resulting in severe water outage in those areas. Relatively slight increases of water outage are observed in other parts of the system and the overall system serviceability is 0.49.




Figure 7.7. Spatial Distribution of Water Outage after Scenario 175 Verdugo Earthquake






Figure 7.8. Spatial Distribution of Water Outage after 24-hour Period of Running Tanks for Scenario 175 Verdugo Earthquake

Table 7.1 summarizes the fifteen Monte Carlo simulation results for the Scenario 175 Verdugo earthquake. The mean system serviceability index for the simulations with or without a 24-hour period of running tanks is 0.81 and 0.49, respectively. The losses of storage water in tanks have significant effects on the performance of the system.

Similar Monte Carlo simulations were performed for each of the 59 scenario earthquakes and the results were integrated in the form of risk curves, as described in the next section.

#### **7.4. Risk Curves**

The simulation results for the 59 scenario earthquakes were integrated in the form of risk curves, plotting the variation of annual exceedance frequency as a function of system serviceability index (SSI). Each scenario earthquake is characterized by an optimized annual frequency of occurrence, as shown in Table 3. 1. Fifteen Monte Carlo simulations were performed for each of the 59 scenario earthquakes, resulting in 885 simulation results. If the fifteen Monte Carlo simulation results are assumed to occur with equal likelihood, i.e., equal annual frequency of occurrence, the annual frequency of occurrence for each set of Monte Carlo simulation results is one fifteenth of that for the associated scenario earthquake. Consider, for example, the Scenario 175 Verdugo earthquake, the annual occurrence frequency of which is 0.000964792. Then, the annual occurrence frequency for a SSI (with the effect of water loss in storage tanks) of 0.55, associated with the first simulation results in Table 7.1, is 0.0000643195. Similarly, the annual occurrence frequency for a SSI of 0.49 or 0.44, associated with the second or third simulation results in Table 7.1,

Table 7.1. Monte Carlo Simulation Results for Scenario 175 Verdugo Earthquake

<b>Simulation ID</b>	<b>System Serviceability Index (without 24-hour period of running tanks)</b>	<b>System Serviceability Index (with 24-hour period of running tanks)</b>
<b>1</b>	0.85	0.55
<b>2</b>	0.81	0.49
<b>3</b>	0.85	0.44
<b>4</b>	0.86	0.46
<b>5</b>	0.78	0.35
<b>6</b>	0.86	0.45
<b>7</b>	0.76	0.48
<b>8</b>	0.93	0.46
<b>9</b>	0.83	0.37
<b>10</b>	0.96	0.50
<b>11</b>	0.86	0.47
<b>12</b>	0.68	0.35
<b>13</b>	0.80	0.44
<b>14</b>	0.88	0.38
<b>15</b>	0.81	0.46

is also 0.0000643195. The similar process was applied to all 885 simulation results, i.e., SSI, each of which is associated with its own annual occurrence frequency. The 885 SSI were then sorted in an increasing order of SSI, and the annual frequency of exceedance a given SSI,  $SSI_0$ , is calculated by a summation of the annual occurrence frequencies for those  $SSI \leq SSI_0$ ,

$$F(SSI_0) = \sum_{SSI \leq SSI_0} f(SSI) \quad (7.1)$$

where  $F(SSI_0)$  is the annual frequency of exceeding  $SSI_0$ , and  $f(SSI)$  is the annual occurrence frequency of SSI.

### 7.4.1. System Risk Curves

Figure 7.9 shows the system risk curves plotting the variation of annual exceedance frequency as a function of system serviceability index (SSI) as defined in Section 6.3.1. The system risk curve without a 24-hour period of running tanks is shown by open triangles and that with a 24-hour period of running tanks is shown by open squares. The system risk curve without a 24-hour period of running tanks varies almost linearly in the semi-logarithmic scale, with a minimum SSI of 0.64 corresponding to an annual frequency of 0.0001, or 10,000-year recurrence interval. The system risk curve with 24-hour running tanks plots to the right of the first curve, indicating much lower SSI values for the same annual exceedance frequency. The linear portion of the curve, with lower SSI values, is approximately parallel to the system risk curve without 24-hour period of running tanks. The difference between the curve without 24-hour period of running tanks and its parallel portion in the curve with 24-hour period of running tanks signifies the effects of running tanks. After 24-hour period of running tanks, the system deteriorates rapidly and the SSI decreases significantly.

The system risk curve with a 24-hour period of running tanks provides an estimate of LADWP system performance after earthquakes that reflects the deteriorating capacity of local tanks and reservoirs, where water levels drop because of pipeline damage after earthquakes. This system risk curve is examined more closely to identify the key scenario earthquakes that significantly influence system risk, as described in the next section.




Figure 7.9. System Risk Curves

#### 7.4.2. System Risk Deaggregations

Table 7.2 summarizes the scenario earthquakes that contribute to the system risk at a SSI of 0.42 in the risk curve with a 24-hour period of running tanks, corresponding to a 475-year recurrence interval or 10% probability of exceedance in 50 years. The fourth Column in Table 7.2 indicates the closest distance from the fault to the LADWP service area centroid with geographic coordinates (-118.40787°, 34.11769°), as shown by the green star in Figure 7.10. The annual occurrence frequency in the fifth Column is determined according to the optimized annual occurrence frequency of the scenario and the number of simulations that have the SSI less than the pre-specified value, i.e., 0.42. Consider, for example, Scenario 397 Puente Hills blind thrust earthquake, the optimized annual occurrence frequency of

Table 7.2. Summary of Scenario Contributions to 475-year Recurrence Risks

Scenario ID	Scenario Name	M <sub>w</sub>	Distance (km)	Annual Occurrence Frequency	Contribution (%)
397	Puente Hills blind thrust	7.1	12	4.60E-04	22.47
370	Northridge	7.0	17	3.82E-04	18.65
560	Background Source	7.0	5	2.58E-04	12.60
175	Verdugo	6.9	12	2.57E-04	12.56
159	Newport-Inglewood	7.1	8	1.62E-04	7.90
559	Background Source	7.0	2	1.40E-04	6.81
169	San Gabriel	7.2	25	1.02E-04	4.98
562	Background Source	7.0	11	1.02E-04	4.96
561	Background Source	7.0	11	8.60E-05	4.20
166	Sierra Madre	7.2	19	4.97E-05	2.42
202	Simi-Santa Rosa	7.0	32	4.23E-05	2.07
399	Puente Hills blind thrust	6.6	12	5.47E-06	0.27
372	Northridge	6.5	17	1.58E-06	0.08
119	Hollywood	6.4	3	4.43E-07	0.02
177	Verdugo	6.4	12	1.89E-07	0.01

Note: the table is based on the simulations with a 24-hour period of running tanks and the SSI corresponding to 475-year recurrence risks is 0.42.

which is 0.000863186. Among fifteen Monte Carlo simulations performed for this scenario earthquake, eight of them have SSI less than 0.42, resulting in an annual occurrence frequency of 8/15 of 0.000863186, i.e., 0.000460366, for SSI less than 0.42 because of the Scenario 397 Puente Hills blind thrust earthquake. The contribution in the sixth Column is percentage of the annual occurrence frequency for each scenario earthquake in the fifth Column over the sum of the fifth Column. The table is sorted in a decreasing order of the contribution.

Fifteen scenario earthquakes have contributed to this specific risk level, among which, Puente Hills blind thrust, Northridge, Background source 560, Verdugo, Newport-Inglewood, and Background Source 559 scenario earthquakes have relatively







Figure 7.10. Spatial Distribution of LADWP Water Districts and Their Centroids

significant contributions, i.e., > 5%, to the system risk. Figure 7.11a shows the system risk deaggregation according to earthquake magnitude,  $M_w$ , and distance. Most scenario earthquakes contributing to the system risk originate on faults located within 30 km from the system centroid, i.e., inside the system service areas, and have magnitude greater than 6.5.


Table 7.3 summarizes the scenario earthquakes that contribute to the system risk at a SSI of 0.51 in the risk curve with a 24-hour period of running tanks, corresponding to a 50-year recurrence interval or 100% probability of exceedance in 50 years. In total 59 scenario earthquakes utilized in this work, 44 scenario earthquakes have contributed to this specific risk level, among which, San Andreas-1857, San Andreas-All Southern Segments, and Northridge scenario earthquakes have relatively significant contributions, i.e., > 5%, to the system risk. Figure 7.11b shows the system risk deaggregation according to  $M_w$  and distance. Significant contributions from scenario earthquakes originating from relatively far from the system centroid are observed, particularly those associated with the San Andreas fault, which are about 55 km from the centroid.

Comparisons between Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show that the number of scenario earthquakes that have contributions to the system risk increases significantly as the recurrence interval for the risk decreases from 475 years to 50 years. Comparisons between Figure 7.11a and b show that, as the recurrence interval decreases, or SSI increases, the contributions from scenario earthquakes with relatively large distances from originating faults to the system increase significantly.





(a) 475-year Recurrence Risks, SSI = 0.42



(b) 50-year Recurrence Risks, SSI = 0.51

Figure 7.11. System Risk Deaggregations

Table 7.3. Summary of Scenario Contributions to 50-year Recurrence Risks

Scenario ID	Scenario Name	M <sub>w</sub>	Distance (km)	Annual Occurrence Frequency	Contribution (%)
22	San Andreas Fault - 1857	7.8	55	3.20E-03	16.02
21	San Andreas Fault-All southern segments	8.1	55	2.00E-03	10.00
370	Northridge	7	17	1.24E-03	6.21
195	San Cayetano	7	48	9.15E-04	4.58
175	Verdugo	6.9	12	9.00E-04	4.50
397	Puente Hills blind thrust	7.1	12	8.63E-04	4.32
561	Background Source	7	11	8.60E-04	4.30
198	Santa Susana	6.7	23	8.04E-04	4.02
559	Background Source	7	2	7.68E-04	3.84
560	Background Source	7	5	7.23E-04	3.62
169	San Gabriel	7.2	25	7.15E-04	3.57
159	Newport-Inglewood	7.1	8	7.02E-04	3.51
166	Sierra Madre	7.2	19	6.95E-04	3.48
562	Background Source	7	11	6.61E-04	3.31
219	Anacapa-Dume	7.5	32	5.62E-04	2.81
191	Oak Ridge-onshore	6.5	42	5.14E-04	2.57
443	Sierra Madre-San Fernando	6.7	19	5.02E-04	2.51
444	Palos Verdes	7.3	24	4.91E-04	2.45
440	Cucamonga	6.9	63	4.12E-04	2.06
19	San Andreas Fault - Carrizo	7.4	65	3.04E-04	1.52
454	Palos Verdes	6.3	24	2.89E-04	1.44
189	Oak Ridge-onshore	7	42	2.75E-04	1.38
174	Santa Monica	6.6	6	2.44E-04	1.22
12	Elsinore - Whittier	6.8	39	2.40E-04	1.20
220	Anacapa-Dume	7	30	2.28E-04	1.14
447	Palos Verdes	6.8	24	1.25E-04	0.62
202	Simi-Santa Rosa	7	32	8.46E-05	0.42
168	Sierra Madre	6.7	19	7.38E-05	0.37
221	Anacapa-Dume	7	61	6.29E-05	0.31
162	Newport-Inglewood	6.6	8	6.00E-05	0.30
399	Puente Hills blind thrust	6.6	12	5.47E-05	0.27

Note: the table is based on the simulations with a 24-hour period of running tanks and the SSI corresponding to 50-year recurrence risks is 0.51.

Table 7.3. (Continued)


Scenario ID	Scenario Name	M <sub>w</sub>	Distance (km)	Annual Occurrence Frequency	Contribution (%)
446	Palos Verdes	6.8	41	5.47E-05	0.27
120	Raymond	6.5	17	4.94E-05	0.25
371	Northridge	6.5	25	3.84E-05	0.19
161	Newport-Inglewood	6.6	30	3.72E-05	0.19
118	Holser	6.5	35	2.22E-05	0.11
170	San Gabriel	6.7	25	1.99E-05	0.10
372	Northridge	6.5	17	1.11E-05	0.06
388	Upper Elysian Park	6.4	10	8.18E-06	0.04
176	Verdugo	6.4	14	4.19E-06	0.02
119	Hollywood	6.4	3	1.77E-06	0.01
177	Verdugo	6.4	12	7.57E-07	0.00
173	Malibu Coast	6.7	15	3.60E-07	0.00
222	Anacapa-Dume	6.5	30	2.59E-07	0.00

Note: the table is based on the simulations with a 24-hour period of running tanks and the SSI corresponding to 50-year recurrence risks is 0.51.


### 7.4.3. Risk Curves for Five Water Districts

As described in Chapter 4, the LADWP water supply system can be divided into five water districts: West Valley, East Valley, Western, Central, and Harbor Water Districts. Figure 7.10 shows a spatial distribution of water districts and their centroids by blue stars. The system serviceability indexes (SSI) can be calculated for the 5 water districts, respectively, providing additional information on the spatial distribution of the system risks, as shown in Figure 7.12.

Figure 7.12a shows the risk curves without a 24-hour period of running tanks for five water districts, respectively. The water districts have significantly different risk curves. The most vulnerable one is the Harbor Water District, followed by the Central and Western Water Districts, as opposed to the most robust one, the West Valley Water District. The performance of five water districts is consistent with the



(a) Without 24-hour Period of Running Tanks



(b) With 24-hour Period of Running Tanks

Figure 7.12. Risk Curves for Five Water Districts

system configuration and water flow pattern of the LADWP water supply system. As described in Chapter 4, the LADWP water supply system is configured such that water flows from the north to the south. Starting from the Van Norman Complex in the northern San Fernando Valley, the water flows through the East Valley and West Valley Water Districts, followed by the Western and Central Water Districts, and finally arrives at the Harbor Water District. Because the West Valley and East Valley Water Districts are located close to the water sources, i.e., Van Norman Complex, the chance of disruption is small when the water is conveyed from the sources to the water districts, resulting in more robust performance of these two water districts. In addition, the mesh type configuration of the pipelines in the San Fernando Valley provides redundancy to the system, and hence, improves the performance of these two water districts. In contrast, the Harbor Water district is located in the far end of the system and the distance that the water has to travel before it reach Harbor Water District is the longest. Therefore, the probability of disruption is relatively large when the water is conveyed from the sources to the district. Additionally, less redundancy in the Harbor Water District contributes to the vulnerable performance of the district.

Figure 7.12b shows the risk curves with a 24-hour period of running tanks for five water districts, respectively. When compared with the risk curves without a 24-hour period of running tanks, all the risk curves move to the right, indicating deterioration of system performance. However, the five water districts deteriorate to various degrees after the 24-hour period of running tanks. The most vulnerable districts are the Western and Central Water Districts, followed by the West Valley and Harbor Water Districts, as opposed to the most robust one, the East Valley Water District. The performance of five water districts is consistent with the locations of the most water storage tanks and the water flow pattern in the LADWP water supply

system. As described in Chapter 4 and illustrated by the evaluation example in Section 7.3, most storage tanks are located in the Santa Monica Mountain areas, where the Western and Central Water Districts are located, and west rim of the San Fernando Valley, which is part of the West Valley Water District. A 24-hour running period empties most tanks in these areas and causes significant increases of water outage in these areas, resulting in significant deterioration of system performance in the Western, Central, and West Valley Water Districts. In contrast, only limited numbers of water storage tanks are located in the East Valley and Harbor Water Districts, and hence, the deterioration of the system performance after the 24-hour period of running tanks is not as severe as those of the Western, Central, and West Valley Water Districts. In addition, most water in the East Valley Water District is provided from the Van Norman Complex directly, contributing to the relatively robust performance of the East Valley Water District after the 24-hour period of running tanks.

#### **7.4.4. Risk Deaggregations for Five Water Districts**

The water district risk curves with a 24-hour period of running tanks are examined closely to identify the key scenario earthquakes that significantly influence water district risks. Risk deaggregations are performed at district risks corresponding to 475-year and 50-year recurrence intervals for five water districts, i.e., the West Valley, East Valley, Western, Central, and Harbor water districts. The details on the risk deaggregations are described in Appendix B, and only the summary is provide in this section.

It is found that the number of scenario earthquakes that have contributions to the water district risk increases significantly as the recurrence interval for the risk

decreases from 475 years to 50 years. Furthermore, as the recurrence interval decreases, or SSI increases, the contributions from scenario earthquakes with relatively large distances from originating faults to the water districts increase significantly. However, it is found that, even for risk with relative large recurrence interval, the Harbor Water District is significantly affected by the scenario earthquakes with relatively large distances from originating faults to the water district because of its southern end position in the system and the long distance that the water has to travel before arriving at the district.

## **7.5. Input Data for Consequence Analysis**

An important objective of this work is to provide engineering evaluation results of the LADWP water supply system for social and economic consequence analysis. Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models are being developed to assess the economic impacts caused by earthquake-induced lifelines losses (Rose, 2005). Figure 7.13 shows the spatial distribution of subsystems utilized in the economic consequence analysis. The engineering evaluation results in the form of water availability, SSI, after earthquakes are compiled with respect to the thirteen subsystems, as described in Chapter 4. Since the subsystem Valley Floor (VF) has a service area significantly larger than other twelve subsystems, the subsystem VF is divided into three portions, resulting in a total of fifteen subsystems utilized to determine the SSI. The SSIs in the fifteen subsystems serve as the input data for the CGE models to assess the economic consequence caused by earthquake-induced water supply losses. As described by Rose and Liao (2003 and 2005), water losses in the fifteen subsystems are used to assess the economic consequences arising from water shortage. In brief, the economic impact is evaluated by CGE production functions that




Figure 7.13. Spatial Distribution of Subsystems Utilized in Economic Analysis



are nonlinear and readily incorporate behavioral content for producer and consumer response in a multi-market context. The behavioral content modeled in CGE models generally includes conservation, input substitution, and import substitution. The CGE model can account for seismic resilience, and their results provide more realistic estimates of economic impacts than those of Input-Output models.

## **7.6. Summary**

A process for the seismic performance evaluation of water supply systems was developed using the LADWP water supply system. The seismic hazards in the LADWP water supply system were characterized by a suite of 59 scenario earthquakes and their annual frequencies of occurrence. Procedures were developed to determine the seismic demands on the system components, which were compiled into a hydraulic network model. The damage to the pipelines during earthquakes was estimated using the regressions between repair rates and PGVs based on performance records from previous earthquakes. The damage to the trunk lines was simulated explicitly. A Poisson process was utilized to simulate the occurrences of trunk line damage. This type of damage was further categorized into leaks and breaks that, in turn, were simulated using pipe leak and break hydraulic models, respectively. The damage of local distribution lines was simulated by increasing the nodal demands such that they represent water losses consistent with earthquake-related repair rates in the local distribution systems.

The seismic system performance of the LADWP water system was evaluated using GIRAFFE. Fifteen Monte Carlo simulations were performed for each of the 59 scenario earthquakes, resulting 885 simulations in total. The number of simulations in

each Monte Carlo analysis was determined by the GIRAFFE self-termination algorithm, which stops the simulation process when the difference in the mean and coefficient of variation of the results are less than 2%. The 885 simulation results were integrated in the form of risk curves, plotting the annual exceedance frequency as a function of system serviceability index (SSI), which is defined as the ratio of the sum of satisfied water demands after an earthquake to that before an earthquake. The effects of the loss of storage water in tanks after earthquakes on system performance were evaluated by simulating the leakage from damaged pipelines for a 24-hour period after the earthquake and comparing risk curves with and without the 24-hour running period. The engineering evaluation results, expressing as the water availability after earthquakes, serve as the key input in the social and economic consequence evaluations performed by the social scientists and economists.

The system risk curve without storage water loss varies almost linearly in the semi-logarithmic scale, with an SSI of 0.79, which corresponds to an annual frequency of 0.0021, or 475-year recurrence interval. After a 24-hour period of running tanks, the system deteriorates rapidly, and the SSI decreases significantly. The system risk curve with 24-hour running tanks plots to the right of the first curve, indicating much lower SSI values for the same annual exceedance frequency. The linear portion of the curve, with lower SSI values, is approximately parallel to the system risk curve without a 24-hour period of water losses from the tanks. For the condition of tank losses, the system risk curve shows an SSI of 0.42, which corresponds to an annual frequency of 0.0021, or 475-year recurrence interval. The difference between the curve without a 24-hour period of running tanks and its parallel portion in the curve with a 24-hour period of running tanks signifies the effects of water losses from tanks.

The system risk curve with a 24-hour period of running tanks was examined closely to identify the key scenario earthquakes that significantly influence system risk and their characteristics. The risk level corresponding to a 475-year recurrence interval, or 10% probability of exceedance in 50 years, is attributed to fifteen scenario earthquakes, as summarized in the main text. Most scenario earthquakes, contributing to the system risk, originate on faults located within 30 km of the system centroid, i.e., inside the system service areas, and have magnitude greater than 6.5.

The risk level corresponding to a 50-year recurrence interval, or 100% probability of exceedance in 50 years, can be attributed to 44 scenario earthquakes. Significant contributions from scenario earthquakes with relatively large distances from originating faults to the system centroid were observed, particularly those associated with the San Andreas fault, which are about 55 km from the system centroid.

It was found that the number of scenario earthquakes, which have contributions to the system risk, increases significantly as the recurrence interval for the risk decreases from 475 years to 50 years. Furthermore, as the recurrence interval decreases, or SSI increases, the contributions from scenario earthquakes with relatively large distance from the originating faults to the system increase significantly.

The risk curves were also constructed for five water districts to provide additional information about the spatial distribution of system risks. It was found that the water districts have significantly different risk curves. According to the risk curves without storage water loss in tanks, the most vulnerable one is the Harbor Water

District, followed by the Central and Western Water Districts. The most robust district is the West Valley Water District. The performance of five water districts is consistent with their relative positions in the system and with the north to the south water flow pattern in the LADWP water supply system.

For a 24-hour period of water losses from tanks, the SSIs decrease by varying degrees in the water districts. The most vulnerable districts are the Western and Central Water Districts, followed by the West Valley and Harbor Water Districts. The most robust district is the East Valley Water District. The performance of five water districts is consistent with the concentration of the most water storage tanks in the Western, Central, and West Valley Water Districts and with the north to the south water flow pattern in the LADWP water supply system.

The risk curves with a 24-hour period of tank water losses were examined closely to identify the key scenario earthquakes that significantly influence the water district risks. It was found that the number of scenario earthquakes that have contributions to the water district risk increases significantly as the recurrence interval for the risk decreases from 475 years to 50 years. Furthermore, as the recurrence interval decreases, or SSI increases, the contributions from scenario earthquakes with relatively large distances from originating faults to the water districts increase significantly. However, it was found that, even for risks with relatively large recurrence intervals, the Harbor Water District is significantly affected by scenario earthquakes with relatively large distances from originating faults to the water district because of its southern end position in the system and the long distance that the water has to travel before arriving at the district.

# CHAPTER 8

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

### 8.1. Introduction

This report deals with the seismic performance evaluation of water supply systems. An evaluation process is developed for simulating the seismic performance of a large, geographically-distributed, water supply system and characterizing the performance in terms of system reliability and serviceability. The process makes use of probabilistic seismic hazard analysis, theoretical and empirical relations to estimate pipeline response, hydraulic analysis for heavily damaged water systems, and multi-scale simulations of complex water systems. It provides output that is beneficial for system management and decision-making and necessary for economists and social scientists to assess the economic and community impacts of lifeline disruption by earthquakes.

A framework for evaluating the seismic effects on lifeline systems is first introduced and then demonstrated by an application to one of the largest and most complex water supply systems in the world - the water supply system in the greater Los Angeles area operated by the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP). The framework contains five basic activities, i.e., seismic hazard characterizations, system property characterizations, system component response evaluation, system response evaluation, and consequence evaluation, each of which

was described. The seismic hazards in the greater Los Angeles area were characterized by a suite of 59 scenario earthquakes and their associated annual occurrence frequencies. The LADWP water supply system was represented by a hydraulic model for component response evaluation and system response evaluation. Models for the seismic wave effects on pipelines were developed to improve the capability of component response evaluation. A special computer program (GIRAFFE), equipped with a negative pressure analysis algorithm and capable of performing Monte Carlo simulations, was utilized to evaluate the system response. The system evaluation results were organized in the form of risk curves and serve as the key input for the consequence analysis.

This chapter summarizes the major research findings associated with each part of this report. The sections that follow are organized to present the research findings corresponding to the research objectives described in Chapter 1. The final section provides some recommendations for future research.

## **8.2. Framework for Earthquake Effects on Lifelines**

Lifelines are the systems and facilities that provide services vital to the function of an industrialized society and important to the emergency response and recovery after disastrous events. These systems and facilities include electric power, natural gas and liquid fuels, telecommunications, transportation, waste disposal, and water. In general, each lifeline system is a network within which there are sources, major transmission lines, storage, and distribution or collection system. All lifeline systems share four common characteristics: geographical dispersion, interconnectivity, diversity, and interdependencies.

A framework for evaluating lifeline system seismic performance was presented, and a basic chain of activities that predominates in the framework was identified. The basic chain starts with the characterizations of seismic hazards and system properties, then proceeds to the analyses of interactions between them, from which system response and the evaluation of community impacts follow. Engineering seismologists may estimate the ground shaking hazards at a particular site quantitatively by either deterministic or probabilistic seismic hazard analysis. The lifeline system properties are usually characterized by the utility companies, who own and operate the systems. Geotechnical engineers and structural engineers focus on the evaluation of component response, which are then integrated to provide an evaluation of system performance in terms of system reliability and serviceability, e.g., water availability after earthquakes for water supply systems. The engineering output of the system response evaluation is then utilized in the social and economic consequence evaluation by social scientists and economists.

### **8.3. Seismic Hazard Characterizations of LADWP Systems**

The seismic hazard characterization for the Los Angeles area was developed by approximating the aggregate seismic hazard, i.e., USGS 2002 Dataset, in the area that takes into account all currently identified, potential seismic sources in a probabilistic context. The approximation was accomplished by means of 59 scenario earthquakes that were selected to provide probability of exceedance characteristics for strong ground motion similar to those for all currently identified, potential seismic sources in the area (Lee et al., 2005). Scenario earthquakes that generate ground motion without engineering significance in the LADWP water supply system were

screened from the original USGS 2002 dataset. In addition, expert judgments were exercised to screen out other scenario earthquakes in the original USGS 2002 dataset.

The seismic hazard associated with the 59 scenario earthquakes was adjusted to match that of the USGS 2002 dataset over the LADWP water supply system by a multivariate, nonlinear optimization process. The 59 annual occurrence frequencies for the 59 scenario earthquakes are the optimized variables. The target function was selected by minimizing an error function for the sum of the differences between the hazard curves, i.e., the variation of annual exceedance frequency as a function of  $S_{A1}$  at equivalent rock sites, from the 59 scenario earthquakes and USGS 2002 dataset at each of the 56 control points spatially distributed over the LADWP water supply system.

Strong ground motions, e.g., PGV, for each of the 59 scenario earthquakes were generated at 572 points in a grid covering the LADWP water supply system. The PGV contour surfaces were interpolated from these 572 points, and site condition corrections were applied according to the NEHRP-HAZUS procedures. With the aid of GIS software, the spatial distribution of the LADWP system components were superimposed on the PGV contour surfaces to determine the seismic demand on each component in accordance with its respective location.

#### **8.4. Seismic Body Wave Effects on Pipelines**

The earthquake performance of a water supply system is often closely related to the performance of water trunk and transmission lines, whose seismic wave interactions were studied in this chapter. Examinations of near-source strong ground



motion records during previous earthquakes indicate that seismic waves can be approximated by sinusoidal waves, and it is reasonable to simplify the seismic body waves as a single sinusoidal pulse in seismic wave-pipeline interactions.

Depending on the seismic wave characteristics,  $R$ , ground conditions,  $f$ , and pipeline properties,  $EA$ , pipelines behave either flexibly or rigidly in the axial dimension. When  $f/EAR > 1$ , the pipeline is axially flexible with respect to ground strain accumulation. No relative displacement occurs between the pipeline and the surrounding soil, and the pipeline deforms coincidentally with the ground surrounding the pipeline, resulting in  $\epsilon_p = \epsilon_g$  everywhere the pipeline is continuous. The ratio between maximum pipe strain,  $\epsilon_{pmax}$ , and maximum ground strain,  $\epsilon_{gmax}$ , is equal to 1. When  $f/EAR < 1$ , the pipeline is relatively rigid with respect to axial ground strain accumulation, and relative displacement occurs between soil and pipeline. The strain in the continuous pipeline will accumulate linearly at a slope of  $f/EA$ . The  $\epsilon_{pmax}$  occurs at the locations corresponding to the amplitude of the sinusoidal seismic wave, and the ratio between  $\epsilon_{pmax}$  and  $\epsilon_{gmax}$  is equal to  $f/EAR$ .

The typical range of  $f/EAR$  values for water trunk lines, when affected by seismic body waves, is much greater than 1, and the water trunk lines tend to behave as flexible pipes when affected by seismic body waves. Rigid pipe behavior only occurs under extremely adverse conditions, such as where surrounded by liquefied soils, where the  $f$  approaches 0, resulting in  $f/EAR$  less than 1.

Attention is drawn to the seismic body wave interaction with jointed concrete cylinder pipelines (JCCPs), the performance of which has varied significantly during previous earthquakes. Close examinations of the design and as-built drawings of the

JCCPs reveal that the pullout capacity of the JCCP joints depends on the tensile behavior of the cement mortar at the joints. Moreover, it is not uncommon to observe cracks in the cement mortar and separation at the joints before earthquakes because of shrinkage of mortar cement during curing and subsequent operational loads and movements in the field.

A simplified model for seismic body wave interactions with JCCPs containing existing cracked joints was developed to estimate relative joint displacements. The relative joint displacement at a cracked joint equals the integration of the differential strain between the pipeline and ground from the cracked joint to the positions in the pipe where no relative displacement occurs between the pipe and the soil.

Extensive parametric studies with various ground conditions, seismic body wave parameters, and pipe properties were performed using finite element models. In total, 320 finite element runs were performed, and the results were summarized by a universal relationship between two dimensionless parameters,  $\delta_j/\delta_0$  and  $f/EAR$ . With known ground conditions, pipeline properties, and seismic wave characteristics,  $f/EAR$  and  $\delta_0$  can be calculated, and the joint displacement,  $\delta_j$ , can be estimated directly using the universal relationship.

The continuous JCCPs without existing cracked joints may crack at joints as a result of seismic body wave propagation when  $\epsilon_{pmax}$  exceeds the cracking strain,  $\epsilon_T$ , at the mortar joints. The cracking of joints transforms the pipeline from a continuous structure to a segmented one. Therefore, geometric nonlinearity has to be incorporated in the modeling. The relative joint displacement varies as the seismic body waves pass through the pipelines. The two most critical cases for relative joint displacement were

found to be immediately before the joint cracks and when the  $\epsilon_{pmax}$  occurs at the cracked joint. The equations for calculating the corresponding relative joint displacement were derived.

The JCCP response to seismic body waves depends on the relative magnitude of the mortar cracking strain and maximum pipe strain induced by seismic waves. When  $\epsilon_{pmax} \geq \epsilon_T$ , the mortar at the joints may be cracked and the pipe changes from a continuous pipe to a segmented pipe. In contrast, when  $\epsilon_{pmax} < \epsilon_T$ , no joint will be cracked by the seismic body waves and the relative joint displacement only occurs at existing cracked joints. The mortar cracking strain also has significant effect on the magnitude and occurrence frequency of relatively joint displacement. Low  $\epsilon_T$  causes small relative joint displacement to occur frequently with a small interval along the pipeline. In contrast, high  $\epsilon_T$  results in large relative joint displacement concentrated at fewer locations of cracked joints.

Understanding the interaction of seismic waves and JCCPs leads to some design and construction concepts that may improve earthquake performance. The JCCPs may be designed and constructed such that all the joints have zero or very low axial pullout resistance, i.e.,  $\epsilon_T = 0$ . The zero or low axial pullout resistance allows very small displacements to occur at each joint, with no appreciable strain accumulation along pipe segments or displacement concentrations at existing cracked joints. The absence of mortar cracking strain or low strain capacity may be accomplished by cracking each joint intentionally or reducing the adhesion between mortar and pipe segments by inserting some low adhesion materials, such as Teflon or high density polyethylene (HDPE) at the mortar and pipe segment interface.

The model for seismic body wave interaction with JCCPs was extended for the locally weak joints in pipelines composed of other materials, such as cast iron. A relative joint displacement correction factor,  $\delta_d/\delta_j$ , was introduced and the relationship between  $\delta_d/\delta_j$  and strain ratio,  $\epsilon_u/\epsilon_{pmax}$  [i.e.,  $(P_u/EA)/(V_{ap}/C_a)$ ], was provided. The relative joint displacement at the locally weak joint is a product of the relative joint displacement at the existing cracked joint and the correction factor.

The models for seismic wave interaction with pipelines also have application to other linear structures, such as displacement at flexible connections between subaqueous tunnels and shore facilities when subjected to near-source strong motions.

## **8.5. Prototype for Water Supply System Seismic Performance Evaluation**

A process for the seismic performance evaluation of water supply systems was developed using the LADWP water supply system. The seismic hazards in the LADWP water supply system were characterized by a suite of 59 scenario earthquakes and their annual frequencies of occurrence. Procedures were developed to determine the seismic demands on the system components, which were compiled into a hydraulic network model.

The characteristics of the LADWP water supply system are embodied in a H2ONET hydraulic network model. The H2ONET hydraulic network model was developed under the supervision of LADWP engineers. It contains 9,287 nodes and 10,665 links, representing about 2,186 km of pipelines, 1,052 demand nodes, 591 control valves, 110 tanks and reservoirs, 151 local groundwater wells, and 284 pumps.

The H2ONET hydraulic network model was exported to GIRAFFE, which provides virtually identical results for the undamaged LADWP system when comparing with the results from H2ONET.

The damage to the pipelines during earthquakes was estimated using the regressions between repair rates and PGVs based on performance records from previous earthquakes. The damage to the trunk lines was simulated explicitly. A Poisson process was utilized to simulate the occurrences of trunk line damage. This type of damage was further categorized into leaks and breaks that, in turn, were simulated using pipe leak and break hydraulic models, respectively. The damage of local distribution lines was simulated by increasing the nodal demands such that they represent water losses consistent with earthquake-related repair rates in the local distribution systems.

The seismic system performance of the LADWP water system was evaluated using GIRAFFE. Fifteen Monte Carlo simulations were performed for each of the 59 scenario earthquakes, resulting 885 simulations in total. The number of simulations in each Monte Carlo analysis was determined by the GIRAFFE self-termination algorithm, which stops the simulation process when the difference in the mean and coefficient of variation of the results are less than 2%. The 885 simulation results were integrated in the form of risk curves, plotting the annual exceedance frequency as a function of system serviceability index (SSI), which is defined as the ratio of the sum of satisfied water demands after an earthquake to that before an earthquake. The effects of the loss of storage water in tanks after earthquakes on system performance were evaluated by simulating the leakage from damaged pipelines for a 24-hour period after the earthquake and comparing risk curves with and without the 24-hour running

period. The engineering evaluation results, expressing as the water availability after earthquakes, serve as the key input in the social and economic consequence evaluations performed by the social scientists and economists.

## **8.6. Probabilistic Seismic Performance Evaluation of LADWP Water Supply System**

The system risk curve without storage water loss varies almost linearly in the semi-logarithmic scale, with an SSI of 0.79, which corresponds to an annual frequency of 0.0021, or 475-year recurrence interval. After a 24-hour period of running tanks, the system deteriorates rapidly, and the SSI decreases significantly. The system risk curve with 24-hour running tanks plots to the right of the first curve, indicating much lower SSI values for the same annual exceedance frequency. The linear portion of the curve, with lower SSI values, is approximately parallel to the system risk curve without a 24-hour period of water losses from the tanks. For the condition of tank losses, the system risk curve shows an SSI of 0.42, which corresponds to an annual frequency of 0.0021, or 475-year recurrence interval. The difference between the curve without a 24-hour period of running tanks and its parallel portion in the curve with a 24-hour period of running tanks signifies the effects of water losses from tanks.

The system risk curve with a 24-hour period of running tanks was examined closely to identify the key scenario earthquakes that significantly influence system risk and their characteristics. The risk level corresponding to a 475-year recurrence interval, or 10% probability of exceedance in 50 years, is attributed to fifteen scenario earthquakes, as summarized in the main text. Most scenario earthquakes, contributing

to the system risk, originate on faults located within 30 km of the system centroid, i.e., inside the system service areas, and have magnitude greater than 6.5.

The risk level corresponding to a 50-year recurrence interval, or 100% probability of exceedance in 50 years, can be attributed to 44 scenario earthquakes. Significant contributions from scenario earthquakes with relatively large distances from originating faults to the system centroid were observed, particularly those associated with the San Andreas fault, which are about 55 km from the system centroid.

It was found that the number of scenario earthquakes, which have contributions to the system risk, increases significantly as the recurrence interval for the risk decreases from 475 years to 50 years. Furthermore, as the recurrence interval decreases, or SSI increases, the contributions from scenario earthquakes with relatively large distance from the originating faults to the system increase significantly.

The risk curves were also constructed for five water districts to provide additional information about the spatial distribution of system risks. It was found that the water districts have significantly different risk curves. According to the risk curves without storage water loss in tanks, the most vulnerable one is the Harbor Water District, followed by the Central and Western Water Districts. The most robust district is the West Valley Water District. The performance of five water districts is consistent with their relative positions in the system and with the north to the south water flow pattern in the LADWP water supply system.

For a 24-hour period of water losses from tanks, the SSIs decrease by varying degrees in the water districts. The most vulnerable districts are the Western and Central Water Districts, followed by the West Valley and Harbor Water Districts. The most robust district is the East Valley Water District. The performance of five water districts is consistent with the concentration of the most water storage tanks in the Western, Central, and West Valley Water Districts and with the north to the south water flow pattern in the LADWP water supply system.

The risk curves with a 24-hour period of tank water losses were examined closely to identify the key scenario earthquakes that significantly influence the water district risks. It was found that the number of scenario earthquakes that have contributions to the water district risk increases significantly as the recurrence interval for the risk decreases from 475 years to 50 years. Furthermore, as the recurrence interval decreases, or SSI increases, the contributions from scenario earthquakes with relatively large distances from originating faults to the water districts increase significantly. However, it was found that, even for risks with relatively large recurrence intervals, the Harbor Water District is significantly affected by scenario earthquakes with relatively large distances from originating faults to the water district because of its southern end position in the system and the long distance that the water has to travel before arriving at the district.

## **8.7. Future Research**

This work focuses on the seismic performance evaluation of pipelines and their impact on the overall system performance. The seismic performance evaluation of other components, such as pump stations, regulation stations, ground water wells, and



tanks and reservoirs, is not included in this work. It is useful to extend this study to incorporate the seismic performance of those components and to integrate their impacts to the overall system reliability and serviceability after earthquakes. The framework and procedures described in this work can be readily adapted to other components, provided that fragility information for those components is developed.

Because of the difficulty in predicting the occurrence of permanent ground deformation and delineating the spatial distribution of permanent ground deformation, the PGD effects on the system component performance during earthquakes are not currently incorporated in this work. It is also valuable to extend this study to incorporate the PGD effects on the seismic performance of system components, as well as the overall system. The framework and procedures described in this work can be easily modified to incorporate PGD effects.

Interdependencies among different lifeline systems are one of the most prominent characteristics of lifeline systems. The damage and disruption of seismic hazards in other systems may affect the system being assessed because of physical proximity and/or operational interaction. For example, the loss of electricity affects water supply systems by rendering pumps and automatic valves inoperable, thereby affecting the flow and pressure in the water supply systems. Therefore, one important component of the framework for lifeline seismic performance evaluation is the interaction of the system under scrutiny with other lifeline systems. Although the interactions among different lifeline systems are beyond the scope of this work, further studies of that issue are highly recommended.



## CHAPTER 9

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## **APPENDIX A**

# **TRUNK LINE REPAIRS DURING 1994 NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKE AND REGRESSION ANALYSIS**

### **A.1. Introduction**

This appendix describes a database containing trunk line (diameter  $\geq 610$  mm) repairs during the 1994 Northridge earthquake and regression analysis based on this database. It starts with the collection of trunk line repair information from four water agencies affected by the 1994 Northridge earthquake, followed by an effort to determine the zones of documented permanent ground deformation (PGD) and to screen trunk line repairs in those zones so that the resulting statistics reflect principally the effects of transient ground deformation (TGD). It then proceeds to regression analysis for concrete, steel, and riveted steel trunk lines, using the strong ground motion data and regression procedures developed by O'Rourke et al., (2001) and Jeon (2002).

### **A.2. Trunk Line Repair Database**

The database contains repairs on trunk lines operated by four water agencies, i.e., the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP), Metropolitan Water District (MWD), Calleguas Municipal Water District (CMWD), and Castaic Lake Water Agency (CLWA). In total, 125 repairs in 1094.9 km of trunk line were collected




Figure A.1. Spatial Distribution of Trunk Line Repairs during 1994 Northridge Earthquake

in the database. Figure A.1 shows the spatial distribution of the trunk line repairs during the 1994 Northridge earthquake and trunk lines operated by these four agencies. More description of the collection of the data and details on each trunk line repair is provided in the following subheadings:

### **A.2.1. LADWP and MWD Trunk Line Repairs**

The trunk line repair database for the LADWP and MWD system was first compiled by Toprak (1998), who obtained relevant information from LADWP, MWD, State of California Office of Emergency Services (OES), and EQE, Inc. The database was further updated with the aid of LADWP engineers (Davis, 2003). The Northridge earthquake caused 82 repairs in trunk lines operated by both agencies, 70 for 781.5 km of the LADWP trunk lines and 12 for 262.4 km of the MWD trunk lines. Tables A.1 and A.2 summarize characteristics of the repairs for the LADWP and MWD trunk lines, respectively. The tables include repair location, pipe diameter, pipe material, joint details, damage description, and type of repairs. Information about the LADWP and MWD trunk lines was obtained from the LADWP hydraulic model (LADWP, 2002a). The database does not include damage to corrugated metal pipes, which were used as drainage conduits throughout the Van Norman Complex and are described by Davis and Bardet (2000). Please note that the Rinaldi Trunk Line is owned by MWD, but rented and operated by LADWP. Therefore, seven repairs in the Rinaldi Trunk Line are considered as LADWP trunk line repairs. The “NA” in Tables A.1 and other tables in this appendix indicates that sufficient data are not available.

Significant effort was made to identify zones of PGD in the LADWP/MWD system. O’Rourke et al. (2001) identified five high distribution line repair zones in the

Table A.1. Summary of LADWP Trunk Line Repairs during 1994 Northridge Earthquake

No.	Pipeline	Location	Diameter (mm)	Material	Joint Connection	Damage Description	Repair	Cause <sup>2</sup>
1	Granada Trunk Line	Upper Debris Basin under Dike	1257	Steel	Welded bell and spigot	Crack at joint, approximate 300 mm long	Rewelded joint inside	PGD
2	Granada Trunk Line	Upper Debris Basin under Dike	1257	Steel	Welded bell and spigot	Crack at joint, approximate 300 mm long	Rewelded joint inside	PGD
3	Granada Trunk Line	Upper Debris Basin Sta. 3+68	1257	Steel	Welded butt strap	Jagged tears, folded inward 76 mm, separated several tens mm, identified as major break by Davis (1999)	Welded 6-mm butt strap inside	PGD
4	Granada Trunk Line	Upper Debris Basin Sta. 3+72	1257	Steel	Welded butt strap	Jagged tears, folded inward 76 mm, separated several tens mm, lateral offset several tens mm to 300 mm, identified as major break by Davis (1999)	Welded 6-mm butt strap inside	PGD
5	Granada Trunk Line	Upper Debris Basin Sta. 6+21	1257	Steel	Welded bell and spigot	Spigot flared inward 13 mm, compression	Welded 6-mm butt strap inside	PGD
6	Granada Trunk Line	Upper Debris Basin Sta. 0+00 Relocated Line	1257	Steel	Welded butt strap	Folded inward and separated, identified as major break by Davis (1999)	Welded 6-mm butt strap inside	PGD
7	Granada Trunk Line	Upper Debris Basin Sta. 0+3.4 Relocated Line	1257	Steel	Welded butt strap	Jagged tears, folded inward 76 mm, separated several tens mm, identified as major break by Davis (1999)	Welded 6-mm butt strap inside	PGD
8	Granada Trunk Line	Upper Debris Basin Sta. 0+4.4 Relocated Line	1257	Steel	Welded butt strap	Folded inward and separated	Welded 6-mm butt strap inside	PGD
9	Granada Trunk Line	Utility Corridor, Sta 0+91.70	1257	Steel	Mechanical coupling	292 mm residual compressional displacement, coupling compressed 305 mm, slammed together, and separated 12 mm	WEKO-SEAL	PGD
10	Granada Trunk Line	Utility Corridor, Sta. 3+39 to 3+48	1257	Steel	Welded bell and spigot	50 to 76 mm inside bulge, buckling at joint	No repair	PGD

Table A.1. (Continued)

No.	Pipeline	Location	Diameter (mm)	Material	Joint Connection	Damage Description	Repair	Cause <sup>2</sup>
11	Granada Trunk Line	Utility Corridor, Sta. 3+60	1257	Steel	Mechanical coupling	50 mm compressional displacement	No repair	PGD
12	Granada Trunk Line	Utility Corridor, Sta. 5+40	1257	Steel	Welded bell and spigot	Cement mortar failure	No repair	PGD
13	Granada Trunk Line	Utility Corridor, Sta. 6+98.4	1257	Steel	Mechanical coupling	76 mm extensional displacement	No repair	PGD
14	Granada Trunk Line	Utility Corridor, Sta. 9+68.4	1257	Steel	Mechanical coupling	76 mm extensional displacement	No repair	PGD
15	Granada Trunk Line	Utility Corridor, Sta. 13+28.5	1257	Steel	Mechanical coupling	102 mm extensional displacement	No repair	PGD
16	Granada Trunk Line	Utility Corridor, Sta. 16+49.9	1257	Steel	Mechanical coupling	50 mm extensional displacement	No repair	PGD
17	Granada Trunk Line	Utility Corridor, Sta. 17+40	1257	Steel	Welded butt strap	Cement mortar failure	No repair	PGD
18	Granada Trunk Line	Utility Corridor, Sta. 26+89.18	1257	Steel	Mechanical coupling	76 mm extensional displacement	No repair	PGD
19	Granada Trunk Line	Utility Corridor, Sta. 39+60	1257	Steel	Mechanical coupling	30 mm extensional displacement	WEKO-SEAL	PGD
20	Granada Trunk Line	Balboa Blvd. at Valve between Woodley and Colvin	1257	Steel	Mechanical coupling	Damaged and leaking, extensional movement	Butt strap	PGD

Table A.1. (Continued)

No.	Pipeline	Location	Diameter (mm)	Material	Joint Connection	Damage Description	Repair	Cause <sup>2</sup>
21	Granada Trunk Line	17200 Balboa Blvd at Lorillard	1257	Steel	Welded bell and spigot	Joint fracture, extensional movement	Butt strap	PGD
22	Granada Trunk Line	11661 Balboa Blvd.	1257	Steel	Mechanical coupling	Pulled apart 508 mm, extensional movement	Pipe sleeve and butt straps	PGD
23	Granada Trunk Line	Balboa Blvd. Sta. 115+80	1257	Steel	Welded bell and spigot	Separated joint, tension	Butt strap	PGD
24	Granada Trunk Line	Balboa Blvd. Sta. 129+56	1257	Steel	Welded bell and spigot	Pipe telescoped inside itself, compression	Pipe sleeve and butt straps	PGD
25	Granada Trunk Line	East of Shoshone	1220	Concrete	Bell and spigot	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	PGD
26	Granada Trunk Line	Wilbur	1220	Concrete	Bell and spigot	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	TGD
27	Granada Trunk Line	Tampa Ave. at 118 Frwy	1220	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint fracture, joint fractured along side existing weld	Welded fracture	TGD
28	Granada Trunk Line	Desoto Reservoir, North side	1220	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint fracture, joint fractured along side existing weld	Welded fracture	TGD
29	Granada Trunk Line	Between Melvin & Winnetka	1220	Concrete	Bell and spigot	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	TGD
30	Rinaldi Trunk Line	11700 Balboa Blvd.	1727	Steel	Welded joint	Pulled apart 508 mm, extensional movement	Pipe sleeve and butt straps	PGD



Table A.1. (Continued)

No.	Pipeline	Location	Diameter (mm)	Material	Joint Connection	Damage Description	Repair	Cause <sup>2</sup>
31	Rinaldi Trunk Line	Balboa Blvd. 91 m North of above	1727	Steel	Welded joint	Extensional movement	Butt strap	PGD
32	Rinaldi Trunk Line	Balboa Blvd. Sta. 62+12	1727	Steel	Welded bell and spigot	13 mm separation, extensional movement	Butt strap	PGD
33	Rinaldi Trunk Line	Balboa Blvd. Sta. 65+87	1727	Steel	Welded bell and spigot	Cement mortar failure	NA <sup>1</sup>	PGD
34	Rinaldi Trunk Line	Balboa Blvd. Sta. 63+72	1753	Steel	Welded bell and spigot	102 mm separation, extensional movement	Butt strap	PGD
35	Rinaldi Trunk Line	11539 Balboa Blvd.	1727	Steel	Welded joint	Compression	Pipe sleeve and butt straps	PGD
36	Rinaldi Trunk Line	West of Winnetka St. Sta. 1219+10 (west of Melvin)	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Multiple cracks in 4.9-m section of pipe, cracked at a cut-off wall	WEKO-SEAL (DWP) and 2.4-m external steel band (MWD)	TGD
37	Hayvenhurst Trunk Line	Rinaldi & Woodley NE corner	1372	Riveted Steel	Riveted	Sheared rivets, up to 25 mm compressional movement	Cut out and welded new	PGD
38	Van Ness Trunk Line Sta. 124+55	Hollywood Freeway	NA <sup>1</sup>	Steel	Welded joint	NA <sup>1</sup>	WEKO-SEAL	PGD
39	Van Norman P.S. Discharge Line	Pier supports	1372	Steel	Welded bell and spigot	Ring girder collapse, displaced pier supports, no damage to pipe connections, only pipe damage came from pipe falling on concrete pier after girder collapse	No repair	PGD
40	Van Norman P.S. Discharge Line	North of Olden St. Trunk Line	1372	Steel	Welded bell and spigot	Compression buckle, 50 mm lateral offset	Pipe sleeve and butt straps	PGD

Table A.1. (Continued)

No.	Pipeline	Location	Diameter (mm)	Material	Joint Connection	Damage Description	Repair	Cause <sup>2</sup>
41	Van Norman P.S. Discharge Line	Between Foothill and Olden St. Trunk Line's	1372	Steel	Mechanical coupling	Compression, bow, wrinkle and rip in gasket, pipe shell bowed	NA <sup>1</sup>	PGD
42	Van Norman P.S. Discharge Line	Between Foothill and Olden St. Trunk Line's	305	Steel	NA <sup>1</sup>	Compression, shear	Realigned and replace butterfly valve	PGD
43	Backwash Pond #6 Drain	West side, pond 4	610	Steel	Welded bell and spigot	Compression, rotation, shear, compound deformation	Pipe sleeve and butt straps	PGD
44	LA Reservoir Outlet	Butterfly valve at vault below dam	3048	Steel	Mechanical coupling	Leak at coupling	Tightened coupling	PGD
45	LA Reservoir Outlet	At City Trunk Line	3048	Steel	Mechanical coupling	Leak at coupling, tear in gasket	Replace mechanical coupling	PGD
46	Stone Canyon Inlet	762-mm main at Hayvenhurst Trunk Line	1524	Steel	Mechanical coupling	Leak at coupling, ruptured gasket	Replace coupling w/ butt strap	PGD
47	Stone Canyon Inlet	1219-mm butterfly valve at LAR outlet	1524	Steel	Mechanical coupling	Leak at coupling, ruptured gasket	Replace coupling w/ butt strap	PGD
48	Reseda Trunk Line	Asuncion St. (1.5 blocks North of Rinaldi)	762	Steel	Welded joint	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	TGD
49	Roscoe Trunk Line	Reseda Blvd.	1016	Steel	Welded joint	No observable pipe movement	Butt strap	TGD
50	Roscoe Trunk Line	Reseda Blvd., 140 m West, 18546 Roscoe Blvd	1016	Steel	Welded joint	No observable pipe movement	Butt strap	TGD

Table A.1. (Continued)

No.	Pipeline	Location	Diameter (mm)	Material	Joint Connection	Damage Description	Repair	Cause <sup>2</sup>
51	Roscoe Trunk Line	Oakdale, 18 m West	1067	Riveted Steel	Riveted	No observable pipe movement	NA <sup>1</sup>	TGD
52	Roscoe Trunk Line	Wilbur Ave. 53 m East 18844 Roscoe Blvd.	1016	Steel	Welded joint	No observable pipe movement	Butt strap	TGD
53	Roscoe Trunk Line	Fallbrook Ave. West Side	914	Riveted Steel	Riveted	No observable pipe movement	NA <sup>1</sup>	TGD
54	Roscoe Trunk Line	Shirley Ave. 46 m East	991	Riveted Steel	Riveted	No observable pipe movement	NA <sup>1</sup>	TGD
55	Roscoe Trunk Line	Tampa	1016	Steel	Welded joint	No observable pipe movement	Butt strap	TGD
56	Roscoe Trunk Line	Calvin	1016	Riveted Steel	Riveted	No observable pipe movement	NA <sup>1</sup>	TGD
57	Roscoe Trunk Line	Haskel Ave	1524	Steel	Welded joint	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	TGD
58	Roscoe Trunk Line	Woodley Ave	1321	Steel	Welded joint	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	TGD
59	Roscoe Trunk Line	Canoga Ave	1295	Riveted Steel	Riveted	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	TGD
60	Roscoe Trunk Line	Faralone Ave. 171 m West 22259 Roscoe Blvd.	1372	Riveted Steel	Riveted	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	TGD

Table A.1. (Continued)

No.	Pipeline	Location	Diameter (mm)	Material	Joint Connection	Damage Description	Repair	Cause <sup>2</sup>
61	Roscoe Trunk Line	Oakdale, 58 m West	1067	Riveted Steel	Riveted	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	TGD
62	Desoto Trunk Line	Ingomar	1067	Steel	Welded joint	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	TGD
63	Desoto Trunk Line	Devonshire	1372	Steel	Welded joint	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	TGD
64	City Trunk Line	Lower San Fernando Dam	1829	Riveted Steel	Riveted	Tear at longitudinal seam	Welded plate strap	TGD
65	Susana Trunk Line	Penstock Pump Station	1372	Steel	Welded joint	102 mm flange gasket tapped off	Repaired gasket	TGD
66	NA <sup>1</sup>	2438-mm butterfly valve east of Van Norman Pump Station #2	3048	Steel	Mechanical coupling	Leak at coupling	Tightened coupling	PGD
67	NA <sup>1</sup>	Near Maclay Reservoir	914	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	TGD
68	NA <sup>1</sup>	Near Topanga Tank	914	Steel	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	PGD
69	NA <sup>1</sup>	Near Cold Water Canyon Tank	610	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	TGD
70	NA <sup>1</sup>	Near Cold Water Canyon Tank	610	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	TGD

1: Sufficient data are not available.

2: Permanent ground deformation (PGD) inferred from published field observations and mapped PGD zones (O'Rourke et al., 2001; LADWP, 1996; Stewart et al., 1996; and Holzer et al., 1999). Transient ground deformation (TGD) inferred where PGD observations were absent.

Table A.2. Summary of MWD Trunk Line Repairs during 1994 Northridge Earthquake

No.	Pipeline	Location	Diameter (mm)	Material	Joint Connection	Damage Description	Repair	Cause <sup>2</sup>
1	Sepulveda Feeder	One block south to Bull Creek	3848	Concrete	Bell and spigot	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	PGD
2	LA-25	Debris Basin, 1st joint past flow structure	1524	Steel	Mechanical coupling	Extension, approximately 102 mm movement	WEKO-SEAL	PGD
3	LA-25	At bend	1524	Steel	Welded joint	Weld fracture	Rewelded fracture	TGD
4	LA-25	At concrete cradle	2438	Steel	Welded joint	Flexure, rotation, 102 mm compression, compound deformation	Butt strap	TGD
5	LA-25 (MWD Overflow Conduit)	Concrete double box	1524x1524	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Extension, 165 mm separation at connection w/ discharge structure and 50 mm break in box culvert	Steel plate bolted in place across gap and welded in corners, voids filled with concrete	PGD
6	LA-35T	Valve structure	1524	Steel	Mechanical coupling	Coupling displaced, differential movement between valve structure and tunnel manifold caused problem	Coupling middle ring welded over gap in pipe between pipeline and valve thimble	PGD
7	LA-35T	Upper Debris Basin	1549	Steel	Mechanical coupling	Permanent horizontal and vertical displacement	Cut out small section of pipe and welded in new, sleeve coupling repositioned and bolted.	PGD
8	Balboa Influent Conduit (MWD)	Jensen, between manifold and vent	2159	Steel	welded bell and spigot	Fracture and rupture, at welded slip joint	Cut out, replaced with 2 fabricated sections and 3 butt straps	PGD

Table A.2. (Continued)

No.	Pipeline	Location	Diameter (mm)	Material	Joint Connection	Damage Description	Repair	Cause <sup>2</sup>
9	Balboa Influent Box (MWD)	Jensen, just before flash mixers	3810	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Separation, 13 mm movement before entering flash mixer and cracks along top of sidewall	Hydracure from inside	PGD
10	Effluent Conduit (MWD)	Jensen, at finish water reservoir #1	3048	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Smashed, continued leaking after repairs	NA <sup>1</sup>	PGD
11	East Valley Feeder (MWD)	Woodley and Rinaldi at flood channel	1219	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Compression, break near bell and spigot away from encasement	Internal band with O-rings	PGD
12	East Valley Feeder (MWD)	Odessa and Rinaldi	1219	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Extension, break near bell and spigot at encasement where pipe goes under flood control channel	Welded bar to fill gap in joint, filled joint with mortar flush wit inside gap	PGD

1: Sufficient data are not available.

2: Permanent ground deformation (PGD) inferred from published field observations and mapped PGD zones (O'Rourke et al., 2001; LADWP, 1996; Stewart et al., 1996; and Holzer et al., 1999). Transient ground deformation (TGD) inferred where PGD observations were absent.

system and attributed the repairs in those zones to their geotechnical characteristics, such as soft clay deposits susceptible to lateral movement and lurching, sands and interbedded clay/silts susceptible to liquefaction, and steep slopes with soils and fills susceptible to slumping and landslides. The trunk line repairs located in those zones are considered related to PGD, and hence, were screened from the regression analysis, as described in Section A.3. In addition, PGDs observed by LADWP engineers (LADWP, 1996) or documented in the literature (Stewart et al., 1996; and Holzer et al., 1999) were used to screen trunk line repairs, located in the zones of PGD, from the regression analysis. The trunk line repairs that were located in the zones of PGD are indicated by “PGD” in the last column of Tables A.1 and A.2.

The damage summarized for MWD pipelines in Table A.2 was assessed from data collected and published by Davis and Bardet (1995) and observations and unpublished data collected after the earthquake by O’Rourke (2005) and Davis (2003). Of special interest is the damage to LA-25. This line provides a tie-in between the Jensen Filtration Plant finished reservoirs and LADWP system that would be used in situations where flow from the Los Angeles Aqueducts is impeded or temporarily stopped. The connection is normally closed. Figure A.2 shows a photo of damage (No. 4 in Table A.2) at a welded slip joint of a 2438-mm-diameter pipe at a concrete cradle. The welded slip joint has failed in compression and ruptured near the crown of the pipe. A very careful inspection of the site was made for evidence of PGD, and none was found (O’Rourke, 2005).



Figure A.2. Welded Slip Joint Damage in LA-25

### **A.2.2. CMWD Trunk Line Repairs**

Contact was made with engineers of the Calleguas Municipal Water District (CMWD), which operates the water supply system in Simi Valley. Information about the trunk line characteristics, geographic location of trunk lines and Northridge earthquake repairs, types of repairs, and soil conditions near repair locations was provided by CMWD engineers (Pugh, 2003; and Mulligan, 2003). The database contains twenty repairs in 33.5 km of concrete trunk line. Table A.3 summarizes characteristics of the repairs, including their location, pipe diameter, pipe material, joint details, damage description, and type of repairs.



Table A.3. Summary of CMWD Trunk Line Repairs during 1994 Northridge Earthquake

No.	Pipeline	Location	Diameter (mm)	Material	Joint Connection	Damage Description	Repair	Cause <sup>1</sup>
1	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Madera Rd	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Weld cracks or ruptures at joint	Welded joint	PGD
2	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Madera Rd	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Weld cracks or ruptures at joint	Welded joint	PGD
3	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Madera Rd	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Weld cracks or ruptures at joint	Welded joint	PGD
4	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Madera Rd	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Weld cracks or ruptures at joint	Welded joint	PGD
5	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Madera Rd	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Weld cracks or ruptures at joint	Welded joint	PGD
6	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Madera Rd	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Weld cracks or ruptures at joint	Welded joint	PGD
7	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Madera Rd	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Weld cracks or ruptures at joint	Welded joint	PGD
8	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Madera Rd	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Weld cracks or ruptures at joint	Welded joint	PGD
9	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Fig St	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Weld cracks or ruptures at joint	Welded joint	PGD
10	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Fig St	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Weld cracks or ruptures at joint	Welded joint	PGD

Table A.3. (Continued)

No.	Pipeline	Location	Diameter (mm)	Material	Joint Connection	Damage Description	Repair	Cause <sup>1</sup>
11	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Fig St	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Weld cracks or ruptures at joint	Welded joint	PGD
12	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Fig St	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Weld cracks or ruptures at joint	Welded joint	PGD
13	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Fig St	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Pulled out of rubber gasket	Welded joint	TGD
14	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Cochran St and Stearns St	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Pulled out of rubber gasket	Welded joint	TGD
15	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Cochran St and Stearns St	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Pulled out of rubber gasket	Welded joint	TGD
16	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Stow St	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Pulled out of rubber gasket	Welded joint	TGD
17	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Stow St	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Pulled out of rubber gasket	Welded joint	TGD
18	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Stow St	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Pulled out of rubber gasket	Welded joint	TGD
19	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Stow St	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Pulled out of rubber gasket	Welded joint	TGD
20	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Stow St	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Pulled out of rubber gasket	Welded joint	TGD

1: Permanent ground deformation (PGD) inferred from published field observations and mapped PGD zones (O'Rourke et al., 2001; LADWP, 1996; Stewart et al., 1996; and Holzer et al., 1999). Transient ground deformation (TGD) inferred where PGD observations were absent.

Among the twenty repairs reported, significant ground and pipeline movement was observed near the locations of twelve repairs (Pugh, 2003), as indicated by “PGD” in the last column of Table A.3. Therefore, these twelve repairs are screened from the regression analysis. The remaining eight trunk line repairs were further checked with the zones of PGD documented in the literature (Stewart et al., 1996; and Holzer et al., 1999), and interviews were conducted with engineers who supervised repairs after the Northridge earthquake (O’Rourke, 2005). In addition, subsurface investigation data near these repairs were reviewed for the presence of liquefiable soils. None of the eight trunk line repairs were located in zones of observed PGD or in zones where significant deposits of liquefiable sand could be identified from the subsurface exploration data.

### **A.2.3. CLWA Trunk Line Repairs**

Contact was made with engineers of the Castaic Lake Water Agency (CLWA), which operates the water supply system in Santa Clarita Valley. Information about the trunk line characteristics, geographic location of trunk lines and Northridge earthquake repairs, and type of repairs was provided by CLWA engineers (Thompson, 2003) in the form of repair project completion and certification reports prepared for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), as well as pipeline plan and profile drawings. The database contains 23 repairs in 17.4 km of concrete trunk lines. Table A.4 summarizes characteristics of the repairs, including their location, pipe diameter, pipe material, joint details, damage description, and type of repairs.

The 23 trunk line repairs were checked with zones of PGD documented in literature (Stewart et al., 1996; and Holzer et al., 1999). None of the 23 trunk line

Table A.4. Summary of CLWA Trunk Line Repairs during 1994 Northridge Earthquake

No.	Pipeline	Location	Diameter (mm)	Material	Joint Connection	Damage Description	Repair	Cause <sup>2</sup>
1	Castaic Conduit	Vicinity of Rye Canyon Rd., Sta. 244 +33	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	NA <sup>1</sup>	Remortared joints	TGD
2	Castaic Conduit	Vicinity of Rye Canyon Rd., Sta. 246 +11	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	NA <sup>1</sup>	Remortared joints	TGD
3	Castaic Conduit	Vicinity of Rye Canyon Rd., Sta. 246 +43	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	NA <sup>1</sup>	Remortared joints	TGD
4	Castaic Conduit	Vicinity of Rye Canyon Rd., Sta. 246 +75	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	NA <sup>1</sup>	Remortared joints	TGD
5	Honby Lateral	23560 Lyons Ave., Sta. 73 +91	838	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint pulled apart or jammed together	Repaired with welding with backing rod	TGD
6	Honby Lateral	23560 Lyons Ave., Sta. 74 +32	838	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint pulled apart or jammed together	Repaired with welding with backing rod	TGD
7	Honby Lateral	23560 Lyons Ave., Sta. 82 +12	838	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint pulled apart	Joints were welded bell-end with backing rod	TGD
8	Honby Lateral	23560 Lyons Ave., Sta. 82 +60	838	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint pulled apart	Joints were welded bell-end with backing rod	TGD
9	Honby Lateral	23560 Lyons Ave., Sta. 125 +87	838	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint pulled apart	Joints were welded bell-end with backing rod	TGD
10	Honby Lateral	23560 Lyons Ave., Sta. 126 +23	838	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint separated	Joints were welded bell-end with backing rod	TGD

Table A.4. (Continued)

No.	Pipeline	Location	Diameter (mm)	Material	Joint Connection	Damage Description	Repair	Cause <sup>2</sup>
11	Honby Lateral	Sta. 112 + 25	838	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint pulled apart, pipe wrap broken and coating damaged	Replace pipe section and close with butt strap at joints	TGD
12	Honby Lateral	Sta. 112 + 50	838	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Weld Joint jammed	Replace pipe section and close with butt strap at joints	TGD
13	Honby Lateral	Sta. 114 + 00	838	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Air Relief fitting and piping damaged	Replace pipe section and close with butt strap at joints	TGD
14	Honby Lateral	Sta. 114 + 75	838	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint separated	Replace pipe section and close with butt strap at joints	TGD
15	Castaic Conduit	Vicinity of Rye Canyon Rd., Sta. 262 +08	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint separated	Butt strap joint	TGD
16	Castaic Conduit	Vicinity of Rye Canyon Rd., Sta. 262 +40	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint separated	Butt strap joint	TGD
17	Castaic Conduit	Vicinity of Rye Canyon Rd., Sta. 263 +00	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint separated	Butt strap joint	TGD
18	Castaic Conduit	Vicinity of Rye Canyon Rd., Sta. 263 +32	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint separated	Butt strap joint	TGD
19	Castaic Conduit	Vicinity of Rye Canyon Rd., Sta. 258 +32	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint deformed	Deformed joint section removed and replaced inside the pipe	TGD
20	Castaic Conduit	Vicinity of Rye Canyon Rd., Sta. 258 +65	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint deformed	Deformed joint section removed and replaced inside the pipe	TGD

Table A.4. (Continued)

No.	Pipeline	Location	Diameter (mm)	Material	Joint Connection	Damage Description	Repair	Cause <sup>2</sup>
21	Castaic Conduit	Vicinity of Rye Canyon Rd., Sta. 239 +10	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint jammed and pipe line deformed	Replace pipe section and close with butt strap at joints	TGD
22	Castaic Conduit	Vicinity of Rye Canyon Rd., Sta. 239 +50	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint pulled apart and pipe line deformed	Replace pipe section and close with butt strap at joints	TGD
23	Castaic Conduit	23560 Lyons Ave., Sta. 257 + 60	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint pulled apart and gasket pulled out of seat	Repaired with welding with backing rod	TGD

1: Sufficient data are not available.

2: Permanent ground deformation (PGD) inferred from published field observations and mapped PGD zones (O'Rourke et al., 2001; LADWP, 1996; Stewart et al., 1996; and Holzer et al., 1999). Transient ground deformation (TGD) inferred where PGD observations were absent.

repairs were located in zones of reported PGD. Because evidence for soil movement and potentially liquefiable soils was absent along the trunk line rights of way, the 23 trunk line repairs were included in the regression analysis.

### **A.3. Regression Analysis**

The regression procedures utilized in this work follow those developed by O'Rourke and Toprak (1997), Toprak (1998), O'Rourke et al. (2001), and Jeon (2002). Empirical data were collected about distribution pipeline repairs and locations of repairs after the 1994 Northridge earthquake and incorporated in a large GIS database, consisting of over 12,000 km of pipelines in the greater Los Angeles area and more than 240 strong motion records. Records from over 240 strong motion stations throughout the earthquake-affected area were analyzed with respect to various seismic parameters (Toprak, 1998). The spatial distributions of different seismic parameters were estimated by interpolation and superimposed on the pipeline network and spatially distributed database of pipeline damage. Where possible, pipeline repairs in zones of documented PGD were screened from the repair rates so that the resulting statistics would reflect principally the effects of seismic waves or TGD. Using the GIS software, the repair rate was calculated for areas influenced by specific seismic parameters. Correlations then were developed through regression analysis to obtain the most statistically significant relationships among repair rate and values of different seismic parameters. It was found that the most statistically relevant parameter for correlation with repair rate is PGV. The most statistically meaningful regression between repair rate and PGV was developed by varying the PGV bins to achieve the highest coefficient of determination,  $r^2$ , in the regression analysis.

Using the spatial distribution of PGV developed by Jeon (2002) and the trunk line repair database described in Section A.2, regressions between trunk line repair rate, number of repairs per km pipe length, and PGV are developed for concrete, steel, and riveted steel trunk lines, which are described in the following subheadings:

### **A.3.1. Concrete Trunk Lines**

After screening the repairs in the PGD zones, 36 repairs in the 141.9 km of pipeline were included in the regressions for concrete trunk lines. Table A. 5 summarizes characteristics of the 36 repairs. Figure A. 3 shows the spatial distributions of concrete trunk lines and their repairs during the 1994 Northridge earthquake, superimposed on the PGV spatial distribution by Jeon (2002). Regression analysis using the repair rates and PGV values summarized in Table A. 6 results in the following regression equation with the highest  $r^2$  (i.e., 0.83):

$$\ln(\lambda) = 2.59 \times \ln(V_p) - 12.11 \quad (\text{A.1})$$

where  $\lambda$  is the repair rate in units of repair number per km length pipeline, and  $V_p$  is peak ground velocity in units of cm/sec.

### **A.3.2. Steel Trunk Lines**

After screening the repairs in the PGD zones, twelve repairs in 468.8 km of pipeline were included in the regressions for steel trunk lines. Table A. 7 summarizes characteristics of the twelve repairs. Figure A. 4 shows the spatial distributions of steel trunk lines and their repairs during the 1994 Northridge earthquake, superimposed on



Table A.5. Summary of Repairs in Concrete Trunk Lines after PGD Screening

No.	Pipeline	Location	Diameter (mm)	Material	Joint Connection	Damage Description	Repair	Owner
1	Castaic Conduit	Vicinity of Rye Canyon Rd., Sta. 244 +33	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	NA <sup>1</sup>	Remortared joints	CLWA
2	Castaic Conduit	Vicinity of Rye Canyon Rd., Sta. 246 +11	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	NA <sup>1</sup>	Remortared joints	CLWA
3	Castaic Conduit	Vicinity of Rye Canyon Rd., Sta. 246 +43	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	NA <sup>1</sup>	Remortared joints	CLWA
4	Castaic Conduit	Vicinity of Rye Canyon Rd., Sta. 246 +75	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	NA <sup>1</sup>	Remortared joints	CLWA
5	Honby Lateral	23560 Lyons Ave., Sta. 73 +91	838	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint pulled apart or jammed together	Repaired with welding with backing rod	CLWA
6	Honby Lateral	23560 Lyons Ave., Sta. 74 +32	838	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint pulled apart or jammed together	Repaired with welding with backing rod	CLWA
7	Honby Lateral	23560 Lyons Ave., Sta. 82 +12	838	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint pulled apart	Joints were welded bell-end with backing rod	CLWA
8	Honby Lateral	23560 Lyons Ave., Sta. 82 +60	838	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint pulled apart	Joints were welded bell-end with backing rod	CLWA
9	Honby Lateral	23560 Lyons Ave., Sta. 125 +87	838	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint pulled apart	Joints were welded bell-end with backing rod	CLWA
10	Honby Lateral	23560 Lyons Ave., Sta. 126 +23	838	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint separated	Joints were welded bell-end with backing rod	CLWA

Table A.5. (Continued)

No.	Pipeline	Location	Diameter (mm)	Material	Joint Connection	Damage Description	Repair	Owner
11	Honby Lateral	Sta. 112 + 25	838	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint pulled apart, pipe wrap broken and coating damaged	Replace pipe section and close with butt strap at joints	CLWA
12	Honby Lateral	Sta. 112 + 50	838	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Weld Joint jammed	Replace pipe section and close with butt strap at joints	CLWA
13	Honby Lateral	Sta. 114 + 00	838	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Air Relief fitting and piping damaged	Replace pipe section and close with butt strap at joints	CLWA
14	Honby Lateral	Sta. 114 + 75	838	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint separated	Replace pipe section and close with butt strap at joints	CLWA
15	Castaic Conduit	Vicinity of Rye Canyon Rd., Sta. 262 +08	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint separated	Butt strap joint	CLWA
16	Castaic Conduit	Vicinity of Rye Canyon Rd., Sta. 262 +40	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint separated	Butt strap joint	CLWA
17	Castaic Conduit	Vicinity of Rye Canyon Rd., Sta. 263 +00	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint separated	Butt strap joint	CLWA
18	Castaic Conduit	Vicinity of Rye Canyon Rd., Sta. 263 +32	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint separated	Butt strap joint	CLWA
19	Castaic Conduit	Vicinity of Rye Canyon Rd., Sta. 258 +32	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint deformed	Deformed joint section removed and replaced inside the pipe	CLWA
20	Castaic Conduit	Vicinity of Rye Canyon Rd., Sta. 258 +65	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint deformed	Deformed joint section removed and replaced inside the pipe	CLWA

Table A.5. (Continued)

No.	Pipeline	Location	Diameter (mm)	Material	Joint Connection	Damage Description	Repair	Owner
21	Castaic Conduit	Vicinity of Rye Canyon Rd., Sta. 239 +10	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint jammed and pipe line deformed	Replace pipe section and close with butt strap at joints	CLWA
22	Castaic Conduit	Vicinity of Rye Canyon Rd., Sta. 239 +50	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint pulled apart and pipe line deformed	Replace pipe section and close with butt strap at joints	CLWA
23	Castaic Conduit	23560 Lyons Ave., Sta. 257 + 60	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint pulled apart and gasket pulled out of seat	Repaired with welding with backing rod	CLWA
24	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Fig St	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Pulled out of rubber gasket	Welded joint	CMWD
25	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Cochran St and Stearns St	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Pulled out of rubber gasket	Welded joint	CMWD
26	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Cochran St and Stearns St	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Pulled out of rubber gasket	Welded joint	CMWD
27	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Stow St	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Pulled out of rubber gasket	Welded joint	CMWD
28	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Stow St	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Pulled out of rubber gasket	Welded joint	CMWD
29	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Stow St	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Pulled out of rubber gasket	Welded joint	CMWD
30	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Stow St	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Pulled out of rubber gasket	Welded joint	CMWD

Table A.5. (Continued)

No.	Pipeline	Location	Diameter (mm)	Material	Joint Connection	Damage Description	Repair	Owner
31	Calleguas Conduit North Branch	Stow St	1981	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Pulled out of rubber gasket	Welded joint	CMWD
32	Granada Trunk Line	Wilbur	1220	Concrete	Bell and spigot	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	LADWP
33	Granada Trunk Line	Tampa Ave. at 118 Frwy	1220	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint fracture, joint fractured along side existing weld	Welded fracture	LADWP
34	Granada Trunk Line	Desoto Reservoir, North side	1220	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Joint fracture, joint fractured along side existing weld	Welded fracture	LADWP
35	Granada Trunk Line	Between Melvin & Winnetka	1220	Concrete	Bell and spigot	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	LADWP
36	Rinaldi Trunk Line	West of Winnetka St. Sta. 1219+10 (west of Melvin)	1372	Concrete	Bell and spigot	Multiple cracks in 4.9-m section of pipe, cracked at a cut-off wall	WEKO-SEAL (DWP) and 2.4-m external steel band (MWD)	LADWP

1: Sufficient data are not available.




Figure A.3. Concrete Trunk Line Performance during 1994 Northridge Earthquake

Table A.6. Summary of Concrete Trunk Line Repair Rate According to PGV

PGV Bin (cm/sec)	Representative PGV (cm/sec)	Pipe Length (km)	Repair No	Repair Rate (Repair No. / km)
30-60	45	91.3	8	0.09
60-80	70	27.7	11	0.40
80-90	85	9.7	9	0.93
90-120	105	13.2	8	0.61

the PGV spatial distribution by Jeon (2002). Regression analysis using the repair rates and PGV values summarized in Table A. 8 results in the following regression equation with the highest  $r^2$  (i.e., 0.76):

$$\ln(\lambda) = 2.59 \times \ln(V_p) - 14.16 \quad (\text{A.2})$$

### A.3.3. Riveted Steel Trunk Lines

After screening the repairs in the PGD zones, eight repairs in 114.5 km of pipeline were included in the regressions for steel trunk lines. Table A. 9 summarizes characteristics of the eight repairs. Figure A. 5 shows the spatial distributions of riveted steel trunk lines and their repairs during the 1994 Northridge earthquake, superimposed on the PGV spatial distribution by Jeon (2002). Regression analysis using the repair rates and PGV values summarized in Table A. 10 results in the following regression equation with the highest  $r^2$  (i.e., 0.84):

$$\ln(\lambda) = 1.41 \times \ln(V_p) - 8.19 \quad (\text{A.3})$$

Table A.7. Summary of Repairs in Steel Trunk Lines after PGD Screening

No.	Pipeline	Location	Diameter (mm)	Material	Joint Connection	Damage Description	Repair	Owner
1	Reseda Trunk Line	Asuncion St. (1.5 blocks North of Rinaldi)	762	Steel	Welded joint	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	LADWP
2	Roscoe Trunk Line	Reseda Blvd.	1016	Steel	Welded joint	No observable pipe movement	Butt strap	LADWP
3	Roscoe Trunk Line	Reseda Blvd., 140 m West, 18546 Roscoe Blvd	1016	Steel	Welded joint	No observable pipe movement	Butt strap	LADWP
4	Roscoe Trunk Line	Wilbur Ave. 53 m East 18844 Roscoe Blvd.	1016	Steel	Welded joint	No observable pipe movement	Butt strap	LADWP
5	Roscoe Trunk Line	Tampa	1016	Steel	Welded joint	No observable pipe movement	Butt strap	LADWP
6	Roscoe Trunk Line	Haskel Ave	1524	Steel	Welded joint	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	LADWP
7	Roscoe Trunk Line	Woodley Ave	1321	Steel	Welded joint	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	LADWP
8	Desoto Trunk Line	Ingomar	1067	Steel	Welded joint	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	LADWP
9	Desoto Trunk Line	Devonshire	1372	Steel	Welded joint	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	LADWP
10	Susana Trunk Line	Penstock Pumping Station	1372	Steel	Welded joint	102 mm flange gasket tapped off	Repaired gasket	LADWP
11	LA-25	At bend	1524	Steel	Welded joint	Weld fracture	Rewelded fracture	MWD
12	LA-25	At concrete cradle	2438	Steel	Welded joint	Flexure, rotation, 102 mm compression, compound deformation	Butt strap	MWD

1: Sufficient data are not available.




Figure A.4. Steel Trunk Line Performance during 1994 Northridge Earthquake



Table A.8. Summary of Steel Trunk Line Repair Rate According to PGV

<b>PGV Bin (cm/sec)</b>	<b>Representative PGV (cm/sec)</b>	<b>Pipe Length (km)</b>	<b>Repair No</b>	<b>Repair Rate (Repair No. / km)</b>
10-50	30	371.2	1	0.003
50-80	65	56.1	7	0.13
80-110	95	19.3	1	0.05
110-140	125	22.2	3	0.14

#### **A.3.4. Comparison of Regressions for Different Trunk Lines**

Figure A.6 summarizes the regressions for concrete, riveted steel, and steel trunk lines. It is obvious that the repair rate increases as the PGV increases. Inspections of the regressions in Figure A.6 show that there is an approximate 10-fold increase in repair rate for concrete trunk lines relative to steel trunk lines.

Table A.9. Summary of Repairs in Riveted Steel Trunk Lines after PGD Screening

No.	Pipeline	Location	Diameter (mm)	Material	Joint Connection	Damage Description	Repair	Owner
1	Roscoe Trunk Line	Oakdale, 18 m West	1067	Riveted Steel	Riveted	No observable pipe movement	NA <sup>1</sup>	LADWP
2	Roscoe Trunk Line	Fallbrook Ave. West Side	914	Riveted Steel	Riveted	No observable pipe movement	NA <sup>1</sup>	LADWP
3	Roscoe Trunk Line	Shirley Ave. 46 m East	991	Riveted Steel	Riveted	No observable pipe movement	NA <sup>1</sup>	LADWP
4	Roscoe Trunk Line	Calvin	1016	Riveted Steel	Riveted	No observable pipe movement	NA <sup>1</sup>	LADWP
5	Roscoe Trunk Line	Canoga Ave	1295	Riveted Steel	Riveted	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	LADWP
6	Roscoe Trunk Line	Faralone Ave. 171 m West 22259 Roscoe Blvd.	1372	Riveted Steel	Riveted	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	LADWP
7	Roscoe Trunk Line	Oakdale, 58 m West	1067	Riveted Steel	Riveted	NA <sup>1</sup>	NA <sup>1</sup>	LADWP
8	City Trunk Line	Lower San Fernando Dam	1829	Riveted Steel	Riveted	Tear at longitudinal seam	Welded plate strap	LADWP

1: Sufficient data are not available.




Figure A.5. Riveted Steel Trunk Line Performance during 1994 Northridge Earthquake

Table A.10. Summary of Riveted Steel Trunk Line Repair Rate According to PGV

PGV Bin (cm/sec)	Representative PGV (cm/sec)	Pipe Length (km)	Repair No	Repair Rate (Repair No. / km)
0-70	35	95.1	3	0.03
70-130	100	14.6	4	0.27
130-180	155	4.8	1	0.21




Figure A.6. Regressions of Repair Rate vs. PGV for Concrete, Riveted Steel and Steel Pipelines

## **APPENDIX B**

### **RISK DEAGGREGATIONS FOR FIVE WATER DISTRICTS**

#### **B.1. Introduction**

The water district risk curves with a 24-hour period of water losses from tanks are examined closely to identify the key scenario earthquakes that significantly influence water district risks. Risk deaggregations are performed at district risks corresponding to 475-year and 50-year recurrence intervals for five water districts, i.e., the West Valley, East Valley, Western, Central, and Harbor water districts, as described in the following subheadings:

#### **B.2. West Valley**

Table B.1 summarizes the scenario earthquakes that contribute to the district risk at a system serviceability index (SSI) of 0.35 in the risk curve for the West Valley Water District, corresponding to a 475-year recurrence interval or 10% probability of exceedance in 50 years. The fourth Column in Table B.1 indicates the closest distance from the fault to the West Valley Water District centroid with geographic coordinates (-118.55175°, 34.21725°), as shown by the blue star in Figure 7.10. The table is sorted in a decreasing order of the contribution. Fifteen scenario earthquakes have contributed to this specific risk level, among which, Northridge, Background Source


Table B.1. Summary of Scenario Contributions to 475-year Recurrence Risks in West Valley Water District

Scenario ID	Scenario Name	M <sub>w</sub>	Distance (km)	Annual Occurrence Frequency	Contribution (%)
370	Northridge	7.0	11	6.69E-04	32.76
561	Background Source	7.0	0	2.58E-04	12.63
198	Santa Susana	6.7	9	2.01E-04	9.84
21	San Andreas Fault-All southern segments	8.1	50	2.00E-04	9.80
175	Verdugo	6.9	13	1.93E-04	9.45
443	Sierra Madre-San Fernando	6.7	12	1.25E-04	6.15
202	Simi-Santa Rosa	7.0	16	8.46E-05	4.15
559	Background Source	7.0	9	6.98E-05	3.42
219	Anacapa-Dume	7.5	29	6.24E-05	3.06
159	Newport-Inglewood	7.1	24	5.40E-05	2.64
562	Background Source	7.0	22	5.09E-05	2.49
166	Sierra Madre	7.2	25	4.97E-05	2.43
203	Simi-Santa Rosa	6.5	16	1.91E-05	0.94
372	Northridge	6.5	11	4.74E-06	0.23
177	Verdugo	6.4	13	1.89E-07	0.01


Note: the table is based on the simulations with a 24-hour period of running tanks and the SSI corresponding to 475-year recurrence risks is 0.35.

561 scenario, Santa Susana, San Andreas Fault-All Southern Segments, Verdugo, and Sierra Madre-San Fernando scenario earthquakes have relatively significant contributions, i.e., > 5%, to the water district risk. Figure B.1a shows the water district risk deaggregation according to M<sub>w</sub> and distance. About 75% of the water district risk is contributed from the scenario earthquakes originating on faults located within 15 km from the water district centroid and having magnitude between 6.5 and 7.0.

Table B.2 summarizes the scenario earthquakes that contribute to the district risk at a SSI of 0.42 in the risk curve with a 24-hour period of running tanks, corresponding to a 50-year recurrence interval or 100% probability of exceedance in 50 years. In total 59 scenario earthquakes utilized in this work, 47 scenario



(a) 475-year Recurrence Risks, SSI = 0.35



(b) 50-year Recurrence Risks, SSI = 0.42

Figure B.1. Risk Deaggregations for West Valley Water District

Table B.2. Summary of Scenario Contributions to 50-year Recurrence Risks in West Valley Water District

Scenario ID	Scenario Name	M <sub>w</sub>	Distance (km)	Annual Occurrence Frequency	Contribution (%)
22	San Andreas Fault - 1857	7.8	50	3.20E-03	16.02
198	Santa Susana	6.7	9	2.01E-03	10.05
21	San Andreas Fault-All southern segments	8.1	50	1.60E-03	8.00
370	Northridge	7	11	1.43E-03	7.16
189	Oak Ridge-onshore	7	25	1.38E-03	6.88
561	Background Source	7	0	1.12E-03	5.59
195	San Cayetano	7	30	9.15E-04	4.58
559	Background Source	7	9	7.68E-04	3.84
175	Verdugo	6.9	13	7.08E-04	3.54
443	Sierra Madre-San Fernando	6.7	12	6.27E-04	3.14
169	San Gabriel	7.2	20	6.13E-04	3.06
219	Anacapa-Dume	7.5	29	5.62E-04	2.81
166	Sierra Madre	7.2	25	4.47E-04	2.24
196	San Cayetano	6.5	30	4.02E-04	2.01
560	Background Source	7	16	3.10E-04	1.55
19	San Andreas Fault - Carrizo	7.4	53	3.04E-04	1.52
444	Palos Verdes	7.3	30	2.80E-04	1.40
18	San Andreas Fault - Mojave	7.3	50	2.75E-04	1.38
159	Newport-Inglewood	7.1	24	2.70E-04	1.35
191	Oak Ridge-onshore	6.5	25	2.57E-04	1.29
562	Background Source	7	22	2.54E-04	1.27
202	Simi-Santa Rosa	7	16	2.54E-04	1.27
23	San Andreas Fault - Southern 2 segments	7.7	97	2.24E-04	1.12
220	Anacapa-Dume	7	29	1.90E-04	0.95
397	Puente Hills blind thrust	7.1	29	1.73E-04	0.86
141	Newport-Inglewood offshore	7.1	92	1.70E-04	0.85
171	San Gabriel	6.7	21	1.69E-04	0.85
447	Palos Verdes	6.8	30	1.66E-04	0.83
221	Anacapa-Dume	7	54	1.26E-04	0.63

Note: the table is based on the simulations with a 24-hour period of running tanks and the SSI corresponding to 50-year recurrence risks is 0.42.



Table B.2. (Continued)

<b>Scenario ID</b>	<b>Scenario Name</b>	<b>M<sub>w</sub></b>	<b>Distance (km)</b>	<b>Annual Occurrence Frequency</b>	<b>Contribution (%)</b>
371	Northridge	6.5	12	1.15E-04	0.58
174	Santa Monica	6.6	21	1.05E-04	0.52
203	Simi-Santa Rosa	6.5	16	7.65E-05	0.38
122	Clamshell-Sawpit	6.5	32	7.09E-05	0.35
446	Palos Verdes	6.8	56	5.47E-05	0.27
162	Newport-Inglewood	6.6	24	5.00E-05	0.25
378	Channel Island Thrust	7.5	71	3.41E-05	0.17
399	Puente Hills blind thrust	6.6	29	2.74E-05	0.14
372	Northridge	6.5	11	2.05E-05	0.10
170	San Gabriel	6.7	20	1.99E-05	0.10
168	Sierra Madre	6.7	25	1.48E-05	0.07
118	Holser	6.5	21	1.11E-05	0.06
177	Verdugo	6.4	13	1.33E-06	0.01
176	Verdugo	6.4	24	1.05E-06	0.01
398	Puente Hills blind thrust	6.6	52	6.93E-07	0.00
173	Malibu Coast	6.7	20	5.40E-07	0.00
119	Hollywood	6.4	20	4.43E-07	0.00
222	Anacapa-Dume	6.5	29	8.63E-08	0.00

Note: the table is based on the simulations with a 24-hour period of running tanks and the SSI corresponding to 50-year recurrence risks is 0.42.

earthquakes have contributed to this specific risk level, among which, San Andreas-1857, Santa Susana, San Andreas-All Southern Segments, Northridge, Oak Ridge-onshore, and Background Source 561 scenario earthquakes have relatively significant contributions, i.e., > 5%, to the system risk. Figure B.1b shows the district risk deaggregation according to  $M_w$  and distance. Significant contributions from scenario earthquakes with relatively large distances from originating faults to the district centroid are observed, particularly those associated with the San Andreas fault, which are about 50 km from the centroid.

Comparisons between Tables B.1 and B.2 show that the number of scenario earthquakes that have contributions to the water district risk increases significantly as the recurrence interval for the risk decreases from 475 years to 50 years. Comparisons between Figure B.1a and b show that, as the recurrence interval decreases, or SSI increases, the contributions from scenario earthquakes with relatively large distances from originating faults to the water district increase significantly.

### **B.3. East Valley**


Table B.3 summarizes the scenario earthquakes that contribute to the district risk at a SSI of 0.49 in the risk curve for the East Valley Water District, corresponding to a 475-year recurrence interval or 10% probability of exceedance in 50 years. The fourth Column in Table B.3 indicates the closest distance from the fault to the East Valley Water District centroid with geographic coordinates (-118.38873°, 34.22718°), as shown by the blue star in Figure 7.10. The table is sorted in a decreasing order of the contribution. Fifteen scenario earthquakes have contributed to this specific risk level, among which, San Andreas fault-1857, Santa Susana, Sierra Madre-San Fernando, San Gabriel, Northridge, and Background Source 561 scenario earthquakes have relatively significant contributions, i.e., > 5%, to the water district risk. Figure B.2a shows the water district risk deaggregation according to  $M_w$  and distance. About 40% of the water district risk is contributed from the San Andrea fault-1857, which is located about 43 km from the water district centroid. The remaining contributions to the district risk are mostly from scenario earthquakes originating on faults located within 30 km from the water district centroid.

Table B.3. Summary of Scenario Contributions to 475-year Recurrence Risks in East Valley Water District


Scenario ID	Scenario Name	M <sub>w</sub>	Distance (km)	Annual Occurrence Frequency	Contribution (%)
22	San Andreas Fault - 1857	7.8	43	6.41E-04	39.87
198	Santa Susana	6.7	15	2.01E-04	12.50
443	Sierra Madre-San Fernando	6.7	6	1.88E-04	11.71
169	San Gabriel	7.2	14	1.02E-04	6.35
370	Northridge	7.0	6	9.55E-05	5.94
561	Background Source	7.0	1	8.60E-05	5.35
175	Verdugo	6.9	1	6.43E-05	4.00
397	Puente Hills blind thrust	7.1	21	5.75E-05	3.58
159	Newport-Inglewood	7.1	20	5.40E-05	3.36
166	Sierra Madre	7.2	11	4.97E-05	3.09
202	Simi-Santa Rosa	7.0	28	4.23E-05	2.63
168	Sierra Madre	6.7	11	1.48E-05	0.92
162	Newport-Inglewood	6.6	20	1.00E-05	0.62
176	Verdugo	6.4	10	1.05E-06	0.07
177	Verdugo	6.4	1	1.89E-07	0.01

Note: the table is based on the simulations with a 24-hour period of running tanks and the SSI corresponding to 475-year recurrence risks is 0.49.

Table B.4 summarizes the scenario earthquakes that contribute to the district risk at a SSI of 0.78 in the risk curve with a 24-hour period of running tanks, corresponding to a 50-year recurrence interval or 100% probability of exceedance in 50 years. In total 59 scenario earthquakes utilized in this work, 46 scenario earthquakes have contributed to this specific risk level, among which, San Andreas-1857, Santa Susana, San Andreas-All Southern Segments, Northridge, and San Gabriel scenario earthquakes have relatively significant contributions, i.e., > 5%, to the system risk. Figure B.2b shows the district risk deaggregation according to M<sub>w</sub> and distance. Significant contributions from scenario earthquakes with relatively large distances from originating faults to water district centroid are observed, particularly



(a) 475-year Recurrence Risks, SSI = 0.49



(b) 50-year Recurrence Risks, SSI = 0.78

Figure B.2. Risk Deaggregations for East Valley Water District

Table B.4. Summary of Scenario Contributions to 50-year Recurrence Risks in East Valley Water District

Scenario ID	Scenario Name	M <sub>w</sub>	Distance (km)	Annual Occurrence Frequency	Contribution (%)
22	San Andreas Fault - 1857	7.8	43	3.85E-03	19.23
198	Santa Susana	6.7	15	1.61E-03	8.04
21	San Andreas Fault-All southern segments	8.1	43	1.40E-03	7.00
370	Northridge	7	6	1.34E-03	6.69
169	San Gabriel	7.2	14	1.02E-03	5.10
175	Verdugo	6.9	1	9.65E-04	4.82
561	Background Source	7	1	8.60E-04	4.30
397	Puente Hills blind thrust	7.1	21	8.06E-04	4.03
443	Sierra Madre-San Fernando	6.7	6	7.53E-04	3.76
166	Sierra Madre	7.2	11	6.46E-04	3.23
219	Anacapa-Dume	7.5	39	5.62E-04	2.81
189	Oak Ridge-onshore	7	36	5.51E-04	2.75
559	Background Source	7	10	4.88E-04	2.44
12	Elsinore - Whittier	6.8	43	4.80E-04	2.40
195	San Cayetano	7	41	4.58E-04	2.29
440	Cucamonga	6.9	62	4.12E-04	2.06
560	Background Source	7	17	3.62E-04	1.81
562	Background Source	7	23	3.56E-04	1.78
159	Newport-Inglewood	7.1	20	3.24E-04	1.62
19	San Andreas Fault - Carrizo	7.4	53	3.04E-04	1.52
167	Sierra Madre	6.7	38	2.93E-04	1.47
171	San Gabriel	6.7	23	2.54E-04	1.27
202	Simi-Santa Rosa	7	28	2.54E-04	1.27
145	Coronado Bank	7.6	115	2.33E-04	1.17
220	Anacapa-Dume	7	39	2.28E-04	1.14
141	Newport-Inglewood offshore	7.1	83	1.70E-04	0.85
444	Palos Verdes	7.3	36	1.40E-04	0.70
174	Santa Monica	6.6	18	1.40E-04	0.70
168	Sierra Madre	6.7	11	1.18E-04	0.59
371	Northridge	6.5	16	1.15E-04	0.58
120	Raymond	6.5	19	9.88E-05	0.49

Note: the table is based on the simulations with a 24-hour period of running tanks and the SSI corresponding to 50-year recurrence Risks is 0.78.

Table B.4. (Continued)

<b>Scenario ID</b>	<b>Scenario Name</b>	<b>M<sub>w</sub></b>	<b>Distance (km)</b>	<b>Annual Occurrence Frequency</b>	<b>Contribution (%)</b>
447	Palos Verdes	6.8	36	8.32E-05	0.42
378	Channel Island Thrust	7.5	85	6.82E-05	0.34
162	Newport-Inglewood	6.6	61	6.00E-05	0.30
118	Holser	6.5	25	4.44E-05	0.22
399	Puente Hills blind thrust	6.6	21	2.74E-05	0.14
170	San Gabriel	6.7	14	1.99E-05	0.10
203	Simi-Santa Rosa	6.5	28	1.91E-05	0.10
388	Upper Elysian Park	6.4	15	1.64E-05	0.08
372	Northridge	6.5	6	9.48E-06	0.05
176	Verdugo	6.4	10	8.39E-06	0.04
398	Puente Hills blind thrust	6.6	41	1.39E-06	0.01
177	Verdugo	6.4	1	1.33E-06	0.01
119	Hollywood	6.4	14	8.86E-07	0.00
173	Malibu Coast	6.7	25	7.20E-07	0.00
222	Anacapa-Dume	6.5	39	8.63E-08	0.00

Note: the table is based on the simulations with a 24-hour period of running tanks and the SSI corresponding to 50-year recurrence risks is 0.78.

those associated with the San Andreas fault, which are about 43 km from the centroid.

Comparisons between Tables B.3 and B.4 show that the number of scenario earthquakes that have contributions to the water district risk increases significantly as the recurrence interval for the risk decreases from 475 years to 50 years. Comparisons between Figure B.2a and b show that, as the recurrence interval decreases, or SSI increases, the contributions from scenario earthquakes with relatively large distances from originating faults to the water district increase significantly.

## B.4. Western

Table B.5 summarizes the scenario earthquakes that contribute to the district risk at a SSI of 0.24 in the risk curve for the Western Water District, corresponding to a 475-year recurrence interval or 10% probability of exceedance in 50 years. The fourth Column in Table B.5 indicates the closest distance from the fault to the Western Water District centroid with geographic coordinates (-118.43397°, 34.05516°), as shown by the blue star in Figure 7.10. The table is sorted in a decreasing order of the contribution. Sixteen scenario earthquakes have contributed to this specific risk level, among which, Puente Hills blind thrust fault, Newport-Inglewood, Background Source 562 scenario, San Andreas fault-Southern 2 Segments, Palos Verdes, and Anacapa-Dume earthquakes have relatively significant contributions, i.e., > 5%, to the water district risk. Figure B.3a shows the water district risk deaggregation according to  $M_w$  and distance. About 75% of the water district risk is contributed from the scenario earthquakes originating on faults located within 30 km from the water district centroid and having magnitude larger than 6.5.

Table B.6 summarizes the scenario earthquakes that contribute to the district risk at a SSI of 0.35 in the risk curve with a 24-hour period of running tanks, corresponding to a 50-year recurrence interval or 100% probability of exceedance in 50 years. In total 59 scenario earthquakes utilized in this work, 43 scenario earthquakes have contributed to this specific risk level, among which, San Andreas-1857, San Andreas-All Southern Segments, and Northridge scenario earthquakes have relatively significant contributions, i.e., > 5%, to the system risk. Figure B.3b shows the district risk deaggregation according to  $M_w$  and distance. Significant contributions from scenario earthquakes with relative large distances from originating faults to water

Table B.5. Summary of Scenario Contributions to 475-year Recurrence Risks in Western Water District


Scenario ID	Scenario Name	M <sub>w</sub>	Distance (km)	Annual Occurrence Frequency	Contribution (%)
397	Puente Hills blind thrust	7.1	12	5.18E-04	24.73
159	Newport-Inglewood	7.1	4	2.70E-04	12.88
562	Background Source	7.0	4	2.54E-04	12.14
23	San Andreas Fault - Southern 2 segments	7.7	90	2.24E-04	10.71
451	Palos Verdes	6.3	43	2.18E-04	10.42
444	Palos Verdes	7.3	18	1.40E-04	6.69
219	Anacapa-Dume	7.5	25	1.25E-04	5.96
560	Background Source	7.0	2	1.03E-04	4.93
161	Newport-Inglewood	6.6	26	7.43E-05	3.55
175	Verdugo	6.9	20	6.43E-05	3.07
166	Sierra Madre	7.2	27	4.97E-05	2.37
174	Santa Monica	6.6	0	3.49E-05	1.67
399	Puente Hills blind thrust	6.6	12	1.09E-05	0.52
170	San Gabriel	6.7	32	6.65E-06	0.32
119	Hollywood	6.4	4	4.43E-07	0.02
173	Malibu Coast	6.7	10	1.80E-07	0.01

Note: the table is based on the simulations with a 24-hour period of running tanks and the SSI corresponding to 475-year recurrence risks is 0.24.


district centroid are observed, particularly those associated with the San Andreas fault, which are about 62 km from the centroid.

Comparisons between Tables B.5 and B.6 show that the number of scenario earthquakes that have contributions to the water district risk increases significantly as the recurrence interval for the risk decreases from 475 years to 50 years. Comparisons between Figure B.3a and b show that, as the recurrence interval decreases, or SSI increases, the contributions from scenario earthquakes with relatively large distances from originating faults to the water district increase significantly.





(a) 475-year Recurrence Risks, SSI = 0.24



(b) 50-year Recurrence Risks, SSI = 0.35

Figure B.3. Risk Deaggregations for Western Water District

Table B.6. Summary of Scenario Contributions to 50-year Recurrence Risks in Western Water District

Scenario ID	Scenario Name	M <sub>w</sub>	Distance (km)	Annual Occurrence Frequency	Contribution (%)
22	San Andreas Fault - 1857	7.8	62	3.20E-03	16.02
21	San Andreas Fault-All southern segments	8.1	62	2.20E-03	11.01
370	Northridge	7	24	1.05E-03	5.25
444	Palos Verdes	7.3	18	9.81E-04	4.91
195	San Cayetano	7	52	9.15E-04	4.58
559	Background Source	7	9	9.07E-04	4.54
397	Puente Hills blind thrust	7.1	12	8.63E-04	4.32
159	Newport-Inglewood	7.1	4	8.10E-04	4.05
560	Background Source	7	2	7.23E-04	3.62
219	Anacapa-Dume	7.5	25	6.87E-04	3.43
23	San Andreas Fault - Southern 2 segments	7.7	90	6.73E-04	3.37
562	Background Source	7	4	6.61E-04	3.31
175	Verdugo	6.9	20	6.43E-04	3.22
198	Santa Susana	6.7	29	6.03E-04	3.01
561	Background Source	7	18	6.02E-04	3.01
189	Oak Ridge-onshore	7	46	5.51E-04	2.75
166	Sierra Madre	7.2	27	5.46E-04	2.73
220	Anacapa-Dume	7	25	3.80E-04	1.90
447	Palos Verdes	6.8	18	3.33E-04	1.66
174	Santa Monica	6.6	0	3.14E-04	1.57
169	San Gabriel	7.2	32	3.06E-04	1.53
454	Palos Verdes	6.3	18	2.89E-04	1.44
161	Newport-Inglewood	6.6	26	2.23E-04	1.12
451	Palos Verdes	6.3	43	2.18E-04	1.09
19	San Andreas Fault - Carrizo	7.4	71	1.52E-04	0.76
162	Newport-Inglewood	6.6	4	1.50E-04	0.75
120	Raymond	6.5	21	1.48E-04	0.74
453	Palos Verdes	6.3	20	1.38E-04	0.69
145	Coronado Bank	7.6	99	1.17E-04	0.58
378	Channel Island Thrust	7.5	77	1.02E-04	0.51
202	Simi-Santa Rosa	7	36	8.46E-05	0.42

Note: the table is based on the simulations with a 24-hour period of running tanks and the SSI corresponding to 50-year recurrence risks is 0.35.

Table B.6. (Continued)

Scenario ID	Scenario Name	M <sub>w</sub>	Distance (km)	Annual Occurrence Frequency	Contribution (%)
443	Sierra Madre-San Fernando	6.7	26	6.27E-05	0.31
168	Sierra Madre	6.7	27	5.91E-05	0.30
399	Puente Hills blind thrust	6.6	12	5.47E-05	0.27
388	Upper Elysian Park	6.4	14	2.45E-05	0.12
371	Northridge	6.5	31	1.92E-05	0.10
170	San Gabriel	6.7	32	1.33E-05	0.07
372	Northridge	6.5	24	9.48E-06	0.05
176	Verdugo	6.4	21	6.29E-06	0.03
119	Hollywood	6.4	4	3.54E-06	0.02
173	Malibu Coast	6.7	10	1.80E-06	0.01
177	Verdugo	6.4	20	5.68E-07	0.00
222	Anacapa-Dume	6.5	25	8.63E-08	0.00

Note: the table is based on the simulations with a 24-hour period of running tanks and the SSI corresponding to 50-year recurrence risks is 0.35.

## B.5. Central

Table B.7 summarizes the scenario earthquakes that contribute to the district risk at a SSI of 0.17 in the risk curve for the Central Water District, corresponding to a 475-year recurrence interval or 10% probability of exceedance in 50 years. The fourth Column in Table B.7 indicates the closest distance from the fault to the Central Water District centroid with geographic coordinates (-118.24667°, 34.07510°), as shown by the blue star in Figure 7.10. The table is sorted in a decreasing order of the contribution. Seventeen scenario earthquakes have contributed to this specific risk level, among which, Cucamonga, Puente Hills blind thrust fault, Newport-Inglewood offshore, Elsinore-Whittier, Santa Susana, and Background Source 560 scenario earthquakes have relatively significant contributions, i.e., > 5%, to the water district risk. Figure B.4a shows the water district risk deaggregation according to M<sub>w</sub> and


Table B.7. Summary of Scenario Contributions to 475-year Recurrence Risks in Central Water District

Scenario ID	Scenario Name	M <sub>w</sub>	Distance (km)	Annual Occurrence Frequency	Contribution (%)
440	Cucamonga	6.9	48	4.12E-04	19.95
397	Puente Hills blind thrust	7.1	4	3.45E-04	16.72
141	Newport-Inglewood offshore	7.1	62	3.41E-04	16.49
12	Elsinore - Whittier	6.8	24	2.40E-04	11.61
198	Santa Susana	6.7	36	2.01E-04	9.73
560	Background Source	7.0	0	1.55E-04	7.50
169	San Gabriel	7.2	27	1.02E-04	4.94
370	Northridge	7.0	26	9.55E-05	4.62
175	Verdugo	6.9	9	6.43E-05	3.11
166	Sierra Madre	7.2	16	4.97E-05	2.40
202	Simi-Santa Rosa	7.0	48	4.23E-05	2.05
388	Upper Elysian Park	6.4	0	8.18E-06	0.40
399	Puente Hills blind thrust	6.6	4	5.47E-06	0.26
372	Northridge	6.5	26	3.16E-06	0.15
398	Puente Hills blind thrust	6.6	20	6.93E-07	0.03
173	Malibu Coast	6.7	27	1.80E-07	0.01
222	Anacapa-Dume	6.5	42	8.63E-08	0.00


Note: the table is based on the simulations with a 24-hour period of running tanks and the SSI corresponding to 475-year recurrence risks is 0.17.

distance. Most water district risk is contributed from the scenario earthquakes with M<sub>w</sub> larger than 6.5.

Table B.8 summarizes the scenario earthquakes that contribute to the district risk at a SSI of 0.38 in the risk curve with a 24-hour period of running tanks, corresponding to a 50-year recurrence interval or 100% probability of exceedance in 50 years. In total 59 scenario earthquakes utilized in this work, 51 scenario earthquakes have contributed to this specific risk level, among which, Cucamonga,



(a) 475-year Recurrence Risks, SSI = 0.17



(b) 50-year Recurrence Risks, SSI = 0.38

Figure B.4. Risk Deaggregations for Central Water District

Table B.8. Summary of Scenario Contributions to 50-year Recurrence Risks in Central Water District

Scenario ID	Scenario Name	M <sub>w</sub>	Distance (km)	Annual Occurrence Frequency	Contribution (%)
440	Cucamonga	6.9	48	2.47E-03	12.36
22	San Andreas Fault - 1857	7.8	52	1.92E-03	9.61
195	San Cayetano	7	61	1.83E-03	9.15
189	Oak Ridge-onshore	7	56	1.38E-03	6.88
167	Sierra Madre	6.7	26	1.17E-03	5.86
12	Elsinore - Whittier	6.8	24	9.60E-04	4.80
397	Puente Hills blind thrust	7.1	4	8.06E-04	4.03
21	San Andreas Fault-All southern segments	8.1	52	8.00E-04	4.00
141	Newport-Inglewood offshore	7.1	62	6.81E-04	3.41
23	San Andreas Fault - Southern 2 segments	7.7	73	6.73E-04	3.37
198	Santa Susana	6.7	36	6.03E-04	3.01
18	San Andreas Fault - Mojave	7.3	52	5.50E-04	2.75
19	San Andreas Fault - Carrizo	7.4	72	4.56E-04	2.28
454	Palos Verdes	6.3	29	4.33E-04	2.17
560	Background Source	7	0	4.13E-04	2.07
169	San Gabriel	7.2	27	4.08E-04	2.04
370	Northridge	7	26	3.82E-04	1.91
559	Background Source	7	7	3.49E-04	1.74
561	Background Source	7	20	3.44E-04	1.72
175	Verdugo	6.9	9	3.22E-04	1.61
562	Background Source	7	8	3.05E-04	1.53
120	Raymond	6.5	6	2.96E-04	1.48
191	Oak Ridge-onshore	6.5	56	2.57E-04	1.29
219	Anacapa-Dume	7.5	42	2.50E-04	1.25
174	Santa Monica	6.6	16	2.09E-04	1.05
202	Simi-Santa Rosa	7	48	1.69E-04	0.85
160	Newport-Inglewood	6.6	40	1.58E-04	0.79
166	Sierra Madre	7.2	16	1.49E-04	0.75
122	Clamshell-Sawpit	6.5	26	1.42E-04	0.71

Note: the table is based on the simulations with a 24-hour period of running tanks and the SSI corresponding to 50-year recurrence risks is 0.38.

Table B.8. (Continued)

Scenario ID	Scenario Name	M <sub>w</sub>	Distance (km)	Annual Occurrence Frequency	Contribution (%)
444	Palos Verdes	7.3	29	1.40E-04	0.70
443	Sierra Madre-San Fernando	6.7	23	1.25E-04	0.63
220	Anacapa-Dume	7	42	1.14E-04	0.57
446	Palos Verdes	6.8	35	1.09E-04	0.55
159	Newport-Inglewood	7.1	13	1.08E-04	0.54
452	Palos Verdes	6.3	32	9.59E-05	0.48
168	Sierra Madre	6.7	16	8.86E-05	0.44
221	Anacapa-Dume	7	75	6.29E-05	0.31
447	Palos Verdes	6.8	29	4.16E-05	0.21
161	Newport-Inglewood	6.6	22	3.72E-05	0.19
399	Puente Hills blind thrust	6.6	4	2.19E-05	0.11
170	San Gabriel	6.7	27	1.99E-05	0.10
371	Northridge	6.5	37	1.92E-05	0.10
388	Upper Elysian Park	6.4	0	1.64E-05	0.08
162	Newport-Inglewood	6.6	13	1.00E-05	0.05
372	Northridge	6.5	26	7.90E-06	0.04
119	Hollywood	6.4	4	3.54E-06	0.02
176	Verdugo	6.4	9	3.15E-06	0.02
398	Puente Hills blind thrust	6.6	20	2.77E-06	0.01
173	Malibu Coast	6.7	27	5.40E-07	0.00
222	Anacapa-Dume	6.5	42	4.31E-07	0.00
177	Verdugo	6.4	13	3.79E-07	0.00

Note: the table is based on the simulations with a 24-hour period of running tanks and the SSI corresponding to 50-year recurrence risks is 0.38.

San Andreas fault-1857, San Cayetano, Oak Ridge-onshore, and Sierra Madre scenario earthquakes have relatively significant contributions, i.e., > 5%, to the district risk. Figure B.4b shows the district risk deaggregation according to M<sub>w</sub> and distance. Most water district risk is contributed from the scenario earthquakes with M<sub>w</sub> ≥ 6.5.

Comparisons between Tables B.7 and B.8 show that the number of scenario earthquakes that have contributions to the water district risk increases significantly as the recurrence interval for the risk decreases from 475 years to 50 years. Although it is not as obvious as that for the West Valley, East Valley, and Western Water Districts, comparisons between Figure B.4a and b show that, as the recurrence interval decreases, or SSI increases, the contributions increase from scenario earthquakes with relatively large distances from originating faults to the water district.

## **B.6. Harbor**

Table B.9 summarizes the scenario earthquakes that contribute to the district risk at a SSI of 0.41 in the risk curve for the Harbor Water District, corresponding to a 475-year recurrence interval or 10% probability of exceedance in 50 years. The fourth Column in Table B.9 indicates the closest distance from the fault to the Harbor Water District centroid with geographic coordinates (-118.28105°, 33.84948°), as shown by the blue star in Figure 7.10. The table is sorted in a decreasing order of the contribution. Fifteen scenario earthquakes have contributed to this specific risk level, among which, San Cayetano, Newport-Inglewood, Palos Verdes, Verdugo, Newport-Inglewood offshore scenario earthquakes have relatively significant contributions, i.e., > 5%, to the water district risk. Figure B.5a shows the water district risk deaggregation according to  $M_w$  and distance. Scenario earthquakes with various distances to the district centroid contribute to the water district risk significantly. This is consistent with the system configuration and water flow pattern of the LADWP water supply system. The Harbor Water District is positioned in the southern end of the system and water has to travel from the north to the south, going through the whole system, before it arrives at the Harbor Water District. Disruption occurred during the conveyance,




Table B.9. Summary of Scenario Contributions to 475-year Recurrence Risks in Harbor Water District

Scenario ID	Scenario Name	M <sub>w</sub>	Distance (km)	Annual Occurrence Frequency	Contribution (%)
195	San Cayetano	7.0	79	4.58E-04	21.93
159	Newport-Inglewood	7.1	4	3.24E-04	15.52
444	Palos Verdes	7.3	7	2.80E-04	13.44
175	Verdugo	6.9	34	1.93E-04	9.25
141	Newport-Inglewood offshore	7.1	44	1.70E-04	8.17
446	Palos Verdes	6.8	9	1.09E-04	5.24
169	San Gabriel	7.2	52	1.02E-04	4.89
452	Palos Verdes	6.3	7	9.59E-05	4.60
370	Northridge	7.0	49	9.55E-05	4.58
397	Puente Hills blind thrust	7.1	17	5.75E-05	2.76
562	Background Source	7.0	19	5.09E-05	2.44
447	Palos Verdes	6.8	7	4.16E-05	1.99
220	Anacapa-Dume	7.0	40	3.80E-05	1.82
162	Newport-Inglewood	6.6	4	1.00E-05	0.48
399	Puente Hills blind thrust	6.6	17	5.47E-06	0.26
398	Puente Hills blind thrust	6.6	20	6.93E-07	0.03


Note: the table is based on the simulations with a 24-hour period of running tanks and the SSI corresponding to 475-year recurrence risks is 0.41.

which may result from the faults located close to the northern portion of the system but distant from the Harbor district, has significant impacts on the performance of the Harbor Water District.

Table B.10 summarizes the scenario earthquakes that contribute to the district risk at a SSI of 0.53 in the risk curve with a 24-hour period of running tanks, corresponding to a 50-year recurrence interval or 100% probability of exceedance in 50 years. In total 59 scenario earthquakes utilized in this work, 51 scenario earthquakes have contributed to this specific risk level, among which, San Andreas-



(a) 475-year Recurrence Risks, SSI = 0.41



(b) 50-year Recurrence Risks, SSI = 0.53

Figure B.5. Risk Deaggregations for Harbor Water District

Table B.10. Summary of Scenario Contributions to 50-year Recurrence Risks in Harbor Water District

Scenario ID	Scenario Name	M <sub>w</sub>	Distance (km)	Annual Occurrence Frequency	Contribution (%)
22	San Andreas Fault - 1857	7.8	76	4.49E-03	22.43
21	San Andreas Fault-All southern segments	8.1	76	1.20E-03	6.00
444	Palos Verdes	7.3	7	9.81E-04	4.91
167	Sierra Madre	6.7	44	8.80E-04	4.40
159	Newport-Inglewood	7.1	4	8.10E-04	4.05
397	Puente Hills blind thrust	7.1	17	8.06E-04	4.03
141	Newport-Inglewood offshore	7.1	44	6.81E-04	3.41
23	San Andreas Fault - Southern 2 segments	7.7	87	6.73E-04	3.37
562	Background Source	7	19	6.10E-04	3.05
370	Northridge	7	49	5.73E-04	2.87
453	Palos Verdes	6.3	8	5.53E-04	2.77
560	Background Source	7	25	5.16E-04	2.58
175	Verdugo	6.9	34	5.15E-04	2.57
446	Palos Verdes	6.8	9	4.92E-04	2.46
559	Background Source	7	32	4.88E-04	2.44
12	Elsinore - Whittier	6.8	28	4.80E-04	2.40
195	San Cayetano	7	79	4.58E-04	2.29
219	Anacapa-Dume	7.5	40	4.37E-04	2.18
160	Newport-Inglewood	6.6	22	3.16E-04	1.58
19	San Andreas Fault - Carrizo	7.4	96	3.04E-04	1.52
166	Sierra Madre	7.2	41	2.98E-04	1.49
454	Palos Verdes	6.3	17	2.89E-04	1.44
189	Oak Ridge-onshore	7	73	2.75E-04	1.38
161	Newport-Inglewood	6.6	4	2.23E-04	1.12
451	Palos Verdes	6.3	16	2.18E-04	1.09
169	San Gabriel	7.2	52	2.04E-04	1.02
198	Santa Susana	6.7	55	2.01E-04	1.00
120	Raymond	6.5	31	1.98E-04	0.99
452	Palos Verdes	6.3	7	1.92E-04	0.96
174	Santa Monica	6.6	26	1.74E-04	0.87
561	Background Source	7	42	1.72E-04	0.86

Note: the table is based on the simulations with a 24-hour period of running tanks and the SSI corresponding to 50-year recurrence risks is 0.53.

Table B.10. (Continued)

<b>Scenario ID</b>	<b>Scenario Name</b>	<b>M<sub>w</sub></b>	<b>Distance (km)</b>	<b>Annual Occurrence Frequency</b>	<b>Contribution (%)</b>
202	Simi-Santa Rosa	7	63	1.69E-04	0.85
447	Palos Verdes	6.8	7	1.66E-04	0.83
122	Clamshell-Sawpit	6.5	45	1.42E-04	0.71
443	Sierra Madre-San Fernando	6.7	47	1.25E-04	0.63
378	Channel Island Thrust	7.5	92	1.02E-04	0.51
162	Newport-Inglewood	6.6	4	1.00E-04	0.50
171	San Gabriel	6.7	64	8.47E-05	0.42
220	Anacapa-Dume	7	40	7.60E-05	0.38
221	Anacapa-Dume	7	73	6.29E-05	0.31
399	Puente Hills blind thrust	6.6	17	6.02E-05	0.30
168	Sierra Madre	6.7	41	4.43E-05	0.22
388	Upper Elysian Park	6.4	24	2.04E-05	0.10
170	San Gabriel	6.7	52	1.33E-05	0.07
372	Northridge	6.5	49	6.32E-06	0.03
398	Puente Hills blind thrust	6.6	20	2.08E-06	0.01
119	Hollywood	6.4	29	1.77E-06	0.01
176	Verdugo	6.4	34	1.05E-06	0.01
173	Malibu Coast	6.7	31	7.20E-07	0.00
177	Verdugo	6.4	37	5.68E-07	0.00
222	Anacapa-Dume	6.5	40	1.73E-07	0.00

Note: the table is based on the simulations with a 24-hour period of running tanks and the SSI corresponding to 50-year recurrence risks is 0.53.

1857 and San Andreas-All Southern Segments scenario earthquakes have relatively significant contributions, i.e., > 5%, to the system risk. Figure B.5b shows the district risk deaggregation according to M<sub>w</sub> and distance. Significant contributions from scenario earthquakes with relative large distances from originating faults to the water district centroid are observed, particularly those associated with the San Andreas fault, which are about 76 km from the centroid.

Comparisons between Tables B.9 and B.10 show that the number of scenario earthquakes that have contributions to the water district risk increases significantly as the recurrence interval for the risk decreases from 475 years to 50 years. Although it is not as obvious as that for the West Valley, East Valley, and Western Water Districts, comparisons between Figure B.5a and b show that, as the recurrence interval decreases, or SSI increases, the contributions increase from scenario earthquakes with relatively large distances from originating faults to the water district.



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Red Jacket Quadrangle ■ Buffalo, New York 14261  
Phone: (716) 645-3391 ■ Fax: (716) 645-3399  
E-mail: [mceer@buffalo.edu](mailto:mceer@buffalo.edu) ■ WWW Site <http://mceer.buffalo.edu>



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